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This case study examined the United States’ experience from April 1999 through 
January 2007 in development of its trade policy regarding inclusion of higher education 
in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). It examined how the key actors sought to influence the manner in which 
technical ambiguities, ideological differences and other points of contest were resolved. 
This study also examined how the actors’ ability to influence these issues was 
conditioned by features of the decision making arenas and the broader sociocultural 
context. It utilized a combined political systems/power-influence model developed by 
Mazzoni (1991) to categorize the variables and to account for the findings. Data sources 
included publicly available information and interviews with individuals familiar with the 
case (e.g., WTO officials, U.S. trade representatives, and nongovernmental organization 
officials). The study also outlined possibilities for future research in this ongoing policy 
making process. 
Findings underscored the importance of the domestic arena even with regard to 
agreements at the supranational level The study identified four key players in the process, 
all of which were U.S.-based organizations. The WTO, although responsible for setting 
the overall rules of the game, was a hidden or background player in this issue. In 
addition, agricultural interests were important hidden players; their actions were not 
designed to influence U.S. higher education trade policy but, nevertheless, their ability to 
halt trade talks twice put the policy in jeopardy. 
The study also found that players’ motivations and actions were tied closely to their 
stated organizational missions and affected when the players became involved in trying to 
influence the development of higher education trade policy. Professional expertise and 
direct channels to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representatives were important resources, 
facilitating access to the actor with the authority for developing U.S. higher education 
trade policy. Moreover, the study’s findings underscored the subtle manner in which 
some issues are resolved: The use of voice through printed materials and face-to-face 
meetings, exercised in a collaborative rather than a confrontational manner, was an 
effective influence strategy for the players who were skeptical of GATS’ inclusion of 
higher education.  
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The purpose of the proposed study is to examine, from a political systems/power-
influence perspective, the United States’ experience from April 1999 through January 
2007 in development of trade policy regarding inclusion of higher education in the World 
Trade Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
Introduced in 1995, GATS is designed to eliminate barriers to and promote trade in 
services worldwide. A services classification system generally used by WTO members to 
structure their GATS commitments (an agreement-specific term that will be discussed 
later in this chapter) contains 12 sectors of services, which in turn contain about 160 
subsectors in total (World Trade Organization, 2005b). Higher education is one of the 
subsectors of services included in the classification scheme and in the education sector. 
Very little specific language exists in the GATS framework (the general principles 
and rules) delineating what aspects of higher education must be liberalized for trade 
purposes. The principles and rules include certain critical terms, known as unconditional 
obligations, to which all members must adhere, but they do not provide much 
information beyond basic definitions for each term. The rules document also includes 
sections that could be interpreted many different ways depending on the parties making 
the interpretation as well as on the circumstances that exist at the time of that 
interpretation (Knight, 2003). In short, the document is technically ambiguous. In the 
context of this ambiguity, each of the WTO members is charged with developing its own 
set of conditions regarding trade in higher education as well as in all other subsectors.  
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The worldwide higher education community, broadly defined, has not been of one 
mind over what aspects of higher education should be included in the trade schedules that 
result from the U.S. efforts in the negotiations. Indeed, many stakeholders do not believe 
that higher education should be included at all, that it is a public good and not a 
commodity to be traded. Other stakeholders, however, view the situation differently. 
They maintain that trade in higher education already exists and, as such, the reality of this 
trade and the need to ensure that no trade barriers exist should be addressed via global 
agreement. The basic disagreement over whether higher education should be treated as a 
tradable commodity at all is compounded by concerns over the GATS framework’s 
ambiguity and by questions over the definition of certain key terms and the ultimate 
implementation of the agreement. What might the effect of GATS be in practice on other 
core values such as academic freedom and institutional autonomy? These differing 
opinions and concerns highlight the clash between long-held core values and current 
realities. Thus is the stage set for conflict between proponents and skeptics of higher 
education’s inclusion in GATS. This study will examine how this conflict has thus far 
been manifested and resolved in the context of the U.S. development of policy. As the 
study will reveal, scenes of mass demonstrations and loud protests were not a feature of 
this global trade clash. Rather, attempts to influence policy were handled through calmer, 
although not necessarily less contentious, means. 
An Overview of the WTO and GATS 
In order to provide a context for the information that will be presented in this study, 
this section will present an overview of the World Trade Organization and the trade 
agreement that is the focus of this research. It includes information on the important 
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terms that are critical to the development and ongoing administration of the agreement as 
well as an overview of some of the issues that have been raised with regard to trade in 
services in general and higher education in particular. These issues as they present 
themselves in the context of the U.S. experience with development of its higher education 
trade policy will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 4. 
The World Trade Organization 
Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the 
successor organization to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Established on 
January 1, 1995, the WTO governs three agreements: the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In addition to administering 
these agreements, the WTO serves as a forum for trade negotiations, handles trade 
disputes, monitors national trade policies, provides technical assistance and training to 
developing countries, and cooperates with other international organizations. 
The WTO’s governing body is known as the Ministerial Conference, a group 
comprised of all 150 member states (World Trade Organization, 2006). This body meets 
roughly once every two years in various locations worldwide; its stated approach to 
decision making is by consensus as opposed to by vote. The ministry for United States 
trade matters is the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The USTR 
is part of the Executive Office of the President, and the U.S. Trade Representative is a 
cabinet member who serves as the President’s principal trade advisor, negotiator and 
spokesperson on trade issues (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2006a). 
A permanent staff in Geneva (or mission), led by the U.S. Ambassador to the WTO (the 
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Trade Representative’s deputy in charge of WTO matters), represents U.S. interests in the 
WTO. 
In between the ministerial meetings, the WTO’s day-to-day business is conducted by 
the General Council, composed of representatives of all the WTO member nations. It is 
chaired by an individual selected from among all of the trade missions in Geneva; the 
chair normally alternates between developed and developing nations. The General 
Council serves in two other capacities: as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and as the 
WTO Trade Policy Review Body. Each of these groups has its own chair as well as its 
own purpose and functions (Jawara & Kwa, 2004). 
Assisting the General Council in its work are the approximately 600 staff members of 
the WTO Secretariat (World Trade Organization, 2006). It provides administrative and 
technical support for WTO delegate bodies in negotiations and implementation of 
agreements, technical support for developing countries, analysis of trade performance and 
trade policy, information about the WTO to the general public, and legal assistance in the 
resolution of trade disputes involving the interpretation of trade rules and precedents. The 
Secretariat has not been granted any decision making authority with regard to the trade 
agreements and issues, although in its day-to-day work in providing consultation, 
technical assistance, information and analysis, and legal assistance, the Secretariat can 
indirectly influence any decision making on trade matters.  
The WTO has the authority to impose sanctions on its members for violations of its 
trade agreements. This authority gives the WTO a great deal of power over the actions of 
its members, a power that does not exist in many other intergovernmental organizations. 
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General Agreement on Trade in Services 
As mentioned previously in this chapter, the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) is the first multilateral, legally enforceable agreement covering trade and 
investment in services as opposed to goods. It covers about 160 subcategories of services, 
based upon the United Nations Provisional Central Product Classification.  
GATS consists of three parts: a framework, which contains the agreement’s general 
principles and rules; the national schedules, which list each member country’s specific 
commitments (i.e., the areas to which a country has agreed to provide access and to what 
extent); and annexes, which detail limitations for each trade sector. Negotiations on the 
agreement are conducted in rounds, under the principle of progressive liberalization, i.e., 
the understanding that with each successive round of negotiations, further liberalization 
of trade in service will occur. Ideally, countries will gradually increase the number and 
level of commitments in service areas and negotiate further removal to limitations to 
trade. The eventual goal is the complete removal of barriers to trade in service areas. 
In order to fully understand GATS, one should understand some terms critical to the 
agreement’s aims and functions:  
Under the most favored nation (MFN) principle, imports from all countries will be 
treated in the same manner; services from one country will not be given preference over 
those from another. MFN is considered to be an unconditional obligation; in other words, 
this treatment holds whether or not a member has made a specific commitment in a 
particular sector.  
Market access pertains to the extent a member will permit another member the right 
to enter its market. According to the GATS, “each member shall accord services and 
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service suppliers of any other member treatment no less favourable [sic] than that 
provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its 
Schedule” (World Trade Organization, 2005b, p. 71). It is a conditional obligation, i.e., 
one to which terms and qualifications may be attached. 
National treatment holds that services of foreign origin will be treated the same as 
those provided by domestic suppliers, as long as a country has made a commitment in 
that particular sector. Like market access, it is a conditional obligation.  
Services provided by the government are exempt from inclusion in GATS; this 
feature is known as exercise of government authority. GATS Article I:3c specifies that, in 
order to be considered as governmental, a service is provided on a “non-commercial 
basis” and is “not in competition with one or more service suppliers” (World Trade 
Organization, 2005b, p. 60). Despite the definitions provided in the agreement, the 
government authority principle remains contested and controversial because of ongoing 
disagreements and confusion over the meaning of the terms non-commercial and not in 
competition, as well as what they might mean when implemented. The confusion over 
government authority is especially pertinent to higher education because of the public 
nature of education, the existence in many countries (certainly in the U.S.) of private-
sector higher education, and, in the U.S., a blending of public and private higher 
education providers, the majority of which receive public funding in some form from 
either the federal or state governments. 
According to GATS, trade in services occurs through four channels, or modes of 
delivery. Mode 1, cross-border supply, deals with services that cross international borders 
to reach consumers (e.g., distance education programs offered by U.S. providers to 
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students located in different countries). Mode 2, consumption abroad, concerns the 
movement of consumers to the country of the supplier (e.g., a student from Asia coming 
to the U.S. to study at a U.S.-based institution). Mode 3, commercial presence, occurs 
when a service provider maintains physical commercial facilities in another country (e.g., 
a U.S.-based university with a branch campus in Switzerland). Finally, Mode 4, presence 
of natural persons, deals with the temporary movement of individuals to supply service 
(e.g., a visiting professor from the U.S. teaching in a university in Germany). 
How are negotiations conducted? As stated previously, negotiations occur in rounds, 
with each round being more progressive than those before it. At the time this study was 
conducted, the WTO was working under what is known as the Doha Development 
Agenda round, which began following the Doha, Qatar ministerial meeting of 2001. In 
contrast to the negotiations for trade in goods, in which trade talks are conducted 
multilaterally (i.e., across all countries) and trade is liberalized across the board, GATS 
negotiations take place on a bilateral (country-to-country) basis. In this “bottom-up” 
approach, each country decides which sectors it will agree to cover under GATS rules 
(keeping in mind that the aim is that of progressive liberalization). In the request phase, 
any WTO member can approach any other member with a request for that member to 
open up a particular sector or sectors as well as modes of supply within the sector(s). 
Countries also can make offers to open their markets. This stage is known as the offer 
phase. Once a member has made an offer to another member to open its markets, under 
the most favored nation rule, that offer must be extended to all other members. In 
addition, a request made by a member in one sector does not need to be met by an offer 
by the other member in the same sector; indeed, it may be met by a request to open up 
8
markets in another sector. For example, if Member A makes a request in the 
telecommunications sector, Member B may counter by requesting that Member A open 
up its markets in the education sector. In this manner, sector access may be offered as a 
“trade-off” for access in another sector, and this possibility is a matter of concern for 
some higher education stakeholders (Knight, 2006). 
Members are not obliged to respond to either requests or offers. However, if a 
request/offer has been made and accepted or an alternative has been negotiated, it is 
known as a commitment. Two types of commitments exist. The first, known as a 
horizontal commitment, covers commitments made across the board for all sectors. The 
second, a sector-specific commitment, includes those covering individual sectors or 
subsectors. Those commitments are listed in annexes known as schedules, one for each 
WTO member. Schedules list that particular member’s commitments and limitations for 
each mode of service. Table 1 presents the general design of the GATS schedules for 
individual member commitments. 
Commitments are not considered to be absolutely final until the completion of the 
round, through the agreement of all members over all parts of the items negotiated. In 
other words, “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” (World Trade Organization, 
2005a, p. 96) and thus until the round is considered completed. Up to that point, any 
commitments that have been reached are, in theory, subject to renegotiation should
Table 1
Design of GATS Schedules
Modes of supply: 1) Cross-border supply 2) Consumption abroad 3) Commercial presence 4) Presence of natural persons
I. HORIZONTAL COMMITMENTS [apply to all sectors and sub-sectors]























Source: Sauvè (2002); Office of the United States Trade Representative (2005)
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needs dictate (for instance, as a concession made for gains in other areas). Once the 
particular negotiating round is completed, however, the commitment cannot be altered. It 
is these commitments that are listed in the GATS section of national schedules.  
In summary, GATS covers some 160 subsectors of services; each subsector can be 
supplied through four different modes. Moreover, 150 countries are engaged in bilateral 
talks over these subsectors and modes of supply. From the outset, then, the development 
of agreement specifics can be complicated and lengthy. The “nuts and bolts” negotiations 
of sectors and modes can create difficulties for the WTO and its member states. In 
addition, the concerns of the many individuals and groups with perceived and actual 
stakes in the outcomes of these negotiations, but with no role in the process except as 
interested bystanders, can lead to a slowdown or outright suspension in trade talks. The 
higher education community, in various incarnations, is among those parties. Among the 
concerns of various higher education stakeholder groups worldwide are (1) governments’ 
ability to set their own goals for their higher education systems will be compromised and 
public funding of higher education will be viewed as an unfair subsidy, (2) questions 
regarding the manner in which foreign providers will be regulated and licensed and in 
which other forms of quality assurance (such as accreditation) will be provided remain 
unsettled, (3) governmental regulations covering areas such as licensure and quality 
assurance may be seen as too harsh and thus subject to WTO dispute proceedings, and (4) 
student access and student and professional mobility will not be adequately handled. 
Another concern goes to the heart of the academic enterprise and its values: the market-
oriented nature of the GATS. The agreement challenges the traditional notion of 
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education as a public good and views it in purely economic terms. From this perspective, 
higher education becomes a commodity.  
Publicly available booklets and brochures published by the WTO and other 
proponents attempt to assuage the fears of the stakeholders that have expressed concerns. 
But have the printed materials’ attempts to reassure been successful? The issues are 
many, and they are complex, touching at times upon deeply held values that are not easily 
eroded. Moreover, too much remains to be done in developing the GATS specifics, and 
no one is sure what really will happen when the agreement is fully implemented.  
With so many issues unresolved or unknown, the need for further scholarship on 
GATS and its policy implications is clear. Knight (2002) stated the need for educators to 
undertake further study of GATS for numerous reasons, including (1) understanding the 
perceived rationale and benefits of liberalization to gain a clearer picture of what 
countries expect from increased import and export in education, (2) understanding better 
the anticipated outcomes to assist in the development of policies to help achieve or 
prevent them, (3) identifying the diverse perspectives on the areas to which countries 
have opened up their markets in light of different national policy objectives and, 
therefore, different goals and expectations from trade in education services, and (4) 
examining trade liberalization from the perspective of who does or does not benefit and at 
what cost. She also addressed the need for ongoing discussions and development of 
frameworks in related areas of higher education, such as quality assurance: “It is 
imperative that education specialists discuss and determine the appropriate regulating 
mechanisms at the national and international level and not leave these questions to the 
designers and arbitrators of trade agreements” (Knight, 2002, p. 18). 
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Knight’s (2002) statements on further study of GATS and its implications speak to an 
examination of players, goals, motivations, and winners and losers. The lack of 
specificity over GATS’ rules of conduct speaks to determination of process parameters: 
in other words, choices must be made concerning the “what’s” and the “how’s” of GATS. 
In the absence of specifics, the “what’s” and “how’s” might be fought out through the 
negotiations process as each WTO member, including the United States, requests access 
to other markets and makes offers as to how far it will open its own. How will the 
“what’s” and “how’s” be determined? What stakeholders will ultimately prevail in 
making those choices? What will those choices be? In what arenas will those choices be 
made? And how will the victors accomplish their aims?  
As stated previously in this chapter, numerous higher education stakeholders with 
differing values have expressed varying viewpoints on GATS itself as well as on the 
specific GATS proposals and on the process. Whenever choice needs to be made in 
allocating values, and when those participating (in whatever fashion) are of different 
minds as to what choices should be made, the potential exists for a political resolution, 
rather than one that is made on “professional” grounds. Thus, the elements described 
previously can be examined through political analysis. This study, then, will attempt to 
identify through political frames the participants, their goals and motivations, and their 
resources and strategies for pursuing those goals. It will also examine in what settings 
and arenas those choices are made. 
Because some higher education scholars believe that the application of political 
science theories to the study of higher education in general is sporadic and is lacking 
compared to that conducted on elementary and secondary education (McLendon, 2003a), 
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this study also will explore the utility of studying higher education through a political 
lens. In essence, it will take political science and organizational theories and apply them 
in ways that have, heretofore, been somewhat neglected. In arriving at some conclusions 
regarding major actors, their influence relationships, contextual forces that may shape 
influence attempts, and impact of these factors on policy formulation, the study also 
seeks to examine the extent to which political models help us to understand policy 
making processes in higher education. 
Significance of the Study 
This study extends knowledge of the policy making process in higher education in the 
following ways. 
First, as discussed previously in this chapter, GATS, with all its substantive and 
technical issues, may have major implications for the higher education community, not 
just in the U.S. but worldwide. Who was involved with the introduction and guidance of 
the proposed policy as it made its way through the decision making pipeline? What was 
at stake for the nations or, indeed, for the individuals affected or involved? How and with 
what resources did proponents attempt to influence others involved in the process? And, 
finally, who prevailed? The issues and problems identified in the examination are 
important to fostering a more complete understanding of the complex process of GATS 
negotiations, one that is important in an increasingly globalized higher education arena.  
Second, the study is illuminating from a methodological perspective. It offers a new 
angle on the study of higher education policy making at a macro level, not only from a 
national perspective but from a supranational perspective. It expands the empirical study 
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of higher education into new domains and begins to address the need for new 
examinations of international higher education. 
From these aims, then, came the research questions that guided the design and 
conduct of the study. To that end, this study examined the substance of a particular policy 
making process and was guided by the following primary research questions:  
1. Who were the major actors in the policy making process related to the substantial 
and technical aspects of the U.S. higher education trade negotiations in the context of 
GATS?  
2. How did the actors attempt to influence the policy making process?  
3. What was the outcome of the influence attempts, and what factors accounted for 
the outcome?  
These questions, which followed logically from the framework that provided the 
study structure, will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3. The corollary question deals 
with the utility of applying the concepts and frameworks that are normally associated 
with political science to the study of higher education policy making: To what extent do 
political models help us to understand policy making processes with regard to emerging 
issues in higher education at the supranational level? 
Literature Base and Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework is that of a political systems/power-influence perspective, 
in particular one elaborated by Campbell and Mazzoni (1976) and further developed and 
articulated by Mazzoni (1991a). It assumes the existence of certain conditions that 
politicize policy making: conflict over the goals to be sought or the means by which those 
goals will be achieved, interdependence among actors, need for choice in the allocation 
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of resources or values, view of perceived stakes as important, and use of and dispersal of 
power among participants (Fischer, 1990; Mazzoni, 1991a; Pfeffer, 1981).   
In developing and refining this framework, Campbell and Mazzoni drew upon the 
previous work of scholars such as Easton (as incorporated by Wirt & Kirst [1972]) and 
Allison (1971). In further conceptualization, Mazzoni cited the work of Bacharach and 
Lawler (1981), Baldridge (1971), Cohen and March (1974), Dahl (1984), Gamson 
(1968), Kingdon (1995), Lukes (1977), Morgan (1986) and Pfeffer (1981), as well as 
other political and organizational theorists. The framework is thus firmly grounded in 
theory. It combines two perspectives on decision making processes. The first, the 
political systems component, relates to the mechanism that has been authorized to decide 
conflicts over the allocation of scarce resources. The second, the power-influence 
component, focuses on the micro, internal decision processes that are not captured by a 
study of the system by itself. The combined approach has been utilized successfully in 
prior research on a variety of education policy making processes (see, for example, 
DeGive, 1995; DeGive and Olswang, 1999; Geary, 1992). 
Research Design and Methods 
The investigation examined seven different variables as identified in Mazzoni’s 
framework and used a case study approach as its methodology, with its boundary the 
experience of the United States and its ongoing efforts to develop and present its 
positions to the WTO Council for Trade in Services. Five phases, which will be identified 
in chapter 3, served as separate decision events, under each of which the variables were 
examined.  
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Data sources included official documents, interviews with individuals familiar with 
the case (WTO officials, U.S. government representatives, and nongovernmental 
organization officials as well as other individuals or groups that were made known to the 
researcher during data collection), archival records (including letters, reports, official 
proceedings, and other materials available to the researcher), and other documents 
(including WTO and other organizational publications, press releases, newspaper and 
journal articles, and other existing studies) that contain accounts of the U.S. efforts to 
develop GATS in both substance and practice. 
Potential interviewees for initial interviews were compiled by the researcher from 
names of organizations or from names of individuals appearing in articles, reports, 
proceedings, and other written material, as well as from referrals from informed sources. 
The sample of informants for additional interviews relied heavily on referral or snowball 
techniques in which the pool of potential informants expanded through the referrals of 
those who had already been interviewed. Formal interviews were conducted according to 
an interview protocol developed for use in the interviews. Data analysis occurred in 
tandem with collection to enable the researcher to develop follow up questions as 
necessary. 
Efforts to control for potential bias and error were made through the following 
methods: member checks, in which all interviewees were given an opportunity to review 
transcripts and to add to or correct the contents; notification to interviewees of researcher 
intent to maintain anonymity of participants and to safeguard information; triangulation 
of data among multiple data sources; corroboration among interviewees; and collegial 




Review of the Literature 
 
This research is an exploratory study of the policy making processes that resulted in 
the development of the United States’ proposals in higher education as part of the WTO’s 
General Agreement on Trade in Services. It is grounded in the assumption that policy 
making results from a process in which individuals and groups attempt, through the use 
of power, to obtain preferred outcomes in situations where resource scarcity exists or 
where differences exist in values and how they should be allocated. To that end, the study 
relied on the body of work related to political systems and power and influence and the 
application of that work to organizations and to the study of higher education. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first deals with a review of the 
theoretical literature on political perspectives, beginning with a discussion of the term 
politics and its application to the study of organizations. Using Lasswell’s (1936) classic 
definition of politics, section one outlines elements of political frameworks as might be 
seen according to Lasswell’s definition and discusses the theoretical literature within that 
context. The section continues with an analysis of strengths and weaknesses of political 
models and concludes with a discussion of the relevance of theoretical scholarship to the 
proposed study.  
The second section contains a review of empirical research that has been conducted in 
the area of higher education through the use of political models. The body of research on 
GATS and higher education is clearly growing, as scholars turn increasing attention to 
the topic. However, because GATS has only been in existence for about a decade and 
discussions on higher education in the GATS context have only been conducted for about 
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half that time, and perhaps because higher education stakeholders are still struggling to 
understand GATS and higher education’s place within that treaty, scholarship in this area 
appears to consist primarily of description, analysis, and opinion. In order to tie this study 
into the larger body of scholarly work on higher education policy and political lenses, 
therefore, section two presents a survey of the empirical literature related to higher 
education and political study. While not exhaustive, it presents a cross-section of the 
arenas in which this research has been conducted and the relation of this work to the 
current study. 
The third section presents the conceptual framework, one developed and articulated 
by Mazzoni (1991a), that guided the conduct and analysis of the research. It describes the 
structure of this combined political systems/power-influence model (built primarily upon 
the groundbreaking work of Easton [1965] and Allison [1971] and incorporated by Wirt 
and Kirst [1972] and Campbell and Mazzoni [1976]). This comprehensive, open-ended 
framework draws upon previous study by political and organizational theorists and is 
firmly grounded in theory. It is particularly well suited for use in relatively unexplored 
research areas. By generating thick descriptions of the decision making processes, the 
framework can be used to unlock the influence dynamics occurring in such processes and 
ultimately can generate new hypotheses regarding critical influence relationships. The 
chapter concludes with a short summary of the relevant research and the conceptual 
framework and the implications for this study. 
Studying Organizations through a Political Perspective: 
A Review of the Theoretical Literature 
A rich body of literature seeks to capture the mechanics of political processes in 
organizations, whether one is interested in examining the macro level which deals with 
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political decision making models in their entirety or the micro level which focuses on the 
pieces of the models. This section discusses the examination of organizations from a 
political perspective, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of political frameworks. 
Before beginning to discuss the models themselves, however, one must be acquainted 
with alternative definitions of political processes: definitions that help dispel the typical 
negative connotations associated with the term politics and instead offer other ways of 
envisioning how such processes manifest themselves. 
Prologue: Politics and Its Application to the Study of Organizations 
The term politics in common usage often connotes a sense of partisanship, of 
wheeling and dealing, of “dirty” or dishonest actions behind the closed doors of a 
Congressional office: politics in a pejorative sense. Whether accurate or not, politics as 
an underhanded process is the singular definition many observers assign to the term. 
Hardy (1987) described some of the beliefs surrounding politics and political 
perspectives in organizations:  
Organization behaviorists have tended to explain behavior in ways other than 
political…one explanation is the negative connotations associated with these terms 
(see, for example, McClelland 1974). The application of “power” and “politics” seems 
slightly unethical (Pfeffer 1981). They are often felt to be used to further individual 
goals at the expense of the organization. A hint of corruption and malpractice is 
associated with the use of political strategies and, as a result, they are not deemed 
appropriate methods with which to manage and change organizations. (p. 96)  
Scholars of politics, however, view politics as a phenomenon as opposed to a 
“pathology” (Hardy, 1987, p. 97) and recognize the existence of multiple definitions. The 
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more inclusive definitions move beyond the concept of politics as partisan figures, 
“smoke and mirrors,” and governmental institutions and broaden that concept to include 
other dimensions (Mazzoni, 1991a). One of the most frequently cited definitions is 
Lasswell’s (1936) description of politics and political life as the study of “who gets what, 
when, [and] how.” Easton’s (1965, p. 56) definition of politics as the “authoritative 
allocation of values” also departed from popular negative perceptions of politics to a 
more neutral definition. 
Lasswell (1936), and especially Easton (1965), applied their broad definitions in 
conventional form to the study of the inner workings of systems developed to go about 
the business of governing a locality, state or country. Over the years, however, theorists 
concerned with organizational development and the study of organizational decision 
making processes have realized the applicability of Lasswell’s and Easton’s definitions to 
the processes inherent in making policy in nongovernmental organizations. The result has 
been the refinement of the definition of politics as it applies to organizations in general. 
For instance, Pfeffer (1981, p. 7) defined organizational politics as the activity 
undertaken by individuals and groups “within organizations to acquire, develop, and use 
power and other resources to obtain one’s preferred outcomes in a situation in which 
there is uncertainty or dissensus about choice.” Bolman and Deal (1997) described 
organizational politics in similar fashion: as the allocation of scarce resources by actors 
with enduring differences. 
Numerous scholars (e.g., Fischer, 1990; Hardy, 1987; Malen & Knapp, 1997) have 
noted the applicability of political behavior perspectives to the study of organizations in 
general. That recognition has led to the adaptation of political models to the study of 
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organizational behavior and to the development of organizational decision making 
models. These models incorporate the perspectives of political science and enable 
scholars to view organizations in much the same fashion that political scientists view 
governments: as formal systems that authoritatively allocate values that are generally 
accepted as legitimate (Easton, cited in Wirt & Kirst, 1972).  
Whether developed by political scientists or by organizational theorists, the 
approaches to the study of organizations as political entities are numerous. Frequently, 
these approaches (with slight variations) are grouped into two categories: (1) those 
dealing with the system as the unit of analysis and (2) those dealing with participants as 
the unit of analysis. Campbell and Mazzoni (1976) classified these approaches as either 
political systems, in which policy making is an “interactive process through which inputs 
(including demands for change) are converted into outputs (including authoritative 
decisions)” (p. 5), or allocative theory, in which “influence is the dynamic in the pattern 
of actor relationships by which functions are performed, conflicts are overcome, and 
decisions are reached” (p. 8). Kanter (1972, p. 78) used different terms for classification 
but followed a similar system/participant delineation: The systemic approach “considers 
the system as a whole, the relation of system parts to one another, and how the overall 
system maintains itself or disintegrates over time and regulates conflict,” and the 
behavioral approach “considers the interaction and exchanges among political actors as 
they struggle for power and influence. It deals with the intended effects of actors on the 
decisions of other actors.”  
Geary (1992), in discussing political decision making models in her study of the fiscal 
policy making process in Utah, followed a similar approach to those outlined previously 
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but noted the existence of formal and informal groupings. She classified frameworks as 
either institution-authority models, which take as their emphasis the formal structures and 
processes of governmental units and the legitimate activities of formal actors in those 
units, or actor-influence models, which focus on groups outside the formal structure and 
the ways they exert influence. 
Elements of Political Frameworks 
What are the basic elements of political frameworks? Lasswell’s (1936) basic 
definition provides a general clue to the components of political models. In addition, 
other scholars, in developing their various definitions, have built upon Lasswell’s basic 
elements while illuminating other aspects of organizational politics. All together, these 
scholars have provided evidence of the explicit and implicit elements of a political 
decision making model. Still other scholars specifically described the elements of 
political models. In his seminal work Essence of Decision, Allison (1971, p. 175) noted 
that political models view organizations as pluralistic and comprised of individual players 
and that action results from “games among players who perceive quite different faces of 
an issue and who differ markedly in the actions they prefer.” Morgan (1986), moreover, 
noted that organizational politics can be analyzed in a systematic way by focusing on 
relations between interests, conflicts, and power.  
From definitions of organizational politics and a review of political decision making 
models, key elements of the political approach to the study of decision making emerge. 
They include the following descriptive categories: actors, interests and goals, resources,
motivations, strategies, settings, and interactions. In the following discussion, the 
categories will be presented under the rubric of Lasswell’s definition of politics and also 
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will serve as a structure for reviewing theoretical literature related to the study of 
organizations through a political perspective. The categories will appear again in this 
chapter in the discussion of the framework used specifically for the phenomenon that was 
examined in this study.   
The elements of political decision making frameworks incorporate two concepts that 
are integral to the understanding and the use of these models. According to Pfeffer 
(1981), it is the combination of conflict and decentralized power that leads to political 
activity. Because the work of Pfeffer and other scholars illuminates just how important 
conflict and power (and power’s corollary, influence) are to political decision making 
models, these two concepts will be included as separate sections in the following 
discussion. 
Lasswell’s “Who:” Actors  
The definitions of politics described previously underscore the importance of actors 
or players in organizational decision making. As such, an organization is seen not as a 
monolith but as a collection of parts, with views and interests that may or may not be 
consistent with that of the organization as a whole. Various terms have been used to 
classify players according to the roles they perform in the political process. 
Allison (1971) defined players as “men [sic] in jobs” (p. 164) and placed them into 
four categories according to formal position: Chiefs (players in the highest leadership 
roles, such as the President of the United States), Indians (players in lower-level 
leadership positions, such as permanent governmental officials), Staffers (the immediate 
staff of each Chief), and Ad Hoc Players (others with a potential role to play, such as 
members of the press or spokespersons for interest groups). According to Allison, the 
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formal position, when coupled with the formal rules of the game, affects each category’s 
patterns of influence.  
Gamson (1968) described players in terms of potential influence (a term to be 
discussed later in this chapter). Partisans, those affected by decisions and actions, are the 
agents of influence; authorities, the system agents who make those decisions, are the 
targets of that influence. Gamson classified their relationship as one of social control. The 
authorities, acting in their capacity as system agents, are agents of control. The targets of 
that control, the partisans, nevertheless possess the potential to disrupt the system’s 
orderly function.  
Kingdon (1995), in his groundbreaking work on policy making, introduced the 
concepts of visible and hidden participants, both of whom play different roles in the 
identification of agenda items and choice of solutions. Visible participants tend to affect 
the setting of agendas and to bring issues to the forefront. Hidden participants, on the 
other hand, tend to affect the shaping of various alternatives and to enunciate, revise, and 
disseminate solutions. Kingdon noted that some actors might move between categories to 
try to shape both issues and solutions. In addition, Kingdon identified a player he termed 
a policy entrepreneur, one who attaches solutions to problems and then couples both with 
favorable political forces to move favored items to the center of an agenda. 
Collections of persons also have been identified as players. Actors need not be 
individual persons but may, indeed, be a gathering of persons into interest groups that 
share common interests and goals but also with multiple, overlapping group memberships 
(Gamson, 1968; Truman, 1951); these groups may form in response to barriers imposed 
by organizational structures (Fischer, 1990). Truman (1951, p. 502) noted the 
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multiplication of interest groups within the American political system due to “the 
increased complexity of techniques for dealing with the environment, in the 
specializations that these involve, and in associated disturbances of the manifold 
expectations that guide individual behavior in a complex and interdependent society.” 
Sometimes interest groups bind together into coalitions. In their discussion of the 
political frame, Bolman and Deal (1997) defined organizations as collections of 
coalitions that, according to Morgan (1986), arise when groups of individuals get together 
to cooperate on specific issues, events, or decisions, or to advance specific values and 
ideologies.  
Lasswell’s “What:” Interests and Goals  
The discussion in the previous paragraph provides a link between the “who” of 
political models (actors) to the “what:” the interests that various players have in the 
decision making process and the goals that they hope to achieve. The political model 
recognizes that within an organization as a whole, a diversity of motives and interests 
exists (Fischer, 1990; Pfeffer, 1981). In fact, the political perspective assumes from the 
start that organizations encompass many different preferences that can result from basic 
value differences (Fischer, 1990) and that decisions are made on the basis of the 
preferences of actors within the organization, preferences that are consistent within actors 
across decision issues (Pfeffer, 1981).  
Organizational goals may be difficult to determine precisely because of actor 
preferences. According to Schmidtlein (1999, pp. 579-580), “[t]he institution per se does 
not have goals. What decision makers seek is a balancing of multiple interests to achieve 
a distribution of resources that maintains all essential members’ participation… 
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participants will state their interests in ways that enhance their bargaining positions and 
maintain their flexibility to accommodate new intelligence on various parties’ positions 
and power relationships. These circumstances no doubt account for the general, 
nonspecific nature of most institutional mission statements. Such statements must 
maintain support of important constituencies with divergent interests.” 
Morgan (1986) stated that political models “encourage us to see organizations as 
loose networks of people with divergent interests who gather together for the sake of 
expediency” (p. 154). His work paid particular attention to the definition and discussion 
of interests, which he defined as a “complex set of predispositions embracing goals, 
values, desires, expectations, and other orientations and inclinations that lead a person to 
act in one direction rather than another” (p. 149). He classified interests into three 
categories: task, those connected with work being performed; career, those independent 
of job but connected with future work aspirations; and extramural, those outside work.  
Allison (1971) described two other terms related to interests and goals: stakes 
(individual interest as defined by a particular issue) and stands (a particular viewpoint 
resulting from the stakes). He discussed the importance of actor role in determining those 
interests. According to Allison, “where you stand depends upon where you sit” (p. 176). 
In other words, priorities and perceptions are shaped by the demands placed upon an 
actor by his or her position. “The essence of any responsible official’s task,” Allison 
stated, “is to persuade other players that his [sic] version of what needs to be done is what 
their own appraisal of their own responsibilities require them to do in their own interests” 
(p. 177). Moreover, perception can, in turn, shape interests and goals. In other words, 
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“the face of the issue differs from seat to seat” (p. 178): What actors see, and thus, 
presumably, the stands and stakes they develop, are dependent also on their roles.  
Lasswell’s “When,” Part 1: Motivation  
Much of the determination as to when an issue becomes political rests on motivation, 
a will to act. Such will is critical in determining whether an actor becomes involved in a 
policy making situation. In fact, according to Dahl (1984), variations in the extent to 
which individuals will use their resources for political purposes are traceable to 
differences in motivation. The will to act, however, is often absent. In his various works 
on college and university governance structures, Baldridge (1971, 1983) noted that in a 
political model, “inactivity prevails…[f]or most people most of the time, the 
policymaking process is an uninteresting, unrewarding activity, so they allow 
administrators to run the show” (1983, p. 51). Moreover, Baldridge stated that the 
characteristic of inactivity is a feature of general political processes, not just those in 
postsecondary institutions. 
When are players motivated to act? Pfeffer (1981) and Gamson (1968) identified key 
elements in creating motivation to engage in policy making activities. Pfeffer (1981) 
spoke of motivation as an important factor in wielding power: a bridge between conflict 
and actual political activity. In order for conflict to lead to that activity, a decision being 
made needs to be critical to an actor in order to prompt that actor to engage in political 
activity, to provide the will to act. In fact, Pfeffer identified certain strategies to make 
decision making less political, one of which was labeling critical decisions as 
unimportant in order to avoid the involvement and concern of potential participants. 
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Gamson (1968) described motivation in terms of an assessment of the cost of 
influence. Like Pfeffer, Gamson noted that despite the ability to use resources, an actor 
may care little about the outcome of an issue at hand; hence, involvement will not occur, 
and the issue of cost is moot in such an instance. In cases in which an actor has some 
preference on an issue, however, carrying out influence involves making commitments 
that affect an actor’s future store of resources. Therefore, an actor will determine what 
that influence will cost, not just in terms of tangible profit and loss in physical resources, 
but also in terms of present or future opportunities (including ease of use of resources) 
and in changes in the relationship between the actor and his/her target. Gamson also 
implied that perceived benefits enter into that decision as well: The determination that the 
transactional costs are greater than the potential gains from an outcome may cause an 
actor to refrain from participation. 
Lasswell’s “When, Part 2: Setting 
Numerous structural and contextual factors create opportunities and act as constraints 
on what actors will be able accomplish as well as how they can accomplish whatever they 
seek to do in a political contest. Various organizational/political theorists (with slightly 
varying terminology and emphases) have acknowledged these setting factors as important 
aspects of a political process.   
Allison (1971) described the political decision making process in terms of a game. 
The rules of that game and how those rules are structured will define who is able to play 
the game at all. It is those players in formal positions that link to action-channels (“a 
regularized means of taking…action on a specific kind of issue” [p. 169]) whose actions 
and stands are important. The rules also determine how the game will be played: what 
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range of decisions and actions are acceptable as well as what moves are acceptable and 
what moves are inappropriate. In subsequent work, Bolman and Deal (1997), in a 
different slant on the game analogy, discussed organizations as arenas that house 
contests. Those arenas help determine not just the game rules and who will be on the field 
but what game actually will be played and what interests will be pursued.   
The work of Gamson (1968) and Mazzoni (1991b) also underscored the importance 
of arena. Because resources for one set of authorities may not be valid for another set, 
Gamson suggested, “the crucial aspect of the scope of influence is not the content of the 
decision but the arenas or sites in which resources are relevant” (p. 82). Mazzoni noted 
their importance by describing what can happen when issues shift into new arenas. 
“Moving an issue to a new arena,” argued Mazzoni, “can change the key actors, relevant 
resources, incentives for action, influence relationships, and governing rules—and hence 
winners and losers—in policy struggles. Thus, establishing the arena for action is a 
fundamental political strategy…” (p. 116). 
Other aspects of the political process can serve to set the stage. In his work on the 
importance of agenda setting, Kingdon (1995) described three separate streams of 
processes in the agenda process: problem recognition, which can be triggered by 
particular events or personal experiences; proposal formulation, in which free-floating 
ideas encounter one another and recombine; and the political stream, which is composed 
of electoral, partisan, or interest group factors. According to Kingdon, the joining of 
those streams can facilitate certain decisions and constrain others, in essence providing a 
structure for a particular decision making event. When changes in the problem 
recognition or political streams occur, a policy window may open and present 
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opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to put forth the issues they are advocating by 
moving them from the margins to the center of the agenda. 
Lasswell’s “When,” Part 3: Conflict 
Without conflict, organizational politics essentially would not exist. In Pfeffer’s 
(1981) discussion of political activity in organizations, he listed three ingredients, actor 
interdependence, heterogeneous goals, and resource scarcity, that when combined will 
produce conflict. In his flowchart for political activity, conflict precedes political activity; 
thus, Pfeffer implied that political activity cannot occur without a conflict situation 
arising first. Fischer (1990, p. 279) was more explicit in identifying the link between 
conflict and politics: He stated that organizational politics is “a response to conflicts 
over…competing interpretations” (emphasis added). Dahl (1984) also identified conflict 
as an important aspect of a political system. Indeed, an examination of political models 
(as discussed previously) demonstrates how political systems are established to regulate 
conflict (Campbell and Mazzoni, 1976; Gamson, 1968; Hardy, 1987; Kanter, 1972) as 
well as how individuals manage the strategy and tactics of conflict (Bolman and Deal, 
1997). 
Morgan (1986, p. 155) noted that “conflict arises wherever interests collide.” 
According to Morgan, conflict may be overt or covert, may arise from resource scarcity, 
and may be found in organizational belief structures. In fact, opined Morgan, “[m]any 
organizational conflicts often become institutionalized in the shape of attitudes, 
stereotypes, values, beliefs, rituals, and other aspects of organizational culture” (p. 158). 
For that reason, “[o]ne does not have to be consciously cunning or deviously political to 
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end up playing organizational politics. For political behavior is a fairly natural response 
to the tensions created between individuals and their organizations” (p. 156). 
Similarly, Bolman and Deal (1997) suggested that conflict is natural and inevitable 
whenever resources are in short supply. They noted that conflict is particularly likely to 
occur at the boundaries between groups and units and identified three types of conflict in 
organizations: horizontal, between units; vertical, between levels; and cultural, between 
groups with different values, traditions, beliefs, and lifestyles. They also stressed, 
however, that conflict is not necessarily a sign of a dysfunctional organization; in fact, 
conflict can be desirable. Bolman and Deal quoted Heffron (1989) to that effect: 
“Conflict challenges the status quo and stimulates interest and curiosity. It is the root of 
personal and social change, creativity, and innovation” (p. 172). 
Lasswell’s “How,” Part 1: Power/Influence  
The previous sections have outlined important variables in describing political 
situations and in what manner they might come about, but they only set the stage. It is in 
the remaining elements of political analysis that the story is told. They provide the 
explanation as to how all these factors combine to tell the tale; that is, how the 
participants that ultimately prevail in a political situation are able to do so.  
Power, and its study as related to political analysis, has commanded vast portions of 
the theoretical discourse, and with good reason. Scholars have stressed the importance of 
power and influence (a related concept) in the decision making process. Thus, the 
inclusion of the power concept is critical to the study of decision making as a political 
process. Indeed, many political theorists placed power at the center of politics: as its 
fundamental commodity (Fischer, 1990) or as the “medium through which conflicts of 
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interest are ultimately resolved” (Morgan, 1986, p. 158). Other scholars contended that 
“the study of politics is essentially the study of power” (Cobb & Elder, 1983, p. 22).   
But power is a highly contested term as well, a complex yet oversimplified concept 
(Dahl, 1984) that seems to defy absolute definition. Political scientists have not reached 
consensus on defining it, on measuring it, or on identifying its essence (Mazzoni, 1991a). 
Scholars disagreed on whether power is held by the many (Dahl, 1957, 1961) or the few 
(Bachrach & Baratz, 1962; Lasswell, 1936; Lukes, 1974; Mills, 1956). Some theorists 
defined power as a resource (Bolman & Deal, 1997), others as a relation (e.g., Cobb & 
Elder, 1983; Dahl ,1957, 1984; Pfeffer, 1981). According to Pfeffer (1981, pp. 2-3), 
“most definitions of power include an element indicating that power is the capability of 
one social actor to overcome resistance in achieving a desired objective or result.” A 
classic example of such capability was proffered by Dahl (1957, p. 202): “A has power 
over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” 
However, even this definition was criticized as insufficient in light of its omission of 
other “faces of power” that encouraged nondecision (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962) or even 
led to shaping of false interests (Lukes, 1974).  
Just as defining power has been troublesome, so has defining influence. As with 
power, no consistent definition exists. Scholars have defined it as the actual exercise of 
power by an actor (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976), as a shift in the probability of an 
outcome (Dahl, 1957), as a term interchangeable with power (Dahl, 1984), or as an 
attempt by partisans to cause a desired action by authorities (Gamson, 1968). 
Because of problems with definition and measurement, the literature on power and 
influence “is concept redundant but theory barren” (Geary, 1992, p. 55) and for that 
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reason has sometimes been ignored in discussions of organizational politics (Pfeffer, 
1981). On the other hand, when power has been addressed in political analysis, the terms 
related to power and its exercise appear to be used in a manner that implies total 
understanding by everyone (Dahl, 1984). The one consistency in discussions of political 
analysis is that power (whatever it is) exists. Furthermore, despite ongoing disagreements 
about its “true” meaning, measurement, and essence, its inclusion (how it is acquired, 
how it is used) in analysis is absolutely critical to understanding political processes 
(although, as Pfeffer [1981] noted, power is not everything; it is not sufficient in and of 
itself in that understanding). Fischer (1990, p. 275) clarified the importance of studying 
power in defining the objective of the political approach: “[T]o uncover patterns of power 
in organizations and to reveal the ways in which these power relations shape the actual 
operations of the organization as a whole.”  
In summary, then, power and influence as concepts are difficult to define, measure, or 
capture. Scholars appear to agree on only two points: that something known as power 
and/or influence exists, and that they disagree, sometimes markedly, on precise definition 
and measurement of these terms. Definition of these terms is not always made in political 
analyses; it often remains, then, for scholars of political situations to make individual 
determinations of meaning and use. This study, however, has made explicit for purposes 
of its analysis how the terms are defined: power as potential impact and influence as 
actual impact. These definitions are consistent with the Mazzoni framework and will be 
discussed within the framework’s context later in this chapter. The existence of the 
political systems component in the model used in this study also makes necessary the 
identification of a particular type of power, that of authority, which is defined as “the 
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legitimate [i.e., accepted and expected] prerogative to make decisions binding on others” 
(Bolman and Deal, 1997, p. 167). 
Lasswell’s “How,” Part 2: Resources 
According to Schmidt and Kochan (1972, cited in Pfeffer, 1981), shared, scarce 
resources serve as precursors to conflict, and conflict, as discussed previously in this 
chapter, is a critical precursor to political activity. Resources are an indicator of the 
power of an actor; they are important for providing the means by which actors can use 
power or influence to obtain some other goal (or, put another way, as a means to an end, 
not an end in themselves). Resource types are numerous and need not be of the economic 
variety. Schmidtlein (1999) identified four categories of resources: In addition to that of 
economic goods and services, resources can take the form of social assets (status, 
legitimacy, authority, political power, association with core cultural values, and 
constituent trust), human skills and qualities, and information. In some cases, issues or 
shared goals can be assets on which actors can draw to unify and to mobilize others to 
participate in a political situation.  
Gamson (1968) categorized resources into three groups, dependent upon their use to 
constrain, induce, or persuade. He further distinguished resources (i.e., ready to be used 
for influence without extensive deployment) from potential resources (i.e., those that can 
be used only after they have been redeployed or mobilized in some way). His equating 
control of resources with potential influence (rather than actual) relates to factors 
influencing their use: for instance, the appropriateness for a particular resource’s use on a 
particular actor, the skill with which those resources are used, and the actor’s willingness 
to use them in a particular instance. Thus, Gamson contended that the level of resources a 
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person or group possesses should not be confused with the amount of influence that could 
be or is exercised in any given situation.  
Dahl (1961, 1984) introduced the concept of slack resources: those that are possessed 
by an individual or group but not being used in political influence in a particular 
situation. The amount of slack resources possessed is a function of the total amount of 
resources plus the degree of commitment or liquidity of those resources.  
Gamson’s (1968) and Dahl’s (1961, 1984) work on resources illustrate some of the 
ways in which participant resource (power) bases can be identified and categorized. Of 
course, these methods do not represent an exhaustive list of typologies for uncovering the 
full range of resources actors have (or may have) at their disposal to exert influence. In 
any event, resource effectiveness is sensitive to the relevant issues, arenas, actors, and 
game rules (Mazzoni, 1991a). Therefore, the categorization of resources must be 
sensitive to the particulars of the case as well. Mindful, perhaps, of his own admonition, 
Mazzoni compared listings and classifications of power bases for community, 
organizational, and legislative influence and developed a list of ten resources with 
widespread utility across issues, actors, and arenas. These categories will be discussed 
later in this chapter in the context of Mazzoni’s framework. 
Lasswell’s “How,” Part 3: Strategies 
It is through the use of strategies that actors bring resources to bear upon the decision 
making process in order to achieve their desired goals. As with resources, strategies can 
be numerous and can also comprise an enormous range of possibilities, from the micro 
(for instance, attempts to lobby individuals in a relatively closed setting, such as an elite 
working group) to the macro level (attempts to litigate an issue). They can involve one or 
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many actors. The work of Bolman and Deal (1997) placed great emphasis on strategies 
associated with coalition building in their discussions of political skills necessary for 
managers. Strategies can be quiet (an internal boycott) or loud (a group demonstration) 
and can provide carrots (inducements such as increased visibility) or sticks (constraints 
such as the threat of a lawsuit).  
As with resources, too, strategies can be classified many different ways. Gamson 
(1968) identified strategies as “means of influence” (p. 73) based upon two dimensions: 
attempts to either change an authority’s situation or an authority’s intentions and the 
addition of either advantages or disadvantages. He classified the resulting influence types 
in a fashion similar to his classification of resources: in terms of their use to constrain, 
induce, or persuade.   
Certain types of strategies may be obvious in political analysis (for example, the use 
of money, the control of information and communications, and the manipulation of 
symbols or language), but some very powerful strategic ploys can be ignored in analyzing 
political activity. One such strategy is agenda setting, the use of which actually can 
determine what issues will be considered. Cobb and Elder (1983) incorporated the work 
of Bachrach and Baratz (1962) on nondecisions and of Lindblom (1968) on disjointed 
incrementalism in their study of how group conflicts come to be placed on public 
agendas. Cobb and Elder observed that “control over or influence upon the process by 
which an issue comes to be placed on a governmental agenda is an important source of 
political power” (p. 34). Kingdon’s (1995) subsequent conceptualization of policy 
streams, discussed earlier in the section on settings, described the manner by which 
policy entrepreneurs can define items for consideration.  
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Dahl (1961) described another powerful strategy: the tightening of the slack that was 
described earlier in this chapter under the discussion of resources. If an actor is able to 
remove some of another actor’s resources (i.e., tighten the slack), he or she might 
significantly deter or prevent the other actor from being able to take action on a particular 
issue. 
According to Mazzoni (1991a, p. 100), “[I]t is strategic action which converts power 
and will into decision advantage. Conversely, bungling strategy can fritter away or foul 
up the most powerful of resources and frustrate the most willful of political actors.” The 
ability of an actor to effectively utilize his or her resources to exercise influence, then, is 
largely dependent on the success or failure of the strategies he or she adopts. 
Lasswell’s “How,” Part 4: Interactions 
“What is the game?” Allison (1971, p. 169) asked in his description of a political 
model. “How are players’ stands, influence, and moves combined to yield…decisions and 
actions?” In so doing, Allison underscored the importance of examining the interactions 
among all elements of a political model to describe the dynamics of the decision making 
process.  
For some scholars, group dynamics, involving bargaining, negotiation, jockeying for 
position (Baldridge, 1971, 1983; Bolman and Deal, 1997) and compromise (Baldridge, 
1971, 1983), are critical to the examination. In fact, Bolman and Deal (1997) stated that 
bargaining is central to all decision making from a political perspective, and, furthermore, 
that negotiation is needed whenever two or more parties with some interests in common 
and others in conflict need to reach agreement.  
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For other scholars, the dynamics involve describing interactions arrayed according to 
phases. Kingdon’s (1995) description of policy making identified four related processes, 
agenda setting, alternative formulation, authoritative enactment, and implementation, as 
well as the joining of process streams and the opening of policy windows, in which 
changes in streams lead to opportunities for advocates of particular problems or solutions 
to move those issues to the center of an agenda. Allison’s (1971) description of a political 
game arrayed players’ moves in a framework determined by rules and structure. 
However they are arrayed and described, it is through interactions that the story of 
influence is told; it is perhaps the ultimate “how” of Lasswell’s description of politics. 
Through a discussion of the interactions, the analyst demonstrates how participant actions 
and contextual forces converge to help explain organizational decisions. 
Strengths and Limitations of the Political Models 
 
The use of political models in studying organizational decision making can be a 
powerful tool in analyzing the complexities and dynamics of the decision making 
process. On the other hand, political models, like any other frameworks designed to study 
organizational phenomena, have their limitations. This section will discuss some of those 
strengths and limitations. 
Strengths of the political model. The primary role and focus placed upon actors or 
players in political models help scholars to recognize the importance of the individual 
and of groups in decision making. Whether implicitly or explicitly, political models stress 
that organizations are collections of people with different ways of seeing the world, and 
for that reason, not everyone speaks with one mind. According to Morgan (1986), 
viewing organizations politically helps scholars of organizational functioning to find a 
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way of overcoming the limitations of the idea that organizations are functionally 
integrated systems. Moreover, political models aid in the recognition of the vast array of 
pressures that are put on organizations from societal groups (Easton, 1985) and of 
decision making as an interactive process. With a political lens, it is possible to study 
how the parts of an organization relate to each other and to the organization as a whole. 
A second strength of political models deals with the manner in which conflict is 
viewed. An earlier discussion in this chapter concerned the concept of conflict and its 
importance as a precursor to political activity, an inevitable outcome whenever 
interdependent individuals with heterogeneous goals make decisions about scarce 
resources. But the inevitability of conflict does not make it “bad,” and political models 
can help scholars to see conflict not only as inevitable, but also as desirable. The section 
on conflict quoted Heffron (1989, cited in Bolman & Deal [1997]) on the positive 
benefits of conflict. Bolman and Deal (1997) and Morgan (1986) also noted the 
importance of conflict in preventing groupthink, the tendency of groups to lapse into 
similar modes of thinking that preserve the status quo and limit fresh ways of dealing 
with issues under consideration. 
Finally, political models can lead researchers to question concepts of rationality as 
they have been defined and applied to organizational decision making: in Morgan’s 
(1986) thinking, to explode the myth of organizational rationality. Rational decision 
making occurs in a planned fashion with established objectives and goals, quantifiable 
variables, centralized decision makers and sufficient and timely information. Political 
models, however, provide information that can help scholars understand that pressures 
exerted on organizations by individuals and groups limit decision making ability (Cobb 
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and Elder [1983], for example, described Braybrooke and Lindblom’s [1963] concept of 
disjointed incrementalism, in which issues and problems are dealt in situations of 
insufficient time and incomplete information). Furthermore, some models of 
organizational decision making have presented rational/analytical decision processes and 
political processes as dichotomous and basically opposite each other in terms of the 
thought that goes into making decisions. By extension, it is as if they imply that to act 
politically is “irrational.” Put another way, rational processes are “good” and political 
processes are (as was discussed earlier in this chapter) “dirty” or “bad.” 
Perhaps what is needed, however, is a new definition of what it is to think rationally. 
Such a change in definition might be especially applicable to the study of policy making 
in American education. Schmidtlein (1974) identified two ideal types of decision process 
paradigms, the comprehensive/prescriptive (a rational/analytic approach) and the 
incremental/remedial (a political approach). According to Schmidtlein (1974, p. 11), 
“[t]he conditions set by the environment in which American education takes place and 
the traditional values associated with education appear more compatible with the use of 
the [incremental/remedial] paradigm…a focus on the willful behavior of people…is 
particularly ineffective since people’s values and ideologies are highly resistant to 
change.” In such an environment, a new definition of rational behavior would assume 
that individuals making decisions according to their own values and goals were acting in 
a rational manner. Morgan (1986) appears to agree with this assessment; according to 
him, rationality is always interest-based and political.  
Limitations of the political model. One of the biggest problems with political models 
might be that of semantics. To many scholars, despite the efforts of those who have 
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developed political models and have stressed the inevitability of politics in organizational 
decision making, politics is synonymous with “dirty,” as introduced at the beginning of 
this chapter and again in the previous section. In addition to Hardy’s (1987) discussion on 
concerns about the use of the term political, Morgan (1986) commented that writing 
about issues in a political manner tends to emphasize the cynical side of politics. What 
might be needed, then, is a new style of writing, one that attempts not to place value 
judgment on politics in decision making but rather presents the facts in a more neutral 
tone.  
While perhaps being able to predict how political processes might evolve, political 
models’ use in predicting major decision outcomes is limited. Wirt and Kirst (1972) 
described their approach to studying political systems as heuristic, one that is able to 
analytically separate and categorize items in experience but is not so much a predictive 
scheme. Of course, Wirt and Kirst’s work dealt with a broader picture, seeing the system 
as a whole. Smaller-scale predictions might be possible: For instance, Kingdon’s (1995) 
work set forth conditions under which certain developments are more or less likely and 
discussed ways in which certain forces might converge to make certain events more or 
less likely.  
However, political models have not really shown themselves to be able to predict an 
outcome of a decision making process. Although Pfeffer (1981) mentioned the use of 
frameworks to make predictions as to what will occur, it is not clear what the meaning of 
“what” is in that context and the extent to which models can be used to accurately predict 
decision outcomes completely. Analysts might be able to talk about general tendencies in 
what will occur, but the strength of these models is in analyzing the processes that 
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occurred, with an eye toward developing theory. The complexity and chaos that is part 
and parcel of political decision making, however, makes prediction very difficult if not 
impossible. Furthermore, political models, while enabling the study of how particular 
decisions came about, do not address the merits of a decision; i.e., how “good” it was. 
Political decision making models, because of the importance of actor interdependence 
and dispersed power, rest largely upon an assumption of pluralism, that numerous actors 
have an opportunity to get involved. According to Fischer (1990), however, pluralism 
fails to incorporate the hidden institutional factors, often latent and subjective, that have 
pre-shaped interest group behavior. Disagreement on the concept of pluralism (e.g., 
Bacharach & Baratz, 1962; Lukes, 1974) throws doubt on the viability of some models. 
So, too, does disagreement on the concept of power. For all its importance, power defies 
easy definition and measurement. The inability to definitively define and measure power 
might lead scholars and critics of political models to question the rigor of the model if 
such an important concept is so difficult to demonstrate. 
Morgan (1986) identified other problems with the use of political models. He noted 
that it is almost always possible to see signs of political activity, and that one can look for 
hidden agendas everywhere even where none exist; such views can lead to a 
Machiavellian interpretation that suggests that everyone is trying to outwit and/or 
outmaneuver everyone else. Then, too, the factors that are necessary for political activity 
to occur might not be present; an issue may not be seen as important, or perhaps there is 
more agreement on an issue than the analyst is willing to admit. When expecting 
everything to be political, the analyst can always interpret it that way. Morgan (1986) 
also noted that political models may overstate the power and importance of the individual 
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and underplay the system dynamics that determine what becomes political and how 
politics occurs. What structural forces might have shaped the nature of issues? 
Finally, a political model is only one way of seeing an organization. Allison (1971) 
and Hardy (1987) stressed the importance of viewing an organization through more than 
one lens. It is important for an analyst to recognize that political models, as well as any 
other framework that might be applied to describe organizational behavior, must be 
recognized for what they are: one method among many. 
Theoretical Literature: Relevance to This Study 
The preceding discussions underline the rich body of scholarly work on political 
processes and in particular on the nuances of the processes, e.g., in the multiple ways in 
which decision making may be observed and described. In addition to providing evidence 
underpinning the framework used in the study (discussed later in this chapter), the 
literature has particular application to this study in providing the researcher with tools 
that enable thick description of processes in a relatively unexplored area of study and also 
provide ways to classify and define concepts and terms important to the design and 
conduct of the research. 
A rich method to describe political phenomena. Wirt and Kirst’s (1972) description of 
the scheme they developed (as a heuristic model) is one that can be applied to the 
collective theoretical literature on political processes and its broader application to 
different types of organizations. The literature offers various ways of defining politics, 
from Lasswell’s (1936) simple “who gets what, when, how” to the more complex 
definitions offered by scholars such as Pfeffer (1981). The literature provides a 
mechanism for the organization and classification of the components of political 
processes. It enables researchers to draw out the level of descriptive detail necessary to 
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arrive at grounded conclusions regarding the development of policy and the process by 
which it was achieved. Its rich detail offers numerous terms to help scholars more 
precisely describe political phenomena in the manner that is most appropriate to their 
findings. 
Application of definitions and classifications. This study used as its overarching 
assumption the belief that political activity is the process by which individuals and 
groups attempt, through the use of power, to obtain preferred outcomes in situations 
where resource scarcity exists or where differences exist in values and how they should 
be allocated. This definition acknowledges that political situations can arise not only 
when decisions need to be made over how tangible resources such as money will be 
allocated, but also when decisions require action concerning intangible issues and how 
they will be addressed. Viewed another way, value applications become scarce resources 
when a “yes or no” decision regarding an intangible outcome (such as deciding whether 
an organization will support a particular point of view) is involved. Furthermore, this 
study acknowledged that applications of the study of political behavior to organizations 
in general is feasible and can yield valuable information regarding the dynamics of 
organizational behavior. Perhaps more importantly, this study, in using a more neutral 
definition of political behavior, demonstrates that politics is a process that occurs in 
numerous situations without necessarily meaning that negative ulterior motives or unfair 
methods are at work. 
In conducting the study, Lasswell’s (1936) definition of politics as “who gets what, 
when [and] how” formed the foundation for the use of the categories of variables outlined 
in this section to analyze and array the study’s findings. Its simple construction allows 
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scholars of political behavior the flexibility to examine multiple ways in which 
combinations of the “who,” “what,” “when,” and “how” join to provide a picture of the 
process by which a particular decision was reached. More specifically, it allowed for the 
examination in this study of seven variables, anchored in Lasswell and named in this 
study’s conceptual framework: actors; their goals; their resources, motivations, and 
strategies; the setting or contextual factors that shape actor decision processes; and the 
interactions of these variables that shape the decision outcomes.  
The various political models constructed by scholars provide a further framework in 
which these variables can be placed to explain particular phenomena. This study made 
use of both the political systems and actor-influence forms of models by combining them: 
Its model is a political systems/power-influence approach. Because both categories of 
approaches concentrate more on certain variables than on others, the combined approach 
provided a powerful mechanism to examine a policy making phenomenon in a more 
holistic fashion. The combined approach also helped address issues raised by Morgan 
(1986) by placing the individuals or groups within a more structural context. 
Multiple facets of power and influence. The extensive work conducted on the concept 
of power has yet to offer an overarching definition of the term. Perhaps the lack of a 
simple definition serves to illustrate that power can manifest itself in many different ways 
and, as such, requires multiple paths by which researchers can observe and describe it. 
Although power is contested, the literature provides many ways of addressing its 
existence. Just knowing how other scholars have defined the term and the problems they 
have identified with their own and others’ definitions provides researchers with at least 
enough background to make informed choices about how they will define and apply the 
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concepts of power and influence in their own studies. The literature also provides 
numerous ways of gauging influence (measuring power) through the work on resources 
(e.g., Gamson, 1968), strategies (e.g., Bolman & Deal, 1997; Dahl, 1961), 
settings/channels/game rules (e.g., Allison, 1971) and factors that affect how resources 
and strategies are used (e.g., Kingdon, 1995). The work on gauging influence provides 
powerful tools that offer flexibility in analyzing and arraying the process variables to 
provide a picture of how influence was attained. 
Application of power and influence literature. For the purposes of this study, conflict 
and power were considered necessary precursors to the reliance on political behavior to 
shape outcomes. It assumed that, consistent with Bolman and Deal (1997), conflict arises 
when resources are scarce and that power is a capability (Pfeffer, 1981) to achieve an 
objective. In this manner, power is defined more as a potential action rather than as a 
possession (i.e., as a resource as defined by Bolman and Deal [1997]). Moreover, because 
it is a combination of conflict and decentralized power that leads to political activity 
(Pfeffer, 1981), and because actors, resources, and strategies can take many different 
forms as identified by various scholars, this study assumed a pluralistic concept of power 
as defined by Dahl (1957): the view that numerous individuals or groups have the 
capacity to shape or influence a decision outcome. Lastly, it assumed that influence is an 
interplay of multiple factors that come together in different ways depending on the 
specifics of the situation. Further application of the theoretical literature will be discussed 
later in this chapter in the context of the particular conceptual framework that guided this 
study. 
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The Study of Policy Making in Higher Education from a Political Perspective: 
A Review of the Substantive Literature 
Numerous scholars noted the applicability of political models of behavior to 
organizations; the applications ranged from those dealing with organizations in general 
(e.g., Fischer, 1990; Hardy, 1987) to school systems (e.g. Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976; 
Wirt & Kirst, 1972) and to colleges and universities (Baldridge, 1971, 1983). Indeed, a 
review of studies demonstrates that such models have been applied to the study of 
educational politics at different educational and governmental levels as well as different 
topic areas. The politics of education at the kindergarten through 12th-grade level has, in 
particular, accumulated a rich and broad literature base (McLendon, 2003a). Studies at 
the K-12 level have addressed, among other topics, influence patterns in site-based 
governance councils (Malen & Ogawa, 1988), state decision making regarding tuition tax 
credit deduction statutes for private school attendance (Malen, 1985), state 
government/school relations on the issue of public school choice (Fowler, 1994; 
Mazzoni, 1991b), mobilization of constituency pressure to influence state policy making 
on tax concessions for private schools (Mazzoni & Malen, 1985), self-protection 
strategies undertaken by county school districts (Jones & Hill, 1998), and K-12/higher 
education cooperation and competition (Abrams, 1987). 
According to at least one scholar, however, the study of higher education politics has 
not reached the same level of richness and breadth as has the K-12 level. It suffers instead 
from “acute underdevelopment” (McLendon, 2003a, p. 166). McLendon (p. 186) did 
acknowledge the existence of a “small number of individual works, particularly those 
concerned with the national level of government [that] provide important insights into the 
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connection of higher education institutions with broader political systems and 
processes…”. The following section of this chapter discusses some of that work and 
makes the case for extending the study of higher education politics into the supranational 
(organizational structures that have authority over more than one national system) arena 
through the current study. 
State Arenas 
Prestine (1989) examined a governance conflict between the School of Education at 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison (UWM) and the Wisconsin Department of Public 
Instruction for control of UWM’s teacher education program. Her study looked at 
questions of “who decides” and “who decides what” in the governance of an academic 
program and program policy, using a “governance perspective” (p. 288) to investigate 
interactions between an organization and its environment. Her study also investigated the 
role of cultural norms and beliefs in influencing actions. Prestine identified four internal 
forces (role of institutional saga, a cultural norm of insularity and isolation, the UWM 
School of Education’s diffuse faculty membership, and the UWM’s decentralized 
structure) and three external forces (public mood, a successful coalition of interest 
groups, and the role of the State Superintendent) that brought about a loss of control for 
UWM regarding its preparation of teachers. Moreover, Prestine noted that “no attempt 
was made to assess the degree of importance associated with each of the factors; 
cumulative effect was critical in this study” (p. 297). 
De Give and Olswang (1999) utilized a combined political systems/power-influence 
model with a case study to examine the role of special interests in policy making in 
Washington State with regard to branch campuses. They identified community groups as 
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having played a key role in negotiating a branch campus agreement by using a wide array 
of resources to create broad-based coalitions. The community groups were dominant 
throughout the agenda setting, alternative formulation, and decision enactment stages of 
the process and created a statewide coalition that ultimately succeeded in securing the 
passage of a bill that created branch campuses. 
A study by McLendon (2003b) examined the dynamics by which decentralization 
first emerges as an area of consideration by state decision makers. McLendon employed a 
comparative case study methodology and three theories of public policy (rational-
comprehensive, Lindblom’s [1959] incremental, and Kingdon’s [1984] revised garbage 
can). He found that the process of setting the agenda for higher education decentralization 
closely resembled the “garbage can” model but neither of the other two models he 
examined. He used this finding to develop a grounded conceptual model (modifying the 
Kingdon model to account for state conditions arising from campus-state regulatory 
reform) to depict the manner by which decentralization emerges on the state agenda. 
According to McLendon, three separate activity streams, similar to those identified by 
Kingdon, exist. The first, the state political stream, includes the routine political cycle as 
well as any single disturbing event. The second, the state problem stream, includes the 
various conditions defined by the political elite as problems meriting attention. The third 
stream is that of decentralization solutions. The streams can become linked when an issue 
opportunist takes advantage of an issue window, a time opportunity that may arise from 
political crises or from conditions deemed serious enough to be problems. McLendon 
found that the issue of decentralization arose when a political or problem window 
opened, rather than in times of state-campus conflict. 
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McLendon and Peterson (1999) studied the concept of the press as an actor in public 
policy processes in general, and, in this instance, its role in state higher education policy 
making. McLendon and Peterson utilized a content analysis to examine the press 
coverage of the 1995 Michigan legislature funding conflict between the University of 
Michigan and Michigan State University. They suggested that “the absence of formal 
mechanisms of state control in Michigan means that the power to affect policy making 
for higher education is dispersed, contested, and fluid” (p. 228). As a result, capturing 
public opinion became an important strategy, with the press as a crucial player in 
swaying opinion in a particular direction, for example, by influencing public agendas or 
even behaviors, and by helping to determine winners and losers in a conflict. Results of 
the analysis indicated that local papers favored their own universities and adopted the 
local university’s perspective in their coverage of the conflict. McLendon and Peterson’s 
findings illuminated the power that university officials have in shaping coverage of 
events, with potentially critical implications: “[T]o the extent that news coverage may be 
shown to influence policy outcomes, university officials thus have a potentially pivotal 
role in policy making” (p. 242). 
A study by Martinez (1999) examined another set of formal players, legislators, and 
their views on state higher education governing boards (primarily the trustee’s role as 
guardian of public interest and the balance of campus advocacy with that guardianship). 
Although this study, a survey, did not use a political model for the investigation nor deal 
with the policy making process, it was grounded on work examining the concept of 
“public interest.” Martinez grouped words and phrases from interviews touching upon the 
“public interest” into functional and structural/environmental factors. He then categorized 
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the terms of each group into two dimensions (the first, historical, political, social or 
economic; the second, contextual, transactional, or controllable). Martinez also analyzed 
legislators’ responses to the importance they attached to nine areas of board 
responsibility. He found that legislators believed that the most important factor in 
enhancing “lay” governance was the need for trustees to see the bigger picture: to see 
beyond an individual campus to how the institution fits into the state’s total higher 
education system as well as K-12 education and how it helps address larger social 
problems. Legislators also spoke of the need for collaboration between state government, 
governing boards, and campus administration. The study alluded to the potential 
importance of higher education board members as players in the development of higher 
education policy, although no specific mention of possible effects of either collaboration 
or board involvement on higher education policymaking at the state level was made. The 
study also touched upon the potential importance of higher education board governance 
structure (i.e., consolidated, multi-campus, single, or mixed) in affecting legislator views 
on governing boards. 
Leslie and Novak (2003) noted that despite decades of study on public governance of 
higher education, no consistent framework for describing the dynamics has yet been 
developed. Based upon their previous work on policy formulation, they suggested that 
any frameworks to explain governance reform should conceptualize complexity and 
fluidity of variables as well as randomness and unpredictability. They utilized five case 
studies that illustrated wide variation in policy processes and outcomes and a “qualitative 
heuristic” method (p. 102) to study whether instrumental (practical objectives) or political 
factors are primarily responsible (i.e., the main or explanatory effects) in governance 
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reform. Leslie and Novak concluded that the political factors “were usually central to the 
story of reform” (p. 117), with instrumental goals often being secondary considerations to 
political leaders. Thus, they offered instrumental/political interaction as a possible 
framework for understanding governance reform, although they did not actually construct 
that framework. They suggested that further research on governance reform would 
benefit from case study research to help clarify how instrumental and political factors 
interact as well as how governance reform emerges as an agenda item. 
Nicholson-Crotty and Meier (2003) examined state higher education boards’ 
structures to determine whether those structures limit the ability of elected officials to 
influence higher education policy. Drawing from theories and previous studies on 
governance, structures, autonomy, and policy outcomes, the authors offered two 
hypotheses. Their first hypothesis was that consolidated governing boards (which are 
assigned the most authority for higher education coordination) will provide more 
insulation for policies from politics, and hence political influence, than coordinating 
boards (which provide only an interface between state government and the governing 
boards of a state’s colleges and universities). The second (and, ironically, paradoxical) 
hypothesis was that because of their centralization, consolidated governing boards 
generate lower transaction costs to political actors and thus result in greater political 
influence. Using qualitative techniques, Nicholson-Crotty and Meier defined a set of 
political and control variables and used a pooled time series, collected from 47 states over 
eight years, of higher education cost data as dependent variables. Their findings indicated 
that higher education structures significantly affect the ability of political actors to 
influence higher education, although they were unable to provide any conclusive findings 
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on exactly how that influence is manifested through the structure. They suggested that 
higher education policy models include structural as well as political variables. 
Federal Arenas 
Hannah (1996) examined the policymaking process of the 1992 reauthorization of the 
Higher Education Act (HEA) of 1965, in which federal policy shifted from an emphasis 
on need-based grants to one focused on loans available regardless of family income. 
Although the Congressional leadership responsible for heading the effort sought to “put 
everything on the table and make major and fundamental changes where they are called 
for” in order to “[enhance] postsecondary educational opportunities for all Americans” 
(p. 506), this intended outcome did not occur. In investigating this outcome, Hannah 
grounded her study in the work of federal policy scholars, who identified various 
“constraints and crosscurrents” (p. 501) shaping policymaking dynamics: the structure of 
the decision making process; the nature of the economic, social, and intellectual 
environment; the number of active participants; and the impact of the policy outcome. 
She identified the constraints and crosscurrents operating in the 1992 reauthorization: an 
agenda that had begun to be shaped by key Capitol Hill actors immediately upon 
completion of the previous authorization and was basically set by the time the new 
process began; the growing federal deficit, “the most pervasive constraint” (p. 510); a 
presidential election year, in which the politically attractive goal was helping the middle 
class as opposed to needy students; a widespread decline of public confidence in higher 
education’s special status; and a public notion of individual responsibility, which viewed 
grants as “handouts.” Hannah also found that the “skills and intentions” of the principal 
actors determined how the “environmental cards were played” (p. 513). For example, the 
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legislative process seemed unusually staff driven, with the personal lives of the staff (who 
happened to be particularly experienced with HEA reauthorizations) significantly setting 
the tone of interactions with higher education associations and influencing the timing of 
hearings and drafts. 
After presenting a political history compiled from historical documents, recollections, 
descriptive data, political analyses, and policy evaluation efforts, Hearn (1993) used five 
explanatory models to describe the tremendous growth in the federal student aid program 
in the 25 years since the passage of the HEA. That growth occurred despite a lack of the 
classical ideals outlined in political science texts for policy development and 
implementation (e.g., a strong interest group coalition and a good resource environment), 
ideals that assume a basically rationalist, linear approach to policymaking. Hearn 
acknowledged that aspects of truth existed in each of the perspectives he examined, in 
essence arguing for an approach to studying policy making that combines elements of 
these approaches. He left the development of such a comprehensive model, however, for 
other scholars. 
Other Higher Education Arenas 
Working within the context of organization creation as well as old (formal exercise of 
power through a system of legislation and regulations) and new (survival of an 
organization through copying and internalizing values from the external environment) 
institutionalist theories, Bloland (1999) presented a case study on the creation of the 
Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA), an organization that emerged as 
one of the main actors in the development of U.S. higher education trade policy. Bloland 
analyzed the actions and power relationships among the major actors involved in the 
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establishment of the organization. Central to his study was the concept of legitimacy: its 
importance not only for the fledgling organization but also for the founders themselves. 
Bloland argued that “the power and legitimacy of the founders were uncertain and 
contested, but that the level of legitimacy of the organization builders themselves was a 
central requirement for successful organization creation” (p. 357). He demonstrated how 
the founders established the legitimacy necessary to form the organization in the face of 
powerful stakeholders with differing agendas. Bloland found that the most important 
means of establishing the legitimacy were (1) higher education institution presidents as 
the major participants in the building of the organization and (2) the establishment of a 
structure that was acceptable to the most powerful constituencies but still able to carry 
out the task it was being asked to do. 
Higher Education Campuses 
Hackman (1985) examined the process by which colleges and universities allocate 
resources among units, centering on the concept of centrality (how closely the purposes 
of a unit match the central mission of its institution). She utilized a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative research methods to develop a theory of resource allocation in 
colleges and universities. The study demonstrated that a unit’s “centrality” interacts with 
its environmental power and with its resource negotiation strategies to affect the internal 
resource allocations that it acquires from the organization. 
Pusser (2003) utilized the struggle over affirmative action at the University of 
California to examine the usefulness of Baldridge’s (1971) interest-articulation political 
framework, part of the multi-dimensional model (MDM) that Baldridge built in seminal 
research on colleges and universities, in explaining campus political phenomena. Pusser 
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considered the Baldridge framework to be the prevailing model used to study the politics 
of higher education. He held, however, that the political segment of the MDM was in the 
most need of revision of all of the MDM’s parts because of its grounding in sociological 
rather than political theory. He faulted the model for being focused too heavily on 
internal, administrative processes. He also questioned the model’s assumption of an 
“essentially pluralist decision making context” (p. 123), one that “enables legitimate, 
representative expression of majority and minority preferences” (p. 126) or one in which 
“many groups have access to authority and rights to access and participation in the 
decision making process (Carnoy and Levin, 1985)” (p. 137). Based upon his analysis of 
the case, Pusser affirmed the utility of aspects of MDMs to adequately explain 
postsecondary organizational behavior, but he also argued that the interest-articulation 
framework did little to advance understanding. Pusser thus advocated the addition of 
propositions developed from positive theories of institutions, which view organizations 
not as closed systems but as systems whose decision making is influenced by external 
forces and interests. 
International/Comparative Studies 
Morley (2003) applied a Marxist/feminist framework to the study of power and 
quality assurance. Contending that quality assurance is a “socially constructed domain” 
(p. 164), she interviewed 18 women and 18 men in 35 higher education institutions in 
England, Scotland and Wales to attempt to uncover ways in which quality as “a regime of 
power” (p. vii) is experienced by those subject to review by and responsible for preparing 
for the English Quality Control Audit system. Her findings indicated in part that quality 
control was becoming a “creed” (p. 160) that was contributing to the reconfiguration of 
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academic habits and procedures and that was actually resulting to some extent in 
mediocrity. According to Morley, “[quality control] has compromised and muted the 
possibilities for critical engagement with technologies used to assure quality. It demands 
compliance and performativity and the endless reproduction of norms” (p. 161). 
Although her study was country specific and dealt with the implementation of the 
outcome of a policy making process, it nonetheless provided a picture of a quality 
assurance process that had been externally imposed and with which few higher education 
professionals felt much ownership. It served as a glimpse of what can happen to 
academic values if quality assurance procedures are imposed from outside the academy. 
Goedegebuure, Kaiser, Maassen, Meek, van Vught, and de Weert (1993) undertook a 
comparative analysis of regulation, steering and control of 11 higher education systems 
under the assumption that the mechanisms by which those factors are accomplished are 
“the result of the interplay between various forces, interests, or actors” (p. 4), in particular 
state authority, the market, and the academic oligarchy. They used Clark’s (1983) triangle 
of coordination to visualize this interplay: Each of the forces occupies a corner of the 
triangle; the corners represent maximum control of the particular force. In summarizing 
the results of each of the 11 country studies, they concluded that although quality had 
become an emphasis in each of the higher education systems, each of the countries 
“show[ed] as much vagueness and lack of agreement on interpretation of quality 
assessment and its purposes as is found in the literature” (p. 342). Another conclusion 
was consistent with one of Morley’s (2003) themes: “Resistance, where it exists, is based 
on the notion that quality assessment is an interventionist instrument of government used 
to control higher education” (p. 343). For Goedegebuure et al., two primary issues are at 
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stake with regard to the “institutionalization” of quality assurance mechanisms. The first 
is how independent such mechanisms should be of both the government and of the 
institutions themselves. The second is a fear that institutionalizing quality assurance will 
impede diversity within higher education and instead impose uniformity. 
In another use of the Clark triangle, Frederiks, Westerheijden, and Weusthof (1994) 
investigated whether a higher education system dominated by internal actors (those 
within the academy) is more oriented toward improvement (influence and improvement 
within a framework of self-regulation) and whether one dominated by external actors 
(government and society) is focused more on accountability (measurement, report and 
control as a demonstration to actors outside the institution). The researchers studied and 
compared five systems: England, France, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the U.S. state of 
California. Through an analysis of six indicators of power, they determined the locus of 
control of oversight for each system (which actors dominated) and then determined for 
each system whether its quality assurance system was oriented toward accountability or 
improvement. They used qualitative analyses to determine whether the systems’ practices 
in five different functional areas were geared more toward accountability or 
improvement. Indices of internal/external control and accountability/improvement were 
then plotted against each other. The results of the plotting did not indicate clearly the 
tendency for an internally dominated system to have a quality assessment system more 
oriented towards improvement. In further analysis, however, they found that an internally 
coordinated (run by institutions) system of quality assessment in and of itself tended to 
have a high orientation toward improvement as opposed to accountability. 
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The World Trade Organization (WTO) and GATS 
Education scholars are increasingly turning their attention to the topic of higher 
education trade, although the body of research on the effects of GATS on higher 
education is small in relation to other higher education topics. Such a state is hardly 
surprising given GATS’ relatively short existence and the recent emergence of higher 
education on the GATS agenda. Much of the work on higher education and GATS is in 
the form of informational analyses in which the authors attempted to explain GATS itself 
and its potential implications for higher education or in the form of opinion papers 
through which authors argued the relative benefits and (primarily) costs for higher 
education and/or for the world, especially developing countries. However, empirical 
research on GATS is appearing more frequently in American and European journals such 
as Globalisation, Societies and Education, a publication which devoted an entire issue to 
the subject (Robinson [Ed.], 2003). In addition, GATS is now a topic addressed in 
dissertation research by higher education policy students. This section illustrates some of 
the work that has been conducted in the study of GATS and the diverse approaches that 
researchers have applied to the topic. 
An interesting analysis and opinion paper was developed by Patterson (2004), who 
used ecological theories as a source of ideas for thinking about higher education and 
GATS. These theories hold that survival of an organism (or, perhaps, an ecosystem or a 
society) depends on its ability to modify its environment in a cooperative, rather than a 
competitive and conflicted, fashion. She used these theories as background for her 
discussion of the evolution of higher education policy in New Zealand. Patterson then 
contrasted the policy with that of the supranational approach as contained in GATS and 
60
discussed how the New Zealand commitments to GATS were presented. Her approach 
was the antithesis of that of the political perspective, with its emphasis away from 
competition and conflict. It implied that participants have similar values and goals and 
neglected the issue of resource scarcity. 
A recent study by Vlk (2006) examined the influence of the GATS legal framework 
on one hand, and the views and actions of actors on the other, on the steering capacity 
(funding, regulation, planning, and evaluation) of the nation-state with regard to higher 
education. The conceptual framework combined a static or trickle-down dimension 
(GATS rules and disciplines) with a dynamic or trickle-up dimension (stakeholders’ 
standpoints, views and actions) to address three questions: (1) what is the impact of 
GATS on higher education legislation; (2) what is the position and influence of various 
stakeholders in GATS negotiation on higher education; and (3) what other relevant 
factors can be claimed to have a significant impact on the steering capacity of a nation-
state in higher education. His research, which involved case studies of the Netherlands 
and the Czech Republic, indicated that in neither case was there a direct impact from 
GATS rules or from stakeholders’ actions on the governments’ ability to steer their 
higher education policies. Vlk did, however, identify other factors that may have indirect 
effects at some point. The first is a tendency to introduce market-like mechanisms into 
higher education by the nation-state itself, the second is the process of European 
integration (applicable, of course, only to European nations), and the third is 
encouragement and suggestions for change from intergovernmental organizations such as 
the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). 
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Bassett’s (2006) study of GATS and American higher education made use of 
commodification theories to study the perceptions and opinions of the U.S. higher 
education community as well as federal governmental representatives. From her 
examination of the U.S.’ decision to pursue a higher education trade policy and the 
reactions from higher education stakeholders, she developed a commodification theory of 
higher education: that education at the postsecondary level increasingly is treated as a 
commercial product. Her research revealed that the American higher education 
community was not prepared initially to address the issue of trade in higher education and 
that only a few well-positioned individuals have been influencing the development of 
U.S. higher education trade policy. 
Substantive Literature: Relevance to This Study 
The studies described in the previous sections illustrate the range of scholarly work 
related to power and politics in higher education and related areas. Clearly, political 
approaches to the study of higher education can provide valuable insights on policy 
making in the higher education domain. The work previously conducted demonstrates 
multiple ways in which actors of all kinds can play a role in shaping higher education 
policy making. Collectively, this work presents the role that goals, resources, 
motivations, strategies, settings, and interaction play in that process, as well as the 
importance of power as the “spark” in igniting a political situation. The studies also 
illustrate the numerous approaches used to examine education issues from a political 
perspective and the incorporation of various scholarly works to build the studies’ 
theoretical frameworks.  
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Unfortunately, the theories underlining these studies were not always made explicit. 
Moreover, each study appeared to center on only a few elements of the “who gets what, 
when, how” at the expense of the other factors. For example, Vlk’s (2006) examination 
of GATS and its effects on nation-state steering capacity focused on anticipated outcomes 
of decision making processes rather than the process itself. The framework placed a 
particular emphasis on the mechanism designed to decide conflicts, one that focuses on 
actors, their stakes and stands, their motivations and the environment in which they 
operate while not addressing in detail other factors such as resources, strategies, and 
power and influence interactions that converge to produce outcomes.  
Certainly, the emergence of GATS and its connection to higher education as well as 
relatively unexamined nature of the study of higher education trade provide researchers 
with fertile ground for conducting studies on many related issues and for using numerous 
theoretical approaches. Although much confusion remains with regard to GATS and what 
it entails, it provides all the more reason to conduct studies to gain at least some 
preliminary understanding of experiences under the treaty. That understanding can 
provide much-needed information to policy makers and other stakeholders as they 
attempt to formulate new policy or reshape existing policy. Bassett’s (2006) research is of 
particular relevance to the current study. Although her work took a primarily economic, 
rather than a political, approach and focused primarily on participants’ stakes and stands 
and on process outcomes, her findings illustrated aspects of the U.S. experience with 
higher education trade. Those findings underscored the lack of broad direct participation 
from higher education stakeholders in shaping U.S. higher education trade policy in 
contrast to the many concerns the stakeholders expressed.  
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In examining the literature on political approaches to issue analysis and in 
considering Lasswell’s (1936) definition of politics, one is able to ascertain the 
importance of examining multiple variables in the determination of “who gets what, 
when [and] how” in studies using political perspectives. The question in examining a new 
and as of yet relatively unstudied area such as GATS (and, indeed, in any study, whether 
in a new or well-established area of research) is which variables are the most critical for 
study in which instances. The key is to search for variables of relevance and significance, 
and in a new area such as GATS, the relative lack of research lends itself to a study that is 
geared toward exploring the broad issues and generating insight than to testing 
hypotheses and building upon the specific research conducted by other scholars. The 
search for rich descriptive data as a starting point can prevent the development of 
spurious conclusions. Gergen (1971, p. 205) stated that “[b]uilding an adequate theory in 
any area of the social sciences depends ultimately on the availability of ‘real world’ data. 
Without a substantive database, the inductive process by which social science develops 
may give rise to spurious and misleading conceptual premises.”  
In order to begin this examination, an orienting framework of political analysis was 
chosen a priori to guide the study. That choice was made on the basis of a determination 
that the issue of the inclusion of higher education in GATS, one that is filled with 
uncertainty and conflicting opinions, meets the prerequisites for the development of a 
political situation (actor interdependence, goal disagreement, and scarce resources 
producing conflict). This study, in using a broad approach that combines the structural 
component model of political analysis with that of the influence component, examined 
together all of the elements identified in previous sections as being aspects of political 
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models. The following section describes one such model, a framework that is suited to 
examining new areas of scholarship in political processes and to providing rich language 
to describe those processes. That framework guided the analysis presented in this 
research study. 
Conceptual Framework for This Study 
As noted previously, frameworks for political analysis may be thought of as 
belonging to one of two categories: those dealing with the system as the unit of analysis 
and those dealing with participants as the unit of analysis. The eclectic approach used in 
this study combines and capitalizes upon particular models in both of these traditions in 
order to capitalize on the relative advantages of each. 
To examine the factors involved in this case, this study relied on a political 
systems/power-influence perspective, elaborated by Campbell and Mazzoni (1976) and 
further developed and articulated by Mazzoni (1991a). In developing and refining this 
framework, Campbell and Mazzoni drew upon the previous work of scholars such as 
Easton (as incorporated by Allison (1971) and Wirt and Kirst [1972]). In further 
conceptualization, Mazzoni cited the work of Bacharach and Lawler (1981), Baldridge 
(1971), Cohen and March (1974), Dahl (1984), Gamson (1968), Kingdon (1984), Lukes 
(1977), Morgan (1986) and Pfeffer (1981), as well as other political and organizational 
theorists. The framework is thus firmly grounded in theory, much of which was discussed 
earlier in this chapter, to provide evidence for Mazzoni’s general structural model and the 
subsequent classification scheme. Furthermore, because of its heavy theoretical saturation 
and its absorption of other models that describe specific aspects of decision making 
processes, the Mazzoni framework enables the researcher to conduct exploratory studies 
of relatively unexamined and/or unexplained areas of decision making and to elicit thick 
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description of decision making in those areas. The findings may, indeed, provide 
evidence to support the other models and thus to provide direction for further study. If 
not, however, the framework enables the researcher to discover and describe aspects of 
decision making processes. 
The political systems component relates to the mechanism that has been authorized to 
decide conflicts over the allocation of scarce resources. It holds that disturbances from 
the external environment on any political system may become stresses that penetrate the 
boundaries of that system and become inputs (demands, which are generally associated 
with pressures for help, reward, or recognition; and supports, which are usually in the 
form of a willingness to accept the decisions of the system or the system itself [Wirt & 
Kirst, 1972]). Through a conversion process, these inputs are converted into outputs, the 
temporary resolutions of conflict that, through a feedback loop, may themselves become 
inputs. 
Although the political systems framework enables the analyst to understand the 
importance of the environment as well as institutional features in a decision, it does not 
help foster an understanding of how the conversion process takes place, in particular how 
the phenomenon of influence is brought to bear on the process (Campbell & Mazzoni, 
1976). Hence, the power-influence perspective is added to the mix. This lens focuses on 
the insiders’ view of the political process: the micro, internal decision processes that are 
not captured by a study of the system by itself. The power-influence perspective assumes 
that policy making is “a competitive process, the dynamic of which resides in the 
interplay of influence” (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976, p. 13).   
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Although the framework is grounded in and supported by theory, Mazzoni stated his 
view that the framework itself is not a formal theory; no hypotheses are offered or tested. 
Rather, he viewed the framework as having the aim of “personal insight and knowledge,” 
explaining what happened, as opposed to “scientific generalization and law,” predicting 
what will happen (Mazzoni, 1991a, p. 10). Such an aim makes this framework 
particularly useful in the study of a relatively unchartered domain, such as with GATS 
and higher education, because of its ability to enable the analyst to explore a phenomenon 
and provide a rich description of the components of the decision making process. In fact, 
a major strength of the framework is its incorporation of numerous key political 
science/organizational theory conclusions into what might be considered to be an 
omnibus framework that allows the analyst greater flexibility in outlining and describing 
the phenomenon under study. It is also a multidimensional model: the bureaucratic, 
collegial (in particular, widely shared values), and symbolic aspects of other frames (for 
instance, those elaborated by Baldridge [1971] and Bolman and Deal [1997]) have 
particular niches within the categories to provide the analyst the ability to demonstrate 
the effects of these aspects on political processes. Thus, the combined framework is very 
versatile in that it can be used to study all levels of decision making as well as all stages 
in the decision making process (see, for example, DeGive, 1995; DeGive & Olswang, 
1999; Geary, 1992).  
Mazzoni also acknowledged the ongoing debate surrounding the concept of power 
and influence in political analysis. Rather than allow his framework to become mired in 
that debate, however, or to ignore the issue completely, Mazzoni offered a working 
definition for the purpose of political analysis through his model. While not intended to 
67
be a definition with the potential for development of “elegant theory” (Shively, 1974, 
cited in Mazzoni, 1991a, p. 7), Mazzoni contended in his framework document that his 
working definition was consistent with that offered by Burns (1978) and embodied 
elements considered to be the essential ingredients of power by respected analysts: 
The framework which follows is consistent with Burns’ conception, with “power” 
being defined as the capacity of an actor or actors to affect—or effect—decision 
outcomes (Mintzberg, 1983). Power, conceived as being dependent on control of 
resources, may be converted through actor will and skill into influence. “Influence,” 
then, is the exercise of power that shapes or determines decision outcomes. 
(“Decisions” are conceived as choices among alternative goals.) Both power 
(potential impact) and influence (actual impact) are to be understood as 
encompassing a wide spectrum of capabilities and activities. These include, as 
classified by Dahl (1984): trained control, persuasion (rational as well as 
manipulative, inducements and sanctions (and the promise or threat of their use), 
coercion, and physical force. (pp. 7-8) 
Categories for Analysis under the Mazzoni Framework 
In order to enable the analyst to organize, interpret, and present the findings in a 
thorough and meaningful way, Mazzoni offered seven categories, similar in construction 
to the elements of political models described in section one of this chapter. Each of the 
categories represents a different facet or element to be uncovered and described in the 
analysis; when taken together, each of the elements provides its own perspective in 
presenting the analysis of a political phenomenon in its entirety. Pertinent definitions, 
questions, and assumptions inherent in those categories are described in this section. 
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Actors: Who are the relevant participants in the issue being examined? This category 
is concerned with the relevant participants and players in an issue conflict. It is a broad 
term: one that can include individuals, groups, or coalitions; established interests or ad 
hoc organizations; and formal authorities and informal interests.  
While on the surface an analysis of actors might seem straightforward, frequently the 
situation becomes muddied. Participants need not be consistently or heavily involved in 
an issue to play key roles. They may be involved throughout the conflict, or they may be 
active in certain circumstances but not in others. They may be “playing the game” itself 
or “yelling from the sidelines,” and not always for the side on which they are expected to 
be playing or cheering. Involvement in an issue may not even be visible: sometimes the 
most actively involved participants are playing a backstage role, quietly pulling strings 
without any other participants or observers being aware of their involvement.  
Two assumptions related to actors must be made with regard to the framework. The 
first assumption is that human agency is at the heart of political action. That is, actors 
have the ability to significantly affect the thoughts or actions of others as well as the 
belief that such an outcome is possible; in addition, they have the ability to exercise 
choice even within structurally determined limits (Lukes, 1977, cited in Mazzoni, 1991a). 
The second assumption is that participation is based upon rational action. What 
constitutes “rational action” is somewhat modified from that commonly found in 
discussions of the concept in other decision making models. Mazzoni described it as a 
“relaxed version of what is sometimes called…the ‘modified rational-actor’ model” (p. 
16) as outlined by Blalock in 1989. In other words, actors will engage in goal-directed 
behavior and will protect their own interests (which may or may not be of a material 
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nature). In doing so, they will calculate benefits and costs and will make decisions based 
upon “subjective expected utilities” (Blalock, 1989, cited in Mazzoni, p. 16), an analysis 
of the choice situation and personal assessments of the chances for gains or losses. 
However, this modified approach to rational action introduces the notion of actors as 
ethical, social, and emotional beings. Accordingly, actions are not just raw calculations of 
individual self-interest; they may be directed toward achieving goals that serve other 
individuals and/or to engaging in behavior considered to be socially appropriate. Actions 
may also be no more than emotional responses to stressful and uncertain situations (Lynn, 
1980, cited in Mazzoni), in which case a particular actor may not appear to be acting 
rationally at all. 
Goals: What results do actors seek to attain from their involvement? Within any 
given political situation within higher education, a multitude of goals may exist. They 
range from the very concrete (for example, to provide additional language to a criterion 
to clarify a graduation requirement) to the abstract (for example, to maintain and enhance 
student achievement levels). They may deal with issues of broad policy (for example, to 
increase the ability of American higher education institutions to conduct operations 
outside the United States). They may seek personal gains (for example, to broaden 
visibility within an organization or profession) and also may represent personal or group 
values (for example, to protect academic freedom in higher education institutions). In 
short, goals serve as placeholders for a multi-level understanding of what participants 
want. There are probably as many goals as there are actors. 
Assessing what actors hope to achieve in a decision process is somewhat contested 
and tricky. The assumption of intentionality in behavior-based political models, with 
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actor beliefs guiding influence attempts, sometimes clashes with the reality of a particular 
situation. Sometimes goals are not recognized until after a particular decision is made; 
sometimes they are not even known to the participants, so goals appear to be more of a 
rationalization than a reason for action. In addition, goals are often conflicting and 
shifting and sometimes hidden, making their identification difficult at best. However, 
even when accounting for a certain degree of chance in decision making, many actors are 
quite cognizant of what they want. Indeed, studying participant goals can provide 
valuable insights into the degree to which players have an interest in the issue as well as 
into the salience of the issue to the players. A study of the goals also can assist in the 
study of the influence of the actors and, ultimately, in judgments about who were the 
winners and the losers. What did the participants originally want, and what did they get? 
To what degree did they have to compromise? Such pre-post comparisons can provide a 
method of assessing the process dynamics and outcomes of a particular case. 
In analyzing actor goals, it is helpful to examine related concepts that both lead to and 
emanate from goal formulation. Interests, the “set of predispositions…that lead a person 
to act in one direction rather than another” (Morgan, 1986, cited in Mazzoni, 1991a, p. 
23), are reflected in actors’ stakes, or the manner in which interests are implicated for an 
actor in a particular decision making situation. Those stakes lead to the formulation of 
goals, and all three, interests, stakes, and goals, “contribute to the stands (e.g., for, 
against, neutral) that actors take on the proposals that emerge in decision making 
processes” (p. 23). As noted previously, goals can shift; sometimes, too, so do stakes. 
Interests, however, are relatively stable and enduring with regard to a particular actor, 
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even though expressions of these interests and the means by which they are pursued may 
shift. 
Resources: What do actors command that gives them the power, i.e., the capacity, to 
exert influence? According to Mazzoni (1991a, p. 29), “goal attainment requires power; 
power requires resources. Resources serve as the basis for influence because they impact 
motivation” through affecting actors’ perceptions of advantages and disadvantages. 
Almost anything, or anyone, has the potential to be used as a resource. Mazzoni 
identified ten general types of resources that have widespread application in political 
analysis: official position (legitimate authority), money and its purchases (which can be 
converted into other resources), information and its control, professional expertise (which 
expands as society becomes more complex and technologies become more esoteric), 
available time, social status, evocative symbols, group cohesion (particularly critical for 
subordinated groups), access to influentials (for instance, connection networks, which can 
reach upward as well as outward), and political skills. This list, of course, is not 
exhaustive; resources specific to a particular issue may be operating in political 
situations.  
Resources in this framework are generally considered to be an index or an indicator 
of the power of the participants. Consistent with the working definition stated earlier in 
this chapter, Mazzoni did not view power itself as a resource but rather as a potential 
outcome of use of a resource. It is a potential outcome because the use of resources in 
providing power is dependent upon the particular situation. The potency of any given 
resource is dependent upon many factors, including the issue at stake, the stage of the 
decision making process, the relevant actors involved, and the prevailing rules, both 
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formal and informal. Mazzoni (p. 29) made clear the relevance of resources in a 
particular choice situation: “If [actor] perceptions are not affected—directly or indirectly, 
manifestly or implicitly—then no matter how powerful the resource appears, it will turn 
out to be impotent.”  
Motivation: How willing are actors to use their power resources to exert influence? 
The particulars of a situation certainly affect the ability of one actor to utilize resources to 
influence another actor. In any case, however, resource activation requires energy. The 
mere possession of resources is not enough to determine that a participant will act. 
According to Mazzoni (1991a, p. 71), it is human will that lies between power and 
influence. “Motivation is the pivot on which educational change efforts fly or fold,” he 
stated. Mazzoni cited Dahl’s (1961) contention that the variation between the energy 
necessary to exert influence and the willingness to expend that energy might be as 
important in accounting for influence differences as the variations in the resources 
themselves. In fact, in a situation in which most resources lie untapped (Dahl’s concept of 
slack resources), the use of only a few resources may be sufficient to exert influence. 
A study of actors’ motivations, then, involves the analysis of the participants’ 
willingness to use their resources to exert influence on a particular issue, in a particular 
decision area, at a particular time. Analysis of motivation operates under an assumption 
of basic actor rationality; that is, actors will make rudimentary cost and benefit 
calculations in order to determine whether they will bring their resources to bear in a 
particular situation. What is at stake? What are the perceived benefits? What are the 
perceived costs? What are the prospects for success? Is it appropriate to be involved in 
the first place? Assuming that participants act in such a rational fashion, then actors can 
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be expected to mobilize their resources when the benefits versus the costs of expending 
their energy are greater than a similar comparison of benefits and costs in not doing so.  
An analysis of motivation can incorporate the study of noninvolvement, that is, the 
assessment of the reasons that parties may have for not choosing to become involved in a 
conflict (or the manner by which they may be prevented from becoming involved). 
Nonparticipation can be a result of many different combinations of costs and benefits: for 
instance, not enough time to devote to an issue that an actor deems to be ultimately 
unimportant in light of his/her interests, values, and goals. Such assessments can be and 
are made freely. In other instances, however, the use of power and subsequent influence 
by one actor can prevent another actor from participating. Mazzoni (1991a) noted 
Clegg’s (1989) identification of three general noninvolvement tactics. The first, which 
Mazzoni termed the tactics of non-decision, involves the prevention of certain 
participants or demands from ever appearing in a decision arena or their being made 
impotent if they should appear. The second, the rule of anticipated reactions coined by 
Friedrich (1937), involves one actor’s anticipation of opposition by another actor and 
from that the decision not to participate. The third is the mobilization of bias, in which 
such a degree of control is exerted by dominant interests over less powerful individuals 
and groups, and their values, beliefs, and opinions, that those that dominate determine 
whether certain demands are even expressed. Needless to say, identifying the application 
of noninvolvement tactics is difficult if not impossible; however, the difficulty in 
obtaining evidence to support such claims does not mean that the exercise of power to 
prevent participation did not occur. And, indeed, preventing others from participating 
through reducing their motivation can prove to be a smart maneuver. If an actor can keep 
74
potential adversaries from becoming involved in the conflict through whatever means is 
effective, that actor not only gains a relative power advantage from the reduction in the 
number of players but also reduces the resources necessary for him or her to be a player 
(i.e., he/she tightens the slack). 
Strategies: How do actors mobilize their power resources to exert influence? This 
category deals with the activities that actors deliberately undertake to influence decisions; 
it is the tactical deployment of power resources, the action “which converts power and 
will into decision advantage” (Mazzoni, 1991a, p. 100). Successful strategies must be 
tailored to fit the circumstances of a particular situation. Mazzoni, however, outlined 
some basic concepts that point to likely directions for strategy: gaining access, using 
voice and threatening exit, building coalitions, setting agendas, and controlling the scope 
of conflict.   
In order to put any strategy in play, actors must first have access to the appropriate 
decision arena and to other arena players. Access opens lines of communication and 
connotes clout and is considered to be a fundamental expression of power. According to 
Ripley (1985, cited in Mazzoni, 1991a, p. 102), “Who has what kind of access in what 
degree helps determine whose interests triumph when interests conflict.” Many types of 
tactics are used to gain entry into decision arenas. For example, access may be obtained 
through formal or informal means, through third-party interventions, or through illegal or 
extralegal channels. Access does not necessarily mean that influence will follow; 
additional strategies must be used to build upon that initial entrance. Once obtained, 
however, the particular type of access actors have enables them to refine their strategies 
for influencing policy making. For example, access to a high-level governmental figure 
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may call for one-on-one meetings with written follow-up that reiterates the issues 
discussed during the meetings.  
One of the commonly used strategies in political issue contests is that of voice-exit as 
most notably described by Hirschman (1970, cited in Mazzoni, 1991a). Voice enables a 
player to make his/her dissatisfaction known through various channels; it can help to 
“soften” the system for other strategies or can sometimes be effective on its own. Exit, 
the departure or threat of departure from a system, may be an effective strategy if an 
organization is highly dependent on the individuals or groups threatening to depart.  
Coalition formation can be a very effective strategy in using resources to exert 
influence. Securing allies (whether individuals of groups of individuals) in an attempt to 
exert influence enables the pooling of numbers of participants, expertise, money, and 
other resources for realization of a common goal, or at least sets of shared goals. Parties 
can join coalitions for quite different reasons: for the social connections that come with a 
political alliance, for the pursuit of ideological goals, for the promise of material benefits, 
or for other motivations. Because of differences in what are sometimes incompatible 
goals and motivations, coalition leaders often must keep the coalition’s focus and purpose 
very general in order to keep the group from splintering. 
Many times actors use agenda control, the specification and sequencing of items 
under consideration by a decision maker, as a strategy. Often overlooked as a potential 
strategy, agenda control can, nonetheless, be very effective because it can establish some 
of the parameters governing consideration of a particular issue. It can affect which items 
are brought up for consideration at all. If an issue is to be considered, an actor can 
employ various tactics of scope, placement, and time allotment to influence the outcome 
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of a decision. For instance, an actor controlling presentation of an agenda item can frame 
an issue to emphasize certain facets of a situation or to ignore others entirely. An actor 
also can place an item on an agenda to serve as a signaling device as to the perceived 
importance of an issue or to allow for greater or lesser time for discussion and decision. 
Placement at the very beginning can end up as a “garbage can” (Cohen & March, 1974; 
cited in Mazzoni, 1991a, p. 124), which serves as an opportunity for meeting participants 
to air many of their general complaints; placement at the very end may result in little 
attention being paid to the item as weary participants look forward to adjournment. An 
entire agenda may be crammed with items for consideration, a tactic that shortens the 
time and attention available for any given issue. These are only examples of the various 
methods in which agenda control can serve as a strategy for influence. 
The scope of conflict, a concept introduced by Schattschneider in 1960, deals with the 
extent to which an audience, previously uninvolved individuals or groups, become 
involved in a particular conflict. Because the outcome of a conflict is determined by its 
scope, control of that scope is a key strategy. In fact, according to Schattschneider (cited 
in Mazzoni, 1991a), scope control is pivotal to all other strategies because it determines 
whether access is narrow or wide, whether coalitions are small or large, and whether 
agendas are closed or open. One method of controlling scope is that of size control. 
Generally speaking, arena insiders prefer scope to be confined to a few actors and out of 
the public domain; outsiders prefer to expand the scope of the conflict, and in so doing to 
introduce more unpredictability that potentially results in a power shift. Another method 
for managing scope is the displacement of conflicts, in which one conflict issue is 
substituted by or transformed into another. When that happens, the delicate balance of 
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alignments, relationships, and priorities within a coalition can be altered significantly; the 
subsequent need for redefinition of goals and priorities can illuminate existing differences 
among coalition members and create potentially fatal cleavages within a coalition. 
Schattschneider (cited in Mazzoni, p. 129) considered the substitution of conflicts to be 
“the most devastating kind of political strategy.” 
Setting: How does the institutional and sociocultural context shape the interplay of 
influence? Policy and decision making activities do not occur in a vacuum. Political 
participants always find themselves acting within the boundaries of a sociocultural 
context and usually within those of an institutional context. Those boundaries provide the 
structure in which the decision process takes place. They shape strategy choice and 
influence dynamics as well as decision content. The opportunities and constraints set by 
the context are the focus of the setting category. Because it allows for the examination of 
the interplay between the formal structure authorized to make decisions and the internal 
conversion process, the category provides a bridge between the power-influence and 
political systems components of the framework.   
Four general concepts or features are the focus of this category. The first is that of 
roles, both formal (i.e., position within hierarchical structure, such as committee member) 
and informal (such as committee conflict mediator). Roles have inherent expectations and 
rules, not all of them explicit, and they will affect what actions actors will take. For 
example, the action that would be taken by the actor “as a person” versus the actor “as a 
role” may not be the same. The second concept is that of the decision arenas, which shape 
the access, relevance of resources, incentives, influence relationships, and rules of play. 
Arenas can vary in scope and form: from tiny, elite arenas comprised of only top-level 
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individuals (such as the Council on Trade in Services, which oversees GATS) and 
perhaps behind-the-scenes influentials to macro arenas in which “everyone” appears to be 
a participant and the policy making process is more visible and perhaps more contentious 
(for example, U.S. Trade Representative hearings that call for public comment on 
proposed policy). The third concept, group dynamics, considers how multiple actors who 
comprise a group arrive at decisions. Group dynamics can bring about positive (for 
example, synergistic effects from more sharing of views and information) or negative (for 
example, the development of groupthink, in which group members’ views conform to one 
another) effects. The possible development of groupthink mentality may be a function of 
the last concept, organizational processes and culture, which takes into account such 
factors as institutional routines, standard operating procedures, formal and informal rules, 
accepted and expected codes of conduct, and dominant views and values. Processes and 
culture become set in place over time and often result from the impact of environmental 
forces (for example, economic conditions and demographics) on an organization. The 
organization shapes its own ways of existing and of doing its work and subsequently is 
shaped itself by the processes and culture it has created. 
Interactions and outcomes: What are the critical influence relationships among 
actors that decide outcomes? The last category in the Mazzoni framework examines the 
process dynamics that unfold during issue conflicts. The consideration of interactions 
allows for interpretations of the manner in which participants, goals, resources, 
motivations, strategies, and setting interact to create patterns of influence. As such, 
examination of interactions can identify relative power advantages on a particular issue, 
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at a particular time, in a particular arena. It serves to integrate the findings and to account 
for the story described in the analysis.   
Multiple stages and streams of influence may occur in any issue conflict and may 
involve complex patterns of connections between and among players at certain process 
stages and in certain arenas. Therefore, analysis of interactions and determination of 
influence in a decision involves certain initial determinations. The first is which of the 
actors influenced the decision at any point. The second is at what point in the process the 
actor was involved in influencing the decision. The third is what type of influence the 
actor exerted. The procedure under which this study will examine interactions will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 3. 
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework: Summary and Implications 
According to Vlk (2006, p. 24), “It has so far been very rare for higher education 
scholars to go deeply to the primary sources of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services or other related documents. Yet, without such an effort the danger is obvious—
the lack of knowledge on what GATS really is and how it functions might eventually lead 
to increased misunderstanding and inaccuracy in the debate and the decision-making 
process.” This chapter has outlined a framework, rich in theoretical underpinnings, which 
helped to address that concern, at least from the perspective of attempts by one WTO 
member to develop higher education trade policy under the GATS provisions.  
The Mazzoni framework allows for the study of higher education policy making 
through a political lens, one that allows researchers to investigate many different 
elements and provide a picture of an issue in an unexplored domains such as GATS. In so 
doing, the research expands applications of the Mazzoni framework of combined political 
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systems/power-influence into studies with an international aspect. In addition, the 
richness of the theory contained in the framework allows such study to be more explicitly 
theoretically anchored, an approach that is rather absent in studies related to higher 
education and GATS at present. While the study described in this document is descriptive 
in nature and not geared to generating elegant theory, it focused on scholarly work that 
makes explicit its theoretical bearings. 
The application of the Mazzoni framework into new areas of study holds promise for 
generating insights into how particular types of higher education policies may be 
developed in particular arenas. It may prove fruitful in providing findings that will lead to 
further development of theory as well as deeper exploration of issues related to 




Research Design and Methodology 
 
This chapter builds upon the theory and literature introduced in chapter 2 to present 
the research design and methodology for this study. It includes the definition of key 
terms, the assumptions arising from the underlying theory as well as from the Mazzoni 
framework, the research questions, and the variables that will be examined. This chapter 
also discusses the research methods for conducting the study, including selection of case, 
sources of data, procedures for data collection and analysis, and controls for minimizing 
error and bias. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of ethical considerations and 
the protection of the research subjects used in the study. 
Research Design 
This section outlines the application of the conceptual framework, the Mazzoni 
model described in chapter 2, to the case of the U.S. experience in developing higher 
education trade policy under GATS. It includes the review of key terms that were used in 
the study, the assumptions that underlay the framework and the collection and analysis of 
the data, and the questions that guided the conduct and analysis of the study. The research 
variables that were part of the framework also will be examined. A summary of the 
theoretical assumptions and variables, along with the research questions and data sources, 
appears in table 2 at the end of this chapter. 
Definition of Terms 
The following terms, identified and described in some detail in chapter 2, served as 
guiding definitions for the conduct of the study and subsequent analysis of the data. 
Consistent with the Mazzoni model, they have been adapted somewhat from their 
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original forms to be as inclusive as possible of various scholars’ individual explanations. 
Terms more specifically related to GATS and its provisions will be included in the 
presentation of the findings in chapter 5. 
Politics refers to the activity undertaken by individuals and/or groups of individuals 
to acquire and use scarce resources to obtain preferred outcomes in a situation in which 
there is uncertainty or dissensus about choice, as well as the system in which that activity 
takes place. 
Conflict is a situation that is necessary for and precedes political activity. It is 
produced through the combination of actor interdependence, heterogeneous/ conflicting 
goals, and resource scarcity. 
Power refers to potential impact. Dependent upon control of resources and 
appropriateness of those resources in a particular situation, power may be, but is not 
always, converted through actor will and skill into influence. 
Influence is actual impact; the exercise of power that shapes or determines decision 
outcomes. It was gauged according to two determinants that examined which actors could 
have been or were involved and when/how such influence might have occurred. 
Authority is the legitimate (i.e., accepted and expected) prerogative to make decisions 
binding upon others. 
Theoretical Assumptions 
 
Drawn from the Mazzoni framework as well as from the work of Fischer (1990), 
Geary (1992), and Pfeffer (1981), the following assumptions are embedded in this 
particular framework: 
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1. Human agency is at the heart of political action. That is, participants and players in 
an issue conflict have the ability to significantly affect the thoughts or actions of others. 
2. Actor configurations change with different issues and decision arenas, across 
different stages of the policymaking process, and at different points in time. 
3. Actors are rational beings that engage in goal-related activities, but they are also 
ethical, social, and emotional beings who seek to advance their ideologies, views and 
values as well as their material interests. The benefits that actors seek may be collective 
as well as individual, symbolic as well as material. 
4. Interests and stakes contribute to the results (goals) actors seek to attain from their 
involvement in political processes.  
5. Interests, stakes and goals contribute to the stands that actors take on proposals that 
emerge in policymaking processes. 
6. Conflict exists over the goals to be sought or the means by which those goals will 
be achieved.  
7. Goal attainment requires the power (capacity) to exert influence.  
8. Power is dispersed among participants; the power of the various participants will 
determine the outcome of the policy making process. 
9. Actors differ in control of resources and ability to use them. 
10. To be converted into influence, resources must be relevant to the particular policy 
making situation. 
11. Actors differ in the will to exercise power to exert influence and must be willing 
to use their resources to exert influence on a particular issue, in a particular decision area, 
at a particular time. 
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12. Actors will deliberately undertake activities that convert resources into influence. 
These activities are tailored to the particular policy making situation. 
13. Actors differ in the strategies that they will use. 
14. Institutional and sociocultural contexts shape the interplay of influence. 
15. Actors differ in their access to decision arenas and in expertise in using the rules 
and norms of the political system.  
16. Policy making is a pluralistic process through which interdependent participants 
use influence and/or authority in an effort to promote conflicting goals in an attempt to 
acquire favorable decision outcomes.  
17. An examination of the manner in which actors, goals, resources, motivations, 
strategies, and setting interact can identify relative power advantages on a particular 
issue, at a particular time, in a particular arena. 
In addition to these study-specific assumptions, another assumption, that of the 
researcher’s ability to conduct the study, must be noted. As such, it was assumed that the 
researcher possessed the energy and skill to gather and weigh evidence, to decide on 
valid findings, and to present the findings in a clear, coherent, and convincing manner. 
Research Questions 
 
This study sought to answer the following questions:  
1. Who were the major actors in the policymaking process related to the substantial 
and technical aspects of the U.S. higher education trade negotiations in the 
context of GATS? 
a. Who were the major actors at each stage of the process? 
b. What were their goals and priorities? 
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c. What motivated them to become involved in the policy making process? What 
was at stake?  
d. What resources did each actor command?  
2. How did the actors attempt to influence the policy making process? 
a. What strategies did actors employ to use their resources to exert influence?  
b. How were the influence attempts shaped and constrained by the contextual 
factors of the WTO and higher education environments?  
c. What alliances developed among the actors?  
3. What was the outcome of the influence attempts? 
a. What were the differences between what actors sought and what actually 
occurred?  
b. What compromises and bargains were necessary in reaching the policy 
outcome?  
c. What factors were responsible for that outcome? 
Research Variables 
Chapter 2 outlined the Mazzoni framework for analyzing and describing policy 
making processes as seen from a political perspective. It demonstrated the model’s heavy 
theoretical saturation, its inclusion of elements consistent with definitions of politics, and 
its absorption of other models that describe specific aspects of decision making 
processes, aspects that are thus captured into a combined political systems/ power-
influence model of analysis. Chapter 2 also outlined the advantages of using a framework 
that is broader in its scope. It provides a vehicle for the conduct of exploratory studies 
into relatively unexamined and/or unexplained areas of decision making and elicits thick 
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descriptions of decision making in those areas. The framework organizes related theories 
and models into categories to aid in collecting data and presenting findings. This study, 
therefore, used the Mazzoni categories as the variables to be analyzed in answering the 
research questions and thus in describing the policy making process. They are outlined in 
this section. The discussion of the variables contains examples of the manner in which a 
variable may be manifested within the context of the study of U.S. higher education trade 
policy development under GATS. 
Actors are the relevant participants in the issue conflict being examined, whether they 
be individuals, groups, or coalitions; established interests or ad hoc organizations; and/or 
formal authorities and informal interests. Numerous players may be identified: for 
example, governmental bodies, higher education associations, quality assurance oversight 
organizations, and international nongovernmental organizations.  
Goals are the results that actors seek to attain from their involvement in the 
policymaking process. Within the GATS process, goals may be concrete (for example, to 
attempt to ensure access to higher education markets internationally) and abstract (for 
example, an “aspirational” goal such as a desire to maintain the integrity and character of 
public higher education).  
Resources are tangible or intangible items that actors command that give them the 
power, i.e., the capacity, to exert influence. As such, resources are also indicators of the 
power of actors and may include direct access to high-ranking officials, expertise on the 
topic of higher education trade, and the ability to express viewpoints through written 
materials and face-to-face meetings. Consistent with Mazzoni’s framework, power in this 
study was viewed as the result of use of the resources, rather than a resource in itself: “… 
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the capacity of an actor or actors to affect—or effect—decision outcomes (Mintzberg, 
1983). Power, conceived as being dependent on control of resources, may be converted 
through actor will and skill into influence” (Mazzoni, 1991a, pp. 7-8, emphasis added). 
Motivation gauges how willing actors are to use their power resources to exert 
influence on a particular issue, in a particular decision area, at a particular time. Various 
actors may be more motivated to be active in certain stages rather than in others.  
Strategies are the activities that actors deliberately undertake to mobilize their 
resources to exert influence. Certainly within the context of the general WTO 
negotiations, one of the most potent strategies used to exert influence has been that of 
overt protest by individuals and groups that view the WTO treaties unfavorably.  
Setting addresses how the institutional and sociocultural context shapes the interplay 
of influence. Because it allows for the examination of the interplay between the formal 
structure authorized to make decisions and the internal conversion process, the category 
provides a bridge between the political systems (the external structure) and power-
influence (the internal workings) components of the framework. Setting comprises the 
concepts of roles (for example, formal roles such as trade representative or association 
president or informal roles such as facilitator), decision areas (for example, that of the 
WTO or of the higher education association community in Washington, DC), group 
dynamics (either positive, synergistic effects or negative effects), and organizational 
processes and culture (for example, the formal and informal rules developed to govern 
the GATS negotiations). It also includes the broader environmental forces (for example, 
societal views toward higher education or the increase in information technology) and 
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any impacts these forces might have on the external structure or the internal conversion 
process. 
Interactions and outcomes are the process dynamics that unfold during issue 
conflicts. The category allows for interpretations of the manner in which participants, 
goals, resources, motivations, strategies, and setting interact to create patterns of 
influence. Interactions are, in essence, dependent variables: Their outcomes are 
determined by the interpretations of the inputs of the other six variables. 
Multiple stages and streams of influence may occur in any issue conflict and may 
involve complex patterns of connections between and among players at certain process 
stages and in certain arenas. Therefore, analysis of interactions and determination of 
influence in a decision involves certain initial determinations. Using a variant of the 
Lasswell (1936) definition of politics as a scheme for classifying the determinations, they 
are “who,” “when,” and “how.”   
1. “Who:” Which of the actors influenced the decision at any point? 
2. “When:” At what point in the process was the actor involved in influencing the 
decision?  
3. “How:” What type of influence did the actor exert? For instance, did the actor 
prevail in getting an item on the agenda? Was he or she responsible for 
developing support for an issue?  
To examine and analyze these issues, this study used the following procedures, drawn 
from the work of Dahl (1984), Gamson (1968), and Geary (1992), to array the dynamics 
and to provide interpretations: 
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Identifying the influentials (“who”). Identification of influentials may be thought to 
have two indicators: One of capacity and the other of actuality. This phase of 
determining interactions combined steps that addressed both these indicators.  
The first step, positional/reputational review, is an elitist approach that aims to 
identify individuals thought to be capable of exercising power. It assumes that power is 
rooted in top positions and in resources and that those exercising power can be identified 
by people that “know” where that power exists. Identification takes place through 
analysis of organizational lists, inventories of resources and who controls them, and 
interviews with knowledgeable individuals. It provides a starting point for examination of 
interactions; the analyst can conduct further exploration to determine which of these 
individuals may have been involved in a particular issue. 
The positional/reputational review, however, rests on the assumption that people in 
top positions actually exercised power in a specific issue situation. It does not mean that 
such persons actually participated. Nor does it acknowledge the existence of other 
individuals, perhaps not known within a formal structure, who have actually exercised 
influence in an issue contest. Therefore, a second step, decisional review, examines actual 
participation patterns: participants who may have had influence on a decision outcome 
and prevailed on a particular issue. This step is a pluralistic approach that acknowledges 
that power and influence depend on particular issues in particular settings at a particular 
time. Decisional review also can provide insight into differences between what actors 
originally sought and what was achieved. To render these judgments, it was necessary to 
identify actors who have prevailed in certain decisions related to the issue under study. 
These actors included persons identified through the positional/reputational review, but 
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not all these persons were influential in this particular issue. Rather, actors relatively 
“hidden” from public view often exerted influence on the development of higher 
education trade policy. 
Assessing the influence (“when” and “how”). To assess when and how individuals 
might have had influence, decision events and participant actions were examined 
according to the following indicators: (1) Did the actor have the resources necessary to 
influence the decision? (2) Did the actor have the motivation and skill to make an 
influence attempt? (3) Did the actor have a strategy in place to attempt to influence? and 
(4) Within the context of the setting that the decision occurred, can a plausible sequence 
of events that combines actor, motivation, resources, and strategy be constructed? These 
indicators were helpful not only in laying out possible explanations but also in attempting 
to guard against possible misattributions of influence as a result of such occurrences as 
chance/chameleon activity in which a participant’s skill is in correctly guessing the 
outcome of a decision and then attaching him/herself to it without actually having 
exercised any influence whatsoever (Dahl, 1957, 1984; Pfeffer, 1981). 
Methodology 
The previous section discussed the theoretical assumptions, the research questions, 
and variables that served as the foundations for the design of this study. This section of 
the chapter introduces the manner in which the study was conducted, including the 
methodological approach, sources of data, procedures for data collection and analysis, 
organization and presentation of the findings, and steps taken to enhance study rigor.  
General Mode of Inquiry and Rationale for Selection 
This study was designed using a qualitative case study approach, specifically a 
historical case study. In this particular tradition, according to Cresswell (1994, p. 12), 
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“the researcher explores a single entity or phenomenon (‘the case’), bounded by time and
activity [emphasis added] (a program, event, process, institution, or social group) and 
collects detailed information using a variety of data collection procedures during a 
sustained program of time” (see also Merriam, 1988; Yin, 1989).” This mode of inquiry 
is one to which the issue under examination was particularly suited. Case study has a rich 
tradition in the social sciences (Cresswell, 1998; Yin, 1994). Mazzoni himself made 
frequent use of case studies in analyzing political phenomena (e.g., Mazzoni, 1991b; 
Mazzoni, 1994), as did other researchers in applying political models to educational 
policymaking issues (e.g., De Give & Olswang, 1999; Malen & Ogawa, 1988). With 
regard to the issue under examination in this study, the single entity is the United States, 
the activity is the negotiations over the trade of higher education under the WTO’s 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the time period extends from 1999 
(roughly the year in which consideration of the issue began in earnest) to early 2007. 
Thus, the phenomenon is one that is, indeed, bounded by time and activity.   
As demonstrated in chapter 2, policy making processes as seen through political 
lenses are inherently complex. Analysis of such processes involves examining the 
thoughts and actions through which actors employ their values and goals to reach 
decisions, a task in which the ability to capture nuance is important. The how and why of 
decision making processes needs to be explored through techniques that involve the 
researcher as the primary instrument for data collection and analysis in order to ask 
probing questions, to follow up answers with more questions, and to make sense of the 
data that are collected. For that reason, this case study was qualitative rather than 
quantitative in nature.  
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Because of the how and why questions that political models address, these models in 
general (and the Mazzoni framework in particular) inherently lend themselves to 
describing and explaining a phenomenon. Indeed, when conducted through qualitative 
research techniques, a case study seeks to describe a particular event. In the beginning 
phases, however, it may not seek to test or verify a theory, although a theory may in fact 
emerge through the design and analysis phase (Cresswell, 1994). That is not to say that 
qualitative case studies are atheoretical; these studies may employ theory in many 
different ways. Such is the case in this particular study: a framework primarily 
descriptive in nature but securely grounded in theory (i.e., Mazzoni) provides the 
conceptual structure on which the study is built. 
Case Selection 
The selection of the United States experience with the higher education provisions of 
GATS was a function of the U.S. role in higher education. With 4,140 degree-granting 
institutions of postsecondary education serving 16,900,471 students in Fall 2003 (Snyder, 
Tan, & Hoffman, 2005) under both public and private control, from small institutions 
offering liberal arts degrees to large research institutions, the United States has the largest 
system of higher education in the world, both in terms of number of institutions and in 
number of students enrolled in the institutions. Some of those institutions have 
established campuses and programs worldwide. It also has a well-established system of 
nongovernmental quality assurance through the accreditation process, one that has been 
studied by other nations looking to establish more governmentally independent forms of 
quality assurance for their own higher education systems and one that has, in some cases, 
been involved in accreditation of foreign programs of study (for example, the Association 
to Accredit Colleges and Schools of Business).  
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The selection of the United States experience also was made because it is one of only 
a relative few WTO members that has presented a proposal for inclusion of higher 
education services, one that outlines its requests for access to foreign markets as well as 
its offers to provide access by foreign providers to its own markets. In addition, it is one 
of only eight countries that published its offer to provide access to domestic markets 
(Knight, 2003). Although the absence of offers or of publicly available material would 
not have precluded selection of another country, the existence of the U.S. material 
indicated that (1) offers were made and were on the table, which offered a starting point 
for collection of more in-depth information and (2) individuals involved with the process 
were thought to be more forthcoming with additional information. The existence of this 
information also offered archival material for analysis prior to commencing the study. 
The researcher could thus capitalize on the data by building the study on information that 
already existed. In addition, she could use this information to improve the quality of the 
interview questions. 
Finally, the geopolitical position of the United States is a factor that cannot be 
ignored. Described as a “hyperpower—a nation so powerful that it affects the lives of 
people everywhere” (Sardar & Davies, 2002, p. 11), the United States has considerable 
influence both economically and politically. From that perspective, it was expected that a 
study of the United States’ experience with higher education and GATS would be rich in 
information and provide a powerful picture of the ways in which power and influence 
come together to shape higher education policy on the world stage.  
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Data Sources and Procedures for Data Collection 
According to Yin (1994), good case studies make use of multiple sources of 
information. He recommended six types of information sources for case studies: 
documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations, 
and physical artifacts.   
In a study involving processes of policy making, one would not expect to find any 
sort of physical artifacts. Direct and participant observations were not possible due to the 
historical nature of this particular case. The other types of sources, however, were 
appropriate to this study. To that end, the following data sources were used in gathering 
evidence for the analysis. 
Document and archival review. A review of relevant documents provided critical 
information to establish a narrative framework and to develop questions for eventual 
interviewing. These documents included meeting and conference proceedings, letters, 
official reports, position statements, public relations publications, fact sheets, press 
releases, newspaper and journal articles, and books that contain accounts of actions taken 
with regard to higher education and GATS. All documents used in this review were 
publicly available or were provided by interview sources to the researcher during the 
course of the research. In no instance were records considered to be confidential used in 
this study. 
Informal and in-depth interviews with individuals familiar with the case. The 
interviews were useful in providing historical information and verifying information in 
print or received from other interview sources. The informal nature of the interviews 
allowed the researcher to control the line of questioning, to follow up on a response, and 
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to change or amend the questions as necessary. The following organizations were 
contacted for interviews and for assistance in identifying interview sources: (1) officials 
of the WTO, who served as the initial “gatekeepers” to the case and who helped identify 
and gain access to others who could provide insight into the issue; (2) officials from the 
U.S. government, in particular from the USTR; and (3) officials from various groups 
identified in documents, reports, and other material as having been involved in 
deliberations at some level or who have voiced opinions on the matter. The last group 
included heads or other high-level officials from groups such as the American Council on 
Education (ACE), the Commission on Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA), and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  
Potential interview subjects were selected with the guidance of WTO officials as well 
as from records, documents, and other printed material, primarily on the basis of position, 
under the assumption that those in higher levels of authority will have had more 
involvement with the issue or will at least be able to provide a general overview and 
names of individuals more knowledgeable about the case. That assumption was, in fact, 
shown to be valid: Individuals involved in and knowledgeable about the case tended to be 
those at very high levels within their respective organizations. In those instances where 
that was not the case, the individuals were able to direct the researcher to the appropriate 
person. Informants for the interviews were then selected from the total pool of identified 
individuals using the following selection criteria: (1) position/role within the groups 
involved in the process; (2) involvement in the issue being analyzed in this study, (3) 
knowledge/recollection of the issue under study, (4) reputation for candor, (5) willingness 
to participate in the study, and (6) proximity and availability to the researcher. The 
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informants were selected in order to provide a diversity of perspectives on the inclusion 
of higher education in the GATS.  
Eventually, a small but knowledgeable pool of nine individuals was interviewed for 
this study. This group of sources included high-level professionals from the organizations 
involved in the issue, with six individuals holding positive viewpoints on the concept of 
higher education in GATS and three holding negative or neutral views. Five of the 
sources were from authority organizations; the remaining sources were from partisan 
groups (see Gamson, 1968). Each was able to provide in-depth knowledge about the 
issue; all except one were directly involved with the process in some fashion. All the 
sources were candid in their responses, were able to direct the researcher to sources of 
additional information, and agreed to be available for follow-up interviews and questions 
as necessary.  
Interview protocols (see appendices A and B), one for those deemed to be authority 
sources and one for those deemed partisan sources (see p. 109) for the definition of these 
terms), were developed for use in the interviews. Each protocol provided a general script 
for the researcher to follow. Questions were designed to get at the “who, what, when, and 
how” of the policy making process. The researcher, however, was not limited to the 
questions in the protocol if a response sparked a follow up question. Nor was there a 
requirement to follow the script to the letter. For example, any questions deemed to have 
been adequately addressed in a previous response or with the potential to make an 
interviewee unduly uncomfortable were eliminated from the questioning in that particular 
instance. 
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All interview subjects received an informed consent form (appendix C) prior to the 
interview. The form provided information on the purpose of the study, procedures for 
data collection, methods for protection of subject confidentiality, and anticipated benefits 
and risks of subject participation. The form also included contact information for the 
researcher and the university institutional review board and informed the subject that he 
or she had the right to withdraw from the study at any time. This form was signed by the 
participants prior to their interviews. 
Seven of the nine interviews were held face-to-face. This method of interviewing 
enabled the researcher to use gestures, expressions, and so forth to build a rapport with 
the participants both before and during the interviews. In the two instances for which 
face-to-face interviews were impossible because of problems with facilitating the 
meeting, one for travel issues, the other for scheduling conflicts, a telephone interview 
and an e-mail response, respectively, substituted for the face-to-face meeting. Although 
initially the interviews were to be audiotaped whenever possible, the participants, when 
asked prior to their interviews whether they felt comfortable being audiotaped, indicated 
that their responses would be more candid if no recording of the conversation would be 
made. Therefore, none of the interviews were taped, but detailed handwritten notes were 
taken during the interviews.  
At the end of each interview, the sources were asked if they were willing to answer 
follow up questions during subsequent data collection and analysis; all sources were so 
willing. Immediately following each interview, initial thoughts about the content of the 
interview were compiled as well as an assessment of the source’s candor and interest in 
the subject to aid in determining the relative validity of the data collected. As soon as 
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possible after each interview, an outline of the source’s responses was typed and sent to 
the source. Each source was asked to review his or her interview responses and to add to 
or correct the contents as necessary. 
Data Analysis 
As recommended in qualitative research (Cresswell, 1994), data analysis occurred 
simultaneously with data collection as well as with narrative writing. Because of the 
interpretive and interactive nature of qualitative research, the simultaneous conduct of 
these three processes enabled the researcher to look for patterns that could inform 
subsequent interviews, to help refine and shape the questions and to enable the researcher 
to ask follow up questions to informants as necessary, and to assist in sense making in 
data analysis and description in the writing. This approach was a multifaceted version of 
arriving at the “truth;” each of the collection, analysis and writing processes informed and 
improved upon the others.  
Tesch (1990, cited in Cresswell, 1994) stated that the process of data analysis is 
eclectic, that there is no “right way.” Thus, the Mazzoni framework served as the 
mechanism for the organization, analysis, and reporting of the data. The research plan 
allowed for the development of additional categories or amendments to existing 
categories if any data did not fit neatly within the framework. Such a step was not 
necessary: The framework’s categories proved to be sufficient for organizing and 
presenting the findings. Emergent themes and patterns were identified, and an initial 
narrative was written. Questions that emerged in the course of this initial analysis and 
writing were compiled and answers were sought through follow up questions and 
subsequent data analysis and classification. In the course of the follow up questioning and 
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analysis, the researcher searched for evidence that supported as well as refuted the 
apparent themes and patterns that emerged in the initial analysis. 
Data Organization and Presentation of the Findings 
As the picture of “what happened” began to appear and a storyline emerged, the 
prevalent themes provided some of the structure for the final data presentation. One of 
the most critical of these themes was that of event deadlines. Mazzoni (1991b, p. 116) 
argued that moving issues into new decision arenas “can change the key actors, relevant 
resources, incentives for action, influence relationships, and governing rules—and hence 
winners and losers—in policy struggles.” Thus, this study used five temporal phases to 
assist in organizing the discussion of the results of this study and, in so doing, helped to 
identify multiple decision points and patterns of influence. They are as follows:  
Phase 1: Initiation—December 18, 2000. The United States outlines its general 
position related to commitments in the education sector. 
Phase 2: Request—June 30, 2002. All requests for access to foreign markets due. The 
United States makes “substantial requests” of other countries to remove barriers to enable 
greater access to higher, adult and other education services markets. 
Phase 3: Offer—March 31, 2003. Offers from each country to provide access to its 
domestic market due. The United States submits/publishes its offers. 
Phase 4: Revision—May 31, 2005. Original target date for completion of the round 
January 1, 2005; however, trade talks collapse in September 2003. July 2004 talks 
establish new schedules for completion of the round, with a new target date of May 31, 
2005 set for revised services offers. 
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Phase 5: Jeopardy—January 31, 2007 and beyond. Trade talks suffer second 
suspension; the United States is faced with a potential domestic challenge with regard to 
the authority for negotiating trade provisions.  
Steps to Enhance the Rigor of the Study 
No matter how well constructed, no research design is perfect. Each theoretical model 
and methodology offers its own advantages and disadvantages. Chapter 2 discussed the 
various merits and drawbacks of political models but also provided the justification for 
use in this study. Qualitative case study research has been criticized for its lack of 
generalizability to other situations, for the difficulties in replicating the studies, and for 
the interpretive nature of the analysis, which may take different forms depending on the 
particular analyst. In addition, the use of interview sources for information may not 
always be reliable; participants may be reluctant to be completely honest and may not 
remember specifics about the issue under study. Each of these disadvantages, if 
unaddressed, may affect the study’s internal and external validity. However, Merriam 
(1988) and Miles and Huberman (1989) as cited in Cresswell (1994) noted various steps 
that can be taken to enhance internal and external validity of a case study and thus to 
increase the rigor of that study. Based upon their guidance, this study incorporated a 
number of methods to provide that enhancement. The methods included those intended to 
boost both internal validity (member checks, triangulation, researcher/informant 
relationship, adoption of analytic stance, and collegial review) and external validity 
(generalizability and written protocol).  
Member checks. As explained previously in this chapter, all interviewees were given 
an opportunity to review interview outlines and to add to or correct the contents. In 
addition, themes or conclusions that began to emerge in the course of the 
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interview/writing/analysis cycle were shared with interview sources as appropriate to see 
if they concurred with researcher conclusions. 
Triangulation. The collection of data from various interviewees as well as from 
written documents and research studies served as a “triangulation” device. This technique 
provided a method for the researcher to examine data from multiple sources for 
consistency. The existence of data consistency served as a check on the quality of the 
data received from any one source: In cases in which data were inconsistent, the 
researcher probed for causes of that inconsistency and sought to clarify the information. 
Relationship between researcher and informant. Following the advice of Guba and 
Lincoln (1998, cited in Cresswell, 1998), this researcher minimized the distance between 
the interview sources and herself (as researcher) by keeping them involved in the study. 
Sources were asked throughout their interviews if they had any other information to share 
or if they could offer other relevant questions that might be asked in future interviews. In 
addition, they were asked to review their interview response outlines.  
Efforts also were made to establish the researcher’s trustworthiness to help ensure the 
quality of the information collected through interviews. All participants were asked for 
their permission for an interview before further attempts were made to collect data from 
them. Prior to interviews, participants were given assurances of the purpose of the study 
and of the confidentiality of the raw data as well as of their ability to withdraw from the 
study at any time. They also were asked for their permission to be audiotaped. In taking 
these steps, the researcher attempted to arrive at a better “truth,” using the assumption 
that interview responses would be more candid and honest if informants were assured of 
these simple safeguards, than if they had no such assurances. They would have no need to 
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withhold or modify information in any way because of fears of retaliation by others who 
might be made aware of their comments. 
Adoption of analytic stance. Because interpretive research can be shaped by 
researcher experiences and values, the acknowledgement of predispositions prior to 
engaging in qualitative research was important to increasing the rigor of the study. 
However, those same experiences and values also offered professional and research 
competence necessary to conduct a study of this nature. In the case of this researcher, she 
worked in a higher education related setting, an accrediting agency, for over ten years and 
during that time developed and analyzed policy and conducted research on the outcomes 
of those policies. As an expatriate, she has experienced international issues and realities 
firsthand and has witnessed some of the effects of globalization, an issue that is at the 
heart of the matter of the WTO and GATS, on other individuals. She has studied the 
efforts of the European Union and “European Higher Education Space” countries to make 
their educational systems more transparent and comparable and has talked with 
representatives from non-U.S. universities about the need for individuals of all 
nationalities to develop more of a global outlook. All such factors could have affected 
this researcher’s view of the issue under study. The researcher, however, had no vested 
interest in the outcome of the research and, perhaps more critically, was able to recognize 
the potential implications of globalization issues and therefore the importance of her 
research in the globalization debate. In any case, potential and actual biases were 
acknowledged and considered in the course of data collection, analysis, and presentation. 
All efforts were made by the researcher to “suspend judgment, to hold in check [any] 
opinions, values, attitudes, and conclusions in an effort to impartially collect and analyze 
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program data” and “to adopt a hard-nosed attitude about the validity of the data” 
(Murphy, 1980, p. 68).  
Collegial examination. Miller (1992, cited in Cresswell, 1994) noted the use of a peer 
examiner (in his case, a doctoral student who was also a graduate assistant) in the conduct 
of his doctoral dissertation. The inclusion of a collegial examiner can serve as a reality 
check on the analyses and conclusions that result from the data and can provide feedback 
that can help the researcher uncover ways in which, for instance, continuing data 
interpretation may be shaped to fit already existing categories, whether or not such 
interpretation is appropriate. They also can act as a check against researcher bias. 
Students in the College of Education at the University of Maryland have successfully 
made use of this method to increase the rigor of their studies. This study made use of the 
researcher’s dissertation committee, in particular the committee chair, as a collegial 
review panel. Following completion of the first full draft of each chapter, it was 
forwarded to the committee chair for review and comment. Any comments received were 
considered and incorporated as appropriate in subsequent chapter drafts. In addition, all 
members of the committee received drafts of the chapters prior to finalization of the text. 
Generalizability. As noted earlier in this section, a commonly raised criticism of case 
study approaches is the difficulty with which the findings of one study can be applied 
more broadly. This difficulty is a result of the uniqueness of issues examined under case 
study methods. However, the results of case study research can be used to bolster theory; 
this study, in its exploration of new terrain within higher education research, can be used 
to enhance the understanding of politics as it is manifested in higher education settings. 
Indeed, one of the aims of this study was to generate insights into the application of 
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political models to emerging areas for higher education research. In addition, case studies 
are particularly powerful at generating new ideas for research. This study examined the 
experience with only one WTO-member country. The results of this research may 
provide a starting point, for example, toward the examination of other WTO members’ 
experiences in developing higher education trade. Directions for future research and 
possible applications of this study to theory and practice are described in chapter 6. 
Written protocol. External validity is difficult to achieve in case study research 
because of the problems that other researchers might face in replicating such studies. The 
detailed protocol of this study’s data collection and analysis techniques contained in this 
chapter, as well as the interview protocols in appendices A and B, might at some point 
enable another researcher to replicate the study in another setting (Yin, 1994). 
Ethical Considerations 
Because this study makes use of human subjects, consideration of their dignity and 
well being in the course of data collection and analysis was of utmost importance. Prior 
to the final approval of the proposal that outlined the subject, purpose and conduct of this 
study, review by and approval of this study by the University Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) was obtained. Approval was based upon completion of a standard form outlining 
the methods of securing and studying informants and their treatment throughout the 
study. In addition, the following safeguards, which have been outlined previously in this 
chapter, served to provide protection to the informants taking part in this research: 
1. All sources of raw data were treated as confidential and were not shared with 
anyone other than the source from which the data was obtained. Interview sources were 
provided with written assurances of anonymity and confidentiality. 
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2. Interviewees were provided with an informed consent form prior to interviews. The 
form outlined the nature and purpose of the study, uses of the raw data, and their rights as 
study participants. The consent of the participants was obtained prior to the interviews. 
Interview sources also were reminded that they could terminate their involvement in the 
study at any time. 
3. Interviewees were asked whether they would allow the interview to be audiotaped. 
4. Interviewees were given an outline of their interview responses. 
 
Table 2. Theoretical Assumptions, Research Questions and Data Sources for Study
Theoretical Assumptions Research Questions Information Needed Data Sources/ Interview Questions*
Actors:
• Human agency is at the heart
of political action; i.e.,
participants and players in an
issue conflict have the ability
to significantly affect the
thoughts or actions of others.
• Actor configurations change
with different issues and
decision areas, across
different stages of the
policymaking process, and at
different points in time.
• Who were the major actors at each
stage of the WTO policymaking
process?
• What alliances developed among
the actors?
• Names of individuals
and organizations
involved in the process
at each stage





stage of the process
Records: Organizational charts, articles, press
releases
6. (Partisans) Has your agency taken any action
with regard to its view regarding the inclusion of
higher education in GATS? If so, what?
4. What specific actions have you taken with
regard to your organizational role that pertain to
the inclusion of higher education trade policy?
5. Did you initiate any of these actions? If so,
which ones? If you did not initiate the action, who
did?
5.a.i. Did these actions meet with any opposition?
If so, from whom? Whom did the resisters
represent?
8. Have you done anything that reflects your
personal view on inclusion of higher education in
GATS? If so, what?
9.a.i, b.i. Are you aware of actions taken by any
other individuals or groups? If so, what? Which
individuals or groups initiated those actions?
Which individuals or groups resisted or opposed
those actions? Whom did the supporters/resisters
represent?
5.b.i, 5.c.i, 9.c.i, 9.d.i. How did initiators and
opponents try to build support for their positions?
Which individuals/groups were particularly
effective?
Goals:
• Actors are rational beings that
engage in goal-related
activities, but they also are
ethical, social, and emotional
beings that seek to advance
• What were the actors’ goals and
priorities?
• What motivated the actors to
become involved in the
policymaking process? What was
at stake?
• Interests in higher
education
• Goals for participation
• Perceived or actual
stakes in the issue
5.a.ii, iii, 9.a.ii, iii. What positions did initiators
and opponents take on the issue? Was it a high
priority item for them?
7. Is this a high priority item for you [the subject]?
8. Have you done anything that reflects your
personal view? If so, what?
Theoretical Assumptions Research Questions Information Needed Data Sources/ Interview Questions*
their ideologies, views and
values. The benefits that
actors seek may be collective
as well as individual,
symbolic as well as material.
• Interests and stakes contribute
to the results (goals) actors
seek to attain from their
involvement.
• Interests, stakes and goals
contribute to the stands that
actors take on proposals that
emerge in policymaking
processes.
• Conflict exists over the goals
to be sought or the means by
which those goals will be
achieved.
• What were the differences between
what actors sought and what
actually occurred?
Resources:
• Goal attainment requires the
power (capacity) to exert
influence.
• Power is dispersed among
participants; the power of the
various participants will
determine the outcome of the
policymaking process.
• Actors differ in control of
resources and ability to use
them.
• To be converted into
influence, resources must be
relevant to the particular
situation.
• What resources did each actor
command?
• Resources that were at
hand to the individual
or organization
• Resources that actually




5.b.i, 5.c.i, 9.c.i, 9.d.i. How did initiators and
opponents try to build support for their positions?
Which individuals/groups were particularly
effective?
Theoretical Assumptions Research Questions Information Needed Data Sources/ Interview Questions*
Motivation:
• Actors differ in the will to
exercise power to exert
influence and must be willing
to use their resources to exert
influence on a particular issue,
in a particular decision area, at
a particular time.
• What motivated the actors to
become involved in the
policymaking process? What was
at stake?
• Goals for participation
• Perceived or actual
stakes in the issue
• Importance to the
individual or
organization of the
issue and reason for
that view
5.a.ii, iii, 9.a.ii, iii, b.ii, iii. What positions did
initiators and opponents take on the issue? Was it
a high priority item for them?
5. (Partisans) Is this a high priority item for the
agency?
7. Is this a high priority item for you?
8. Have you done anything that reflects your
personal view? If so, what?
5.b.i, 5.c.i, 9.c.i, 9.d.i. How did initiators and
opponents try to build support for their positions?
Which individuals/groups were particularly
effective?
Strategies:
• Actors will deliberately
undertake activities that
convert resources into
influence. These activities are
tailored to the particular
situation.
• Actors differ in the strategies
that they will use.
• What strategies did actors employ
to use their resources to exert
influence?









• Potential strategies that
were rejected (if
possible)
5.b.i, 5.c.i, 9.c.i, 9.d.i. How did initiators and
opponents try to build support for their positions?
Which individuals/groups were particularly
effective?
Setting:
• Institutional and sociocultural
context shapes the interplay of
influence.
• Actors differ in their access to
decision areas and in expertise
in using the rules and norms
of the political system.
• How were the influence attempts
shaped and constrained by the









Records: Organizational charts, texts of
agreements
3. What has been your role with regard to the
WTO/GATS?
3 (Partisans). At what point were you or your
agency made aware of the issue of higher
education’s inclusion in GATS?
4 (Partisans). What is your agency’s view with
regard to the inclusion of higher education in
GATS?
5.b.i, 5.c.i, 9.c.i, 9.d.i. How did initiators and
opponents try to build support for their positions?
Which individuals/groups were particularly
Theoretical Assumptions Research Questions Information Needed Data Sources/ Interview Questions*
effective?
6. What is your personal view with regard to the
inclusion of higher education in GATS?
7. Is this a high priority item for you?
8. Have you done anything that reflects your
personal view? If so, what?
Interactions:
• Policy making is a pluralistic
process through which
interdependent participants
use influence and/or authority
in an effort to promote
conflicting goals in an attempt
to acquire favorable decision
outcomes.
• An examination of the manner
in which actors, goals,
resources, motivations,
strategies, and setting interact
can identify relative power
advantages on a particular
issue, at a particular time, in a
particular arena.
• What was the outcome of the
influence attempts?
• What were the differences between
what actors sought and what
actually occurred?
• What compromises and bargains
were necessary in reaching the
policy outcome?
• What factors were responsible for
the outcome?
• All of the previously
listed information, plus
• Information on what




5.d, 9.e. How was the issue resolved?
5.e, 9f. What compromises were needed to resolve
the issue?
5.b.i, ii, 5.c.i, c.ii., 9.c.i, c.ii, 9.d.i, d.ii. How did
initiators and opponents try to build support for
their positions? Which individuals/groups were
particularly effective?
* Unless otherwise noted, question numbers refer to those asked to “authorities” (those granted the authority for policy making for a particular
issue) and appear on the “authorities” semi-structured interview guide in appendix A. In each case, the same or a similar question appears on the
interview guide for the “partisans” (those who do not have primary authority for policy making but whose actions may influence those of the
authorities) in appendix B. The questions that pertain only to the “partisans” interviews are noted.
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Chapter 4  
Setting the Stage: The General Agreement on Trade in Services  
and a Changing World Higher Education Arena 
Global trade is by no means a 20th-Century phenomenon. One need only look to the 
routes established by ancient civilizations in Phoenicia and Rome and in later centuries 
by Spain, Portugal and England to find evidence of goods exchange occurring for 
thousands of years. In the last 60 years, however, the context of that exchange has been 
altered by the establishment of multilateral trade agreements, in particular the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the precursor to the WTO. During that time, 
the advent of increasing international trade of services brought about a call for a similar 
agreement governing services transactions. GATS resulted from the efforts of certain 
GATT signatories to establish a trade regime for services. GATS also resulted from the 
same ideals of free trade as did GATT; indeed, its framers borrowed many important 
terms and concepts directly from GATT. This chapter begins with an overview of GATS’ 
development and the environment in which it was born.  
New trade agreements, however, are not instantly acceptable just because they share 
the same ideals of other agreements that have been in existence for a longer time period. 
GATS certainly has not been without its share of detractors. Trade in higher education is 
one services sector particularly subject to confusion over how it would be governed by 
GATS and to controversy over why (or even whether) it is subject to GATS in the first 
place. This chapter will examine some of the salient issues related to GATS and higher 
education trade.  
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The Development of GATS 
One of the first attempts at establishing broad trade agreements occurred about two 
years after the end of World War II. In 1947, nine countries became the original 
signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a multilateral treaty 
covering trade in goods. Those nine nations became known as GATT contracting parties. 
By the end of 1948, their numbers increased to 17; by the time the WTO was established 
in 1995, 128 nations had signed the agreement (World Trade Organization, “The 128 
Countries,” n.d.).  
In the years following the establishment of GATT, the parties realized that worldwide 
trade in services, described by an interview source as “anything you can’t drop on your 
foot,” was increasing, and at a rapid pace. Since 1980, in fact, trade in services worldwide 
has grown at a faster rate than that of goods (World Trade Organization, 2005b). Given 
this expansion, efforts to establish a structure for oversight of services trade were 
launched. In the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S., under the GATT structure that was the 
precursor to the WTO, tried to convince other countries to include services as part of the 
trade negotiations. During that time, according to an interview source, employment in 
service sector industries accounted for 70 percent of U.S. non-agricultural employment, a 
figure that since has increased to 80 percent. In the eighth round of multilateral trade 
negotiations under GATT, known as the Uruguay Round (1986-1993), the efforts of the 
U.S. and other GATT contracting parties came to fruition with the extension of 
multilateral trade to services through GATS. This new treaty was one of the most notable 
outcomes of the Round (World Trade Organization, 2005b). The scope of negotiations in 
112
the Uruguay Round was very broad, covering more areas of trade than any of the rounds 
that preceded it (Jawara & Kwa, 2004).  
Developers used the GATT for inspiration and borrowed terms and concepts included 
as part of GATT, concepts that had been tested through half a century of use at that time. 
Those terms included most favored nation, the unconditional obligation that one WTO 
member will be treated as favorably as another, and national treatment, the requirement 
that foreign suppliers will not be discriminated against in favor of a domestic supplier 
(World Trade Organization, 2005b). Although developing countries had misgivings over 
GATS (e.g., fears about being able to compete), they were unable to block its passage. As 
a compromise, developing country members agreed to a “bottom-up” approach: one that 
would allow each member the right to decide which sectors it would open (if any) and the 
extent to and limitations on liberalizing trade in that sector (Jawara & Kwa, 2004). 
The Uruguay Round of talks culminated in an April 1994 meeting in Marrakesh, 
Morocco. At that gathering trade ministers from the GATT member nations enacted the 
agreement that established the WTO itself, in the so-called Marrakesh Agreement 
(Jawara & Kwa, 2004) and became the first members of the new trade body. The 
ministers also signed a number of other agreements reached in the Round. One of those 
agreements was the GATS itself. Each country made different commitments for different 
service sectors during the Uruguay Round. Subsequent liberalizing trade rounds began in 
early 2000 (The Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2000).  
All of the service negotiation agreements were incorporated into the Doha 
Development Agenda, more commonly referred to as the Doha Round, in 2001. Trade in 
services was established as one of the major issues to be discussed, largely at the urging 
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of the U.S., which was in favor of including services in the Doha Round. Because the 
U.S. was in the “driving seat” at Doha (Jawara & Kwa, 2004, p. 119), it got what it 
wanted regarding negotiating services (as well as numerous other issues). In fact, the 
Doha agreement “fast-forwarded” the services negotiations despite the requests of 
developing countries for an assessment, required by GATS, of the effects of trade in 
services before new negotiations began (Jawara & Kwa, 2004). 
Despite the fact that GATS is a treaty establishing the ground rules for trade in 
services, it ironically includes no definition of what constitutes “services” for the simple 
reason, according to one interview source, that its developers had too much difficulty 
with defining the term. Instead, the agreement makes use of a modified form of a 
document known as the Central Product Classification (CPC). The CPC was originally 
developed by a United Nations statistician for the purposes of understanding, not for legal 
purposes. The amended CPC is the “substitute” for the definition. The WTO actually 
amended the CPC for its own purposes for GATS because the UN CPC includes items 
that are not within the scope of the GATS. However, according to an interview source, 
there is “about 90 percent overlap.” The new itemization is called the Services Sectoral 
Classification List. The purpose of this classification is to ensure clarity, comparability 
and consistency of the commitments (World Trade Organization, 2005b). Use of the 
WTO classification is optional, although most members follow it (World Trade 
Organization, 2005b). GATS signatories are advised to make use of the CPC in their 
schedules for clarity and consistency. If the CPC is not followed, according to one 
interview source, then those particular members should at least make references to the 
CPC.  
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In theory, if there is no definition of “service” in the agreement and there is no rule 
that the WTO services classification list be followed, then WTO members can choose to 
declare that they do not believe a certain service to be covered or tradable. With regard to 
higher education, the U.S. obviously did not take such an approach. Indeed, according to 
one interview source, the U.S.’ 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act included a 
definition of services, and education has been considered a service since the U.S. 
Government began its efforts to convince other countries to focus on services trade. 
Trade in Education 
As discussed previously, and will be discussed in later sections of this study, various 
stakeholders have concerns with the concept of higher education being included as part of 
a worldwide trade agreement. These same stakeholders, however, do not deny that “trade 
in education,” like trade in general, has existed for centuries, certainly in higher 
education. If historical higher education patterns are examined and classified in GATS 
language, then one can identify GATS Mode 2 (consumption abroad) in the travel of 
students to other countries to study in foreign universities and Mode 4 (movement of 
natural persons) in the activities of visiting teachers and researchers as well. What has 
changed is the environment in which these activities are occurring (to be discussed in the 
next section). Clearly, higher education has become a lucrative sector in terms of trade. In 
1995, worldwide higher education trade was estimated at $27 billion (World Trade 
Organization, 1998). For the United States, the estimated value was $10 billion in 1999 
(ITA, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, cited in Lenn, 2000). Furthermore, higher education is 
among the U.S.’ top five exports (World Trade Organization, 1998). 
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Forces Shaping Trade in Education 
The monetary figures related to higher education make it clear that higher education 
trade is big business in the years surrounding the turn of the millennium. While such 
trade has occurred for hundreds of years, certain trends have, singly and in combination, 
been contributing forces in shaping trade in higher education. This section discusses the 
forces having an effect on this trade. 
Globalization  
Arguably, no other word has been used more to describe current trends in today’s 
world than globalization. It is a term that is often thrown about without clear definition, 
yet no one will deny that such a phenomenon exists. Altbach (2004, p. 5) stated that 
“[G]lobalization in the 21st Century is truly worldwide in reach—few places can elude 
contemporary trends, and innovations and practices seem to spread ever faster due to 
modern technology.” With regard to higher education, it relates to the movement of both 
students and professional academics, either on a short- or long-term basis, as well as to 
governmental cultural and political objectives related to increased understanding and 
interchange across nations (Hirsch, 2002). Altbach (2004, p. 11) noted that “not since the 
medieval period has such a large proportion of the world’s students been studying outside 
their home countries—more than 1.5 million students at any one time.”  
The boom in information technology and communications has helped to facilitate 
globalization in general and higher education in particular through increased cross-border 
activity (GATS Mode 1) by both “traditional” universities and distance learning 
providers. While education by correspondence is not a new concept (for example, Kansas 
State University has been educating students by correspondence since the 1940s, and the 
116
UK’s Open University has done so since 1971), tools such as e-mail and the World Wide 
Web have made research and education from a distance easier and less expensive. 
Universities such as the U.S.-based University of Phoenix have taken advantage of that 
technology by offering an on-line campus in addition to the more traditional on-site 
learning. The use of technology to deliver higher education means that students from 
more remote locations can participate in higher education programs without setting foot 
in the location, or, indeed, the country from which the education originates. Expanding 
capabilities in information technology also have made possible the development of 
sophisticated education course software that can be distributed either as a stand-alone 
product or as part of an educational program.  
Changes in Dominant Paradigm  
According to Altbach (2004, p. 9), the world view is changing from a primarily 
geopolitical paradigm to one more economic in tone. “We are now in a new era of power 
and influence. Politics and ideology have taken a subordinate role to profits and market-
driven policies. Now, multinational corporations, media conglomerates, and even a few 
leading universities, can be seen as the new neocolonialists—seeking to dominate not for 
ideological or political reasons but rather for commercial gain. Governments are not 
entirely out of the picture—they seek to assist companies in their countries and have a 
residual interest in maintaining influence as well.” What this might mean for higher 
education is an ever-increasing tendency to view higher education activities in economic 
terms and increasing competition in higher education from new types of higher education 
providers, such as corporate trainers, for-profit institutions and virtual universities.  
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Increased Worldwide Demand for Higher Education  
The massification of higher education that occurred in the U.S. in the latter half of the 
20th Century is now occurring in the rest of the world in the face of the knowledge-based 
economy which demands the higher-level thinking skills that higher education can 
provide. An increasing worldwide awareness now exists in the value of education beyond 
the secondary level and a subsequent demand for these services. According to Patrinos 
(2002), implications of the knowledge economy for education include a move from 
terminal education to lifelong learning, rote learning to analysis and synthesis, and 
information-based learning systems to the application of knowledge. The increasing 
worldwide awareness in postsecondary education’s value is creating a demand for these 
services that oftentimes outstrips the capacity of some countries, in particular those in the 
developing world, to provide them. Patrinos (p. 3) noted the existence of an enrollment 
gap between developing and developed countries, the decrease in real terms in public 
resources for higher education, the inequality in access to higher education, the lack of 
quality and relevance of higher education programs, and the lack of sufficient scientific 
and technological literacy for adequate response to the challenges of the knowledge 
economy. He contended that in order to respond effectively to the demands of the 
knowledge economy, developing countries need to secure equal opportunities for their 
citizens to postsecondary education as well as to “tap global knowledge.” “Much of this,” 
Patrinos stated, “can be accomplished by promoting competition in higher education 
domestically and by opening up the system to new ideas from abroad” [emphasis added].  
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The Debate over Higher Education and GATS 
Despite a current economic climate that favors an expansion of higher education on a 
global scale, not everyone is in agreement on the benefits of higher education becoming 
part of a trade regime. Indeed, the inclusion of higher education in GATS has resulted in 
protest within segments of the higher education community. Some see it as a boost to 
higher education institutions in a globalized economy, but others remain unconvinced of 
its value at best and fear its effects at worst. At issue are aspects of the agreement not 
only of a philosophical nature that impinge upon the purposes of higher education, but 
also those of a technical or interpretive nature resulting from the agreement’s broad 
focus, ambiguous wording, and untested status. 
Philosophical Issues 
Perhaps the greatest concerns over GATS and higher education are philosophical, 
based upon what could be categorized as the “clash of values.” In this instance, they are, 
generally speaking, the values of higher education versus those of the marketplace. The 
Joint Declaration on Higher Education and the General Agreement on Trade in Services,
issued in 2001 by four of the world’s leading higher education organizations, puts forth in 
the beginning paragraphs the issuers’ beliefs in the role of higher education: 
Higher education exists to serve the public interest and is not a “commodity,” a fact 
which WTO Member States have recognized through UNESCO [the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization] and other international or 
multilateral bodies, conventions, and declarations. The mission of higher education is 
to contribute to the sustainable development and improvement of society as a whole 
by: educating highly qualified graduates able to meet the needs of all sectors of 
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human activity; advancing, creating and disseminating knowledge through research; 
interpreting, preserving, and promoting cultures in the context of cultural pluralism 
and diversity; providing opportunities for higher learning throughout life; 
contributing to the development and improvement of education at all levels; and 
protecting and enhancing civil society by training young people in the values which 
form the basis of democratic citizenship and by providing critical and detached 
perspectives in the discussion of strategic choices facing societies. (Association of 
Universities and Colleges of Canada, American Council on Education, European 
Universities Association, & the Council on Higher Education Accreditation, 2001, p. 
1) 
By including higher education in GATS, then, it becomes commodified and subject 
more to the language of commerce and the profit motive rather than to the language of 
human development and collective purpose. Concepts such as preparing individuals to 
become participants in a productive society translate into the ability to generate income, 
rather than to be informed citizens able to generate ideas and work for the common good 
of the collective. Other concerns related to higher education values have been manifest in 
arguments and dissent from members of the higher education community:  
Effects of GATS on institutional autonomy. In the United States, the core values of 
higher education also focus on the ability of a given institution to make its own decisions 
regarding education programs, teaching methods, policies and procedures, and other key 
academic and operational choices, insofar as its charter and relationship to the state in 
which it resides permits. Would the existence of a free trade agreement governing higher 
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education affect an institution’s ability to determine policies in areas such as admissions 
and tuition?  
Effects of GATS on higher education systems of developing countries. Some 
stakeholders in higher education have expressed concerns that the United States, as one 
of the world leaders in higher education and one of the countries that stands to benefit the 
most from a higher education trade regime, may undermine the efforts of developing 
countries to develop and improve their own higher education systems. Whether through 
the establishment of U.S.-based higher education providers on foreign soil, through the 
movement of increasing numbers of students from developing nations to U.S. institutions 
rather than to their own institutions in-country, or through distance learning programs, the 
U.S. and other higher education exporting nations could be “stealing” students and any 
tuitions and fees they may pay, thereby depriving the developing nations of the resources 
necessary to invest in their own institutions. 
Effects on quality and the need to ensure quality, especially from “diploma mills.” 
Quality of educational programs is a key issue, raised most notably from organizations in 
the United States that work toward the attainment and maintenance of accepted standards 
of excellence in postsecondary institutions in general and their component education and 
training programs in particular. Could the same quality of teaching and learning be 
maintained were the ultimate goal to maximize profit? Could the market system be 
trusted to maintain control on quality through competition and the idea that consumers 
would choose academic institutions on the basis of the quality of training rather than on 
the basis of ease of obtaining a credential? 
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Why is it necessary? Why is a trade regime necessary to address issues in 
international higher education? Trade in higher education existed long before GATS ever 
existed, say its detractors; moreover, that trade continues to exist and would continue to 
exist without GATS. International organizations such as UNESCO and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have been working toward the 
development of guidelines to address the issues and difficulties that have arisen with 
recognition of individual educational qualifications for use by national governmental 
bodies; the U.S.-based Council on Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) has been 
monitoring developments in globalization in higher education with a particular focus on 
ensuring that quality standards of education are met. “I do need to know exactly what the 
problem that we are attempting to solve is,” commented American Council on Education 
President David Ward at the OECD/US Forum on Trade in Educational Services in May 
2002 (American Council on Education, 2002, p. 2). Proponents of GATS have an answer 
to Ward’s question: the need to address trade barriers in higher education worldwide. A 
communication from the United States to the WTO in December 2000 listed 17 different 
types of restrictions on the operation of foreign educational programs in foreign 
territories (World Trade Organization, 2000b). 
Technical Aspects of GATS 
Opponents of GATS have pointed to language in the document that they contend is 
unclear in one way or another, even in instances in which definitions are provided in an 
attempt to clarify intent of the treaty’s coverage; that is, which services are included and 
which are not. One of the most contentious areas of debate relates to what is not included. 
It deals with the issue of services provided under the exercise of governmental authority, 
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defined in GATS as “any service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in 
competition with one or more service suppliers” (World Trade Organization, 2005b, p. 
60). The exclusion as defined, according to U.S. opponents of higher education’s 
inclusion in GATS, does not provide the necessary clarification and may instead even 
make the situation worse. Neither commercial basis nor in competition are further 
defined in GATS but are instead left to the common wisdom for definition. With the 
U.S.’ diversity of higher education providers, the vast majority of whom receive federal 
and state governmental aid despite being identified as public or private, determining what 
is being provided commercially is difficult if not impossible. Moreover, whether the 
approximately 4,000 degree-granting higher education institutions are or are not in 
competition with one another is unclear, as institutions vie for students and resources 
ranging from federal government research grants to donations from individuals. 
Interpretive Aspects of GATS 
Even in the event that definitions are clarified and communicated to interested 
stakeholders, the GATS is a living document that still is under development. No doubt it 
will be for years to come, if the experience with GATT, which continues to be fought 
over after over 50 years in existence, is anything to go by. Over time, the original intent 
of GATS’ framers may be lost, along with it any interpretations made of terms and 
clauses, even those with definitions attached to them. The question then becomes, who 
will have the power to make those interpretations and what will be the implications for 
higher education? The obvious example is that of services provided under the exercise of 
governmental authority. Sauvé (2002) offered an illustration of how interpretations can 
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be left to “understandings” without being codified and can leave terms open to future 
interpretation: 
GATS negotiators understood [services not supplied on a commercial basis nor in 
competition with other service suppliers—the definition of “exercise of governmental 
authority”] to cover “public services” broadly (if somewhat loosely) defined, 
including public health and education services. But public/private frontiers are 
inherently murky, vary significantly across countries and sectors, and are subject to 
change as markets, political dynamics and technology evolve. Governments have to 
date chosen not to clarify the scope of the GATS’ public services carve-out. But ask 
any negotiator in Geneva and he/she would be prone to regard primary and secondary 
schooling, so-called basic/compulsory education, as lying outside the scope of the 
GATS.  
Common understanding at the inter-governmental level is thus that public 
education services and education services supplied by private actors on a non-
commercial basis are excluded from the GATS….Still, opinions differ as to whether 
some attempt should be made in the context of the current negotiations to provide 
greater clarity to what WTO Members understand to be services supplied in the 
exercise of governmental authority. (p. 3) 
Thus the stage is set for the discussion of policy development under the auspices of a 
document with a broad focus, unresolved philosophical issues, ambiguous terms, and 
untested parameters. The next chapter will discuss the findings of the study and will 
examine how these and other issues have played out in the context of the U.S. experience 




If one thinks of conflict and value clashes when it comes to items for consideration in 
a WTO trade agreement, higher education trade is by no means the first area that comes 
to mind. It is not an issue that has captured the imagination and the coverage of the 
media, nor is it even one that, for the most part, has sparked a groundswell of action 
within the higher education community. Since 2000, however, the intention of the U.S. to 
include higher education within its GATS proposal motivated key stakeholders on both 
sides of the issue to attempt to influence the process in some fashion. This chapter 
describes the events that occurred as the policy process evolved. It is organized by phases 
in that process, with each phase containing a major policy marker or output issued by the 
U.S. according to a schedule developed by the WTO to foster the work to be 
accomplished in the Doha Round. 
Phase 1: Initiation—December 18, 2000 
On December 18, 2000, the United States released a statement outlining its general 
position related to GATS commitments in the education sector. That statement was 
developed after consideration of survey results, expert consultation, U.S. statute, and 
historical reality. This section describes events that occurred from the time work began 
on the GATS/education issue to the issuance of the statement. 
The U.S. and International Trade 
In order to better understand the procedures by which the United States conducts its 
international trade activity, this section outlines the formal lines of authority that govern 
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such activity. The major trade actor for the U.S., the Office of the Trade Representative 
(USTR), is granted power to conduct trade via laws enacted by the U.S. Congress. 
The U.S. Constitution grants the power to regulate international trade to Congress. In 
turn, Congress delegates that authority to the U.S. President and the Executive Branch of 
the federal government. The President exercises this authority through his or her 
delegated agent, which for trade matters is the USTR, an office which is a part of the 
Executive Office of the President. Its head, the U.S. Trade Representative, is a member of 
the President’s Cabinet and serves as the principal Presidential trade advisor, negotiator, 
and trade issues spokesperson. Two groups, the Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG) and 
the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), enable the USTR to consult with other federal 
government agencies on trade matters (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
2006c). 
The USTR also has links to nongovernmental sectors through a system of 26 private 
sector advisory committees. These committees provide advice and information on issues 
such as U.S. negotiating positions on trade agreements. Membership on these committees 
is drawn from outside the government; candidate recommendations are solicited through 
numerous sources including Members of Congress, organizations, and other individuals 
with expertise or interest in U.S. trade policy. One of these committees, Industry Trade 
Advisory Committee (ITAC) Number 10 (Services and Finance Industries), covers 
education services (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2006b). 
In 1988, Congress passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act. This act 
enhanced the authority of the USTR to act on trade matters and delegated the following 
responsibilities to the trade representative: (1) have primary responsibility for 
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development and coordination of implementation of U.S. international trade policy, (2) 
have lead responsibility for the conduct of international trade negotiations and be the 
chief U.S. representative for those negotiations; (3) coordinate trade policy with other 
governmental agencies; (4) act as principal advisor to the President on international trade 
policy as well as advise the president on trade matters, and (5) serve as the President’s 
principal international trade policy spokesperson. A later bill passed by Congress, the 
1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, granted the USTR lead responsibility for all 
negotiations concerning the WTO (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 
2006a). 
Another piece of legislation related to the USTR’s ability to act on trade matters is the 
Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), a part of the Trade Act of 2002. This legislation sets 
out the general parameters for USTR authority over trade, perhaps most importantly the 
latitude that the Office has over the final negotiated products. Once the USTR finalizes 
negotiations with other member countries, Congress cannot make any changes to the 
results of those negotiations. The fast track concept of TPA sets out specific areas where 
Congress can act with regard to trade negotiations; otherwise every element of a 
negotiated treaty would be fair game for Congressional action and, by extension, attempts 
to influence Congress to amend any of those elements. Under the fast track, any attempts 
to influence the contents of the agreement must be made during the negotiating phases. 
With regard to the fast track scheme, TPA sets notice and consultation requirements 
in order to ensure that Congress, the private sector, and the public have opportunity to 
provide input before and during the negotiations. The Executive branch, and in particular 
the USTR, gets specific Congressional guidance on trade negotiation objectives. A 
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special Congressional oversight group provides a channel for Congress to provide 
guidance to and receive briefings from the USTR regarding U.S. negotiating positions. In 
addition, trade negotiators brief and seek advice from Congressional committees prior to 
each negotiating round. Assuming these procedures are followed, TPA allows Congress 
to vote either for or against any resulting trade agreements and the implementing 
legislation as a whole. Congress cannot make amendments to the agreement during 
debate (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2005a).  
Because the TPA and fast track negotiating authority did not exist between 1994 and 
2002, it was very difficult for the U.S. to negotiate trade agreements. Nor will it exist in 
perpetuity with the current authority: it is set to expire on July 1, 2007. According to one 
account, the likelihood of Congress extending this authority is low (Bowley, 2006). The 
most recent suspension and subsequent resumption of Doha Round negotiations (to be 
discussed later in this chapter) may, however, be an extenuating circumstance that will 
help the USTR convince Congress to grant some sort of extension, according to an 
interview source. 
Even before the suspension of talks, the potential loss of the USTR’s ability to 
negotiate a full agreement was not a prospect of doom for its negotiators. On the 
contrary, it set a deadline, one that the U.S. attempted to use strategically. According to 
an interview source, with regard to any WTO agreements such as the GATS, negotiators 
must have, in essence, completed the negotiations by the end of 2006 in order that any 
necessary legislation could be enacted by Congress and the President by the time the TPA 
expired. If the 2006 deadline were not to be met, any negotiated package would be in 
danger of not being adopted, and individual negotiated provisions could be voted away 
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by Congress. With a deadline as a bargaining stick, the USTR hoped to apply pressure on 
other parties to the negotiations, and to place them on notice that time was limited and 
acceptance of offers must be made quickly. The strategy may yet prove to be successful. 
According to another interview source, the TPA may not yet be dead; obtaining an 
extension is still a “good shot.” However, the USTR must provide Congress with a reason 
to extend the authority, such as a “significant breakthrough” on a WTO-related issue such 
as agriculture. Moreover, according to this source, the prospect of a TPA renewal is 
“driving the timeline” for the USTR to come to an agreement on a WTO Doha Round 
trade package. 
USTR General Strategies for Communicating with Groups 
The USTR established a number of strategies for communicating with affected 
groups with regard to GATS negotiations. It has formal consultation channels, including 
its Industry Trade Advisory Committees as well as an Intergovernmental Policy 
Committee which deals with U.S. states’ concerns. The USTR prints notices periodically 
in the U.S. Federal Register, often in preparation for a WTO ministerial. For example, a 
notice requesting written comments “with respect to the development of the agenda, 
scope, content and timetables for negotiations or further work in the WTO, including 
additional consultations with non-governmental stakeholders” (p. 18469) appeared in the 
Federal Register on April 14, 1999, prior to the ministerial meeting held in Seattle, 
Washington, in November 1999. The USTR also conducts public hearings at various 
locations throughout the U.S. as it deems appropriate. General hearings on trade were 
conducted nationwide prior to the beginning of the Doha Round, but no specific hearing 
was held on higher education.  
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In addition, the USTR sends letters to other trade representatives and Congress 
provides advice and feedback as necessary. Before releasing any positions or statements, 
the USTR tries to consult with stakeholder groups, a method which the office finds 
invaluable and is, in fact, the USTR’s most effective avenue for information collection, 
according to an interview source.  
The U.S. and GATS 
With Congressional authority to conduct trade negotiations (with appropriate input 
from Congress and other sectors), the USTR had the responsibility and the right to set the 
agenda for the services to be negotiated within the framework of the Doha Round. But for 
what reason was education, and particular higher education, to be included? The U.S. was 
not tied to using the Central Product Classification developed by the United Nations and 
refined for trade purposes by the WTO. One reason is the 1988 omnibus trade act which, 
as discussed in chapter 4, defined education as a service. Furthermore, according to one 
interview source, the USTR saw it simply: “A service is anything you can’t drop on your 
foot.” Because GATS covers “all” services, the U.S. government, therefore, had “no 
choice” but to include education as one of the areas to be covered.  
In truth, however, the U.S. has had high stakes and high motivation to include higher 
education in its GATS proposals from the very beginning, if viewed from the perspective 
of revenue earned. Particularly in the areas of business, information technology, 
engineering and English language, American education has been in high demand 
internationally and is among the top five U.S. service exports (Sedgwick, 2002). Just in 
terms of revenues from foreign students studying on U.S. soil, the income is $10 billion, 
although it has been hard to determine how much revenue is generated from students 
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outside the U.S. who are studying with U.S. providers. In fact, the U.S. is the world’s 
leading provider of educational and training services (Sedgwick, 2002). U.S. higher 
education’s success as an export means that trade in higher education already is occurring 
and is, in fact, according to one interview source, “big business.” U.S. education as an 
export has existed long before GATS became an issue: “It’s kind of always been there,” 
said the source about trade in higher education.  
According to an interview source, the USTR could see another long-term benefit in 
seeing U.S. higher education institutions becoming more international. The U.S. stands to 
gain from attracting bright students from abroad; it is an important element for creating 
innovation in the U.S. The need for new blood and new ideas also was a trigger for some 
of the USTR’s opening up in its higher education trade negotiations. Furthermore, 
according to the source, signs exist that indicate U.S. higher education institutions are 
getting more active in attracting and investing in foreign students and venues.  
The USTR did not consider valid the concerns of some stakeholders over the effects 
of higher education trade on developing countries’ attempts to enhance their own systems 
of higher education. According to an interview source, most countries do have some form 
of private education in place, so including higher education in GATS negotiations is not 
as big a leap as some people think: “There is a lot of rhetoric tied into a misunderstanding 
that higher education is all private or all public. That simply is not the case.” Moreover, 
some governments worldwide have not been able or willing to cope with their citizens’ 
demands for education services. Foreign providers (for instance, for-profit providers such 
as Sylvan Learning Systems and the Apollo Group, the two biggest education companies 
in the U.S. [Sedgwick, 2002]) saw an opportunity to fill a need and make money. In 
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addition to the international growth in for-profit education, on-line education, aided by 
technological advances, is growing, although it still remains a small portion of cross-
border trade in education services. Competition internationally in the education sector, 
both among for-profit and non-profit educational institutions, was increasing. Education 
was increasingly viewed and packaged as a commodity, and students were increasingly 
referred to as “customers” (Sedgwick, 2002). 
Finally, according to an interview source, “There was incentive in the Doha Round 
for the U.S. to see what more it could offer” in terms of opening up areas for trade. The 
U.S. came to the conclusion that higher education, on the basis of the information it was 
receiving on the popularity of U.S. higher education and increasing demand abroad for 
higher education services, was an area where interest existed. The U.S., therefore, had no 
real defense against not including higher education in its negotiations. 
Clearly, then, the stakes and motivation for including higher education in GATS 
negotiations were there for the U.S. and the USTR. What was a straightforward issue for 
the U.S., however, was not so clear for some of the higher education groups in the U.S. 
and worldwide, as was discussed in chapter 4 and will be discussed in greater detail later 
in this chapter. Would anything that the groups not in favor of higher education in GATS 
could have done or said regarding the issue changed the U.S. position on including it? “It 
would have been difficult to convince the U.S. otherwise,” said an interview source. The 
work of the USTR is driven by what happens in the U.S., which values freedom of choice 
and the private system, the source continued. Therefore, the U.S. would have had 
difficulty projecting a different approach, and no group as of yet has influenced the 
USTR to act in ways contrary to this macro position (although, as will be discussed later 
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in this chapter, the groups have influenced the USTR to act in some ways in which it 
would not otherwise have acted). The nervousness of these groups, coupled with some 
U.S. state governors’ concerns about GATS, in particular the poor wording of the 
agreement’s rules (Foster, 2007), has indeed made the USTR more “cautious.” Beyond 
that caution, however, there have been no calls to cause the U.S. “to do internationally 
anything other than what it would do domestically [i.e., anything beyond current U.S. 
practice regarding promotion of commerce],” according to the source. 
One area in which the U.S. has taken a stand, however, is in the area of regulation and 
trade. Recent WTO member discussion on the conduct of the agreement itself has 
addressed GATS Part I, Article VI, which deals with domestic regulation of services and 
is designed to ensure that qualification and licensing requirements as well as technical 
standards do not constitute “unnecessary barriers to trade in services” (World Trade 
Organization, 2005b, p. 65). According to an interview source, some WTO member 
countries have offered proposals designed to achieve “harmonization,” or 
standardization, of members’ domestic regulatory standards. Such efforts have been 
opposed by the USTR on the grounds that the WTO/GATS should not be in the business 
of standards setting. Fortunately for the USTR, these attempts have been rather 
unsuccessful. In any case, the U.S. would not allow such “harmonization.” While the 
U.S. acknowledges that any trade rules to ensure transparency would be helpful for 
members to understand the meaning of other members’ regulations, and the process by 
which they are applied, anything beyond that cannot be done on an across-the-board basis 
because to do so would be too prescriptive. 
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With these motivations and stands in mind, the U.S. came to the negotiating table. 
The U.S. negotiating strategy was simple: offer something in order to make it easier to 
open up other markets to U.S. higher education providers.  
Outside Help 
The USTR did receive some assistance in its work on higher education trade from the 
U.S. Department of Education (USDE), but that department’s role was limited largely to 
technical advice. Although the USDE participated in an intergovernmental study group 
that conducted a survey on trade barriers (i.e., countries and their methods of interference 
with the U.S.’ ability to operate institutions abroad), it did not advocate any policy 
regarding higher education trade. One group that did offer information and advocated 
policy was, in fact, nongovernmental: The Center for Quality Assurance in Higher 
Education (CQAIE), located in the Washington, DC area. 
CQAIE is a consortium of higher and international education associations as well as 
accrediting and quality assurance agencies, and its activities deal in part with higher 
education trade issues. The Center has sponsored numerous seminars on higher education 
trade and attempts to bring parties interested in international higher education areas 
(particularly quality and trade issues) together once a year. It sponsored a landmark 
conference in Washington, DC with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) circa 2002 with education ministers from all over the world. That 
meeting was the first of three global forums held on international trade in higher 
education; meetings in Trondheim, Norway, Sydney, Australia, and Hong Kong were to 
follow.  
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Dr. Marjorie Peace Lenn, CQAIE’s director, has been involved with trade in 
education matters for many years, with involvement on the topic predating GATS, and is 
considered to be one of the top experts on education trade in the U.S. Following her 
appointment by President Clinton, Dr. Lenn also became the appointed educational 
services expert to the USTR’s ITAC Number 10 on Services and Finance Industries. 
Committee 10 meets on a monthly basis; its 31 members are cleared advisors, meaning 
that they hold top secret clearance. Because of the high level of this clearance, the 
Committee’s meetings are closed to the public. ITAC and its members attend WTO 
meetings and ministerials.  
In 1998, the Global Alliance for Transnational Education (GATE), an organization 
which deals with issues of quality and access in educational programs that cross 
international borders, conducted a survey of attendees (comprised of business, higher 
education institution and quality assurance agency representatives) at that year’s GATE 
conference. The survey, which dealt with barriers to trade in education services, was 
conducted in order to collect information for the Council on Trade in Services. GATE 
was managed by CQAIE and worked closely with it until 2000, when it was determined 
that GATE’s board was too partial and the two organizations parted ways. GATE was 
motivated to do the study on the basis of its interactions with the Council, which was 
seeking information on the “breadth and depth of transnational education and issues 
related to unequal treatment in education services” (Center for Quality Assurance in 
International Education, 1999, p. 2). 
This submission to the WTO acted as a basis for CQAIE’s subsequent work on 
GATS, including a separate trade in education services report, which was submitted to 
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the USTR on May 11, 1999. The report was prepared in response to the April 14, 1999 
Federal Register notice requesting public comment on negotiations on market access and 
other WTO issues. When the U.S. government (through the USTR) defined its education 
trade area, it relied heavily on that report, according to an interview source.  
In 1999, the National Committee for International Trade in Education (NCITE) was 
formed. A committee and arm of CQAIE, NCITE’s purpose is “to create a collective 
voice for those engaged in providing education services to foreigners to express their 
views to the U.S. Government on problems in international education. NCITE seeks 
liberalization of trade in education services throughout the world through…various trade 
agreements [e.g., bilateral, regional, and global trade agreements such as GATS]” 
(National Committee for International Trade in Education [NCITE], 2000). NCITE came 
about because, according to one source, the U.S. government required an entity from 
which it could get advice on issues related to trade in higher education. Dr. Lenn set out 
to fill that role. 
According to the NCITE’s mission statement, “A new global order brought about by 
regional and global trade agreements, and particularly the [GATS], has spawned the need 
for an organized voice for United States education, training and testing institutions, 
corporations and organizations which provide services internationally. This organized 
voice is the [NCITE]” (NCITE, 2000, para. 1). The mission statement continues by 
identifying four purposes: (1) to provide “accurate, current and organized” information to 
government agencies, in particular the USTR, and keep NCITE sponsors informed of 
related activities by governmental and nongovernmental actors; (2) to develop and 
maintain a national database of global education and training providers; (3) to act as a 
136
clearinghouse for issues in the globalization of education as well as an advocate; and (4) 
to provide a forum for its corporate, institutional and organizational members. NCITE 
also “identified barriers to international education and training services and contributed to 
the creation of a negotiating proposal for the GATS, which calls for transparency in 
national regulations and a reduction of trade barriers for higher education services. Such 
barriers include: [sic] non-recognition of universities operating in other countries; 
limitations of ownership; visa limitations for teaching or administrative staff; customs 
restrictions for certain teaching resources; and others” (NCITE, personal communication, 
2000). 
NCITE sponsoring institutions include Temple and George Washington University 
(two higher education institutions that are exploring overseas ventures), professional 
organizations (such as the Accreditation Commission for Acupuncture and Oriental 
Medicine), nonprofit distance-learning institutions (such as the University of Maryland 
University College), and accrediting groups for traditional institutions (such as the 
Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools) (Foster, 2002). NCITE’s 
sponsorship fee is $2,500 per year; this fee limits sponsorship to groups that are willing 
and/or able to pay.  
Because of NCITE’s status as a committee of CQAIE, Marjorie Lenn also leads this 
group, to some consternation from other higher education organizations. Sheldon 
Steinbach of the American Council on Education (ACE), a group which became involved 
in the GATS/higher education trade issue in 2001 and which will appear again later in 
this chapter, remarked, “I’m not sure who anointed her the spokesman for higher 
education in this area” (Foster, 2002, p. A33). No other group in higher education was 
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dealing with issue of trade, however, so “she stepped into a vacuum” (Foster, 2002, p. 
A33). Dr. Lenn contended that she had invited ACE and the Council on Higher Education 
Accreditation (CHEA) to join early discussions about globalization in education but they 
rejected her invitation (Foster, 2002). According to an interview source, no one else on 
the U.S. higher education scene paid any attention to higher education trade matters even 
though they were asked to several times.  
On September 13 and 14, 1999, the formal organizing meeting of the group was held 
and was attended by “a broad spectrum of the U.S. education and training services area.” 
These included commercial education interests, community college consortia, regional 
alliances of colleges and universities, adult education and distance education institutions, 
and “major public and private universities” (NCITE, personal communication, October 
26, 1999). The NCITE was “officially introduced” (NCITE, personal communication, 
October 26, 1999) to the USTR office on September 15, 1999 and to the Department of 
Commerce at a roundtable discussion on trade in services on October 20, 1999. 
In the summer of 2000, an international education study team was formed with 
members of the following agencies: the USTR; the U.S. Departments of Education, State, 
Labor, and Commerce; and the U.S. International Trade Commission. The group was 
organized in partial response to a memorandum issued on April 19, 2000 on international 
education policy by then President Clinton (International Education Study Team, 2001). 
The Presidential memorandum directed the Secretaries of State and Education to take 
specific action but no other agency was mentioned by name. The memo’s focus was not 
on education trade, at least not specifically. The stated goal of the study group, however, 
was to “obtain and analyze information on education systems in various countries and 
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prospects for U.S. providers to provide education and training to foreign students in their 
home countries” (International Education Study Team, 2001, p. 1). 
The group conducted a survey of consular posts worldwide to learn what practices 
existed with regard to regulation of foreign educational institutions. One of the study 
goals was to develop systematic and comprehensive information about foreign education 
regulations and about U.S. institutional activity abroad in educational pursuits. The 
USTR was a named beneficiary of the results of that study, and the agency, in turn, used 
a draft of the report in formulating education proposals for GATS.  
The study’s key finding was that “nearly all countries permit private education to 
exist side-by side with public education, thus supporting a U.S. position that negotiations 
to remove obstacles to education and training services are intended to supplement, not 
supplant, public education” (International Education Study Team, 2001, p.1). This 
finding was “contrary to previous impressions” (International Education Study Team, 
2001, p. 1). Some ownership/operational limitations exist in certain countries while many 
others allow foreign educational providers to establish services without significant 
restrictions. The survey “helped to identify country practices that tend to discourage U.S. 
entities from pursuing education and training opportunities in foreign markets” 
(International Education Study Team, 2001, p. 2). The study also “gave impetus to…U.S. 
entities engaged in commercial education and training enterprises in other countries” 
(International Education Study Team, 2001, p. 2).  
Proposals on Conduct of Negotiations  
In July 2000, the U.S. presented a proposal on the conduct of all GATS negotiations 
in the Doha Round. In addition to offering proposed approaches to the negotiations, it 
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also stated general interests and objectives in its negotiations on the trade agreement. The 
objectives were couched in the language of the GATS’ critical terms: (1) to deal with 
reduction or elimination of inconsistent market access measures, (2) to reduce or 
eliminate discriminatory national treatment measures, (3) to ensure full most favored 
nation treatment, (4) to allow service consumers and suppliers freedom to choose 
commercially desirable ways of purchasing/selling services through the WTO members’ 
mode commitments, (5) to bring about greater transparency in the regulation of services, 
and (6) to implement the new provisions through progressive liberalization. To achieve 
those objectives, the U.S. proposed that “meaningful liberalization” (World Trade 
Organization, 2000a, p. 3) should occur in this negotiation, that GATS scheduling should 
be broader and more transparent, and that the GATS classifications should better reflect 
the reality of the marketplace. 
Furthermore, stated the U.S. proposal, goals and objectives should be achieved 
through the following mechanisms: (1) adopting approaches for negotiations, including a 
“standstill” (World Trade Organization, 2000a, p. 4) in taking any new measures 
affecting trade in services that would improve negotiating position or be used as leverage 
to obtain other concessions; (2) using the current restrictions, sector by sector, as the 
starting point for the new negotiations; (3) establishing modalities for treatment of 
liberalization undertaken autonomously by WTO members since previous negotiations; 
(4) using a full range of negotiating modalities, not just limiting the negotiations to the 
request-offer approach which had been developed as the main approach to the 
negotiations; (5) conducting a needs assessment for developing countries; and (6) 
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extending special treatment on trade issues to least-developed countries. The U.S. 
proposed that negotiations conclude by December 2002. 
The U.S. Position on Higher Education Trade 
On December 18, 2000, the U.S. submitted a communication on Higher (Tertiary) 
Education, Adult Education, and Training and became one of only four WTO members 
that have to date outlined their general positions on commitments on trade in education in 
the Doha Round (Knight, 2003). Bernard Ascher, the Director of Service Industry Affairs 
for the USTR, together with his USTR colleagues and in coordination with other 
government agencies and private sector representatives, was charged with developing the 
proposal. Mr. Ascher had been active in early U.S. efforts to promote trade in services 
and also had participated in efforts to bring services negotiations into the Uruguay 
Round. He and his fellow writers drew upon information from a draft report of the 
International Education Study Team, discussed earlier in this chapter, to formulate the 
proposal.  
The paper, intended to “stimulate discussion and help liberalize trade” (World Trade 
Organization, 2000b, p. 1), recognized that while education is a government function to a 
large extent, most countries permit private education to coexist with public education and 
suggested that private education would continue to supplement but not displace public 
education systems. The U.S. position also stated that “the intent is to help upgrade 
knowledge and skills through these educational and training programs, while respecting 
each country’s role of prescribing and administering appropriate public education for its 
citizens” (World Trade Organization, 2000b, p. 3). Recognizing the fact that education 
below the university level was almost exclusively a governmental function worldwide, 
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the U.S., therefore, proposed the inclusion of higher education, adult education and 
training/testing services in the negotiations but not primary and secondary education. It 
urged WTO members “that have not yet made commitments on higher education, adult 
education, and training services formulate their commitments based on the list of 
obstacles [presented in the paper]. Members are invited to inscribe in their schedules ‘no 
limitations’ on market access and national treatment…Further, the paper proposes that all 
members consider undertaking additional commitments relating to regulation of this 
sector. The United States has taken commitments for adult and other education, and is 
willing to consider undertaking additional commitments for higher education and 
training” (World Trade Organization, 2000b, p. 3, emphasis added). 
The proposal then proceeded to present a list of 17 general (that is, non-country 
specific) obstacles in the education sector and stated which of the four GATS modes of 
delivery were affected by each obstacle. The majority of the obstacles affected delivery 
either by cross-border supply or commercial presence on foreign soil. They included the 
prohibition of higher education, adult education, and training services offered by foreign 
entities; the lack of opportunity for foreign suppliers of higher education, adult education, 
and training services to obtain authorization to establish facilities within the territory of 
the member country; the lack of an opportunity for foreign suppliers of higher education, 
adult education, and training services to qualify as degree granting institutions; the 
existence of inappropriate restrictions on electronic transmission of course materials; and 
the application of economic needs tests on suppliers of these services. Other obstacles 
cited dealt with unclear or unfair regulations regarding hiring specialized personnel from 
outside the country or the royalties or earnings gained by the foreign provider. 
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The Emergence of the Opposition 
Thus the U.S. federal government established and broadcast its stand on the need for 
provisions regarding higher education trade. To the federal government, the existence of 
higher education trade, the numerous methods by which other nations made that trade 
difficult or impossible, and the means to address once and for all those trade obstacles 
meant that such existence might as well be codified into trade agreements. Other groups 
interpreted that existence in another manner: that higher education trade occurred without 
trade agreements, so it should be left alone. Among those groups were key voices for 
American higher education institutions. 
The American Council on Education (ACE), a U.S. organization of about 1,800 
colleges and universities, higher education-related associations, organizations, and 
corporations (American Council on Education, “About ACE,” n.d.), began to actively 
monitor the GATS situation, most likely sometime in 2000. Although more exact timing 
is unknown, an ACE paper on GATS stated that the organization had been monitoring 
GATS since 2000 (American Council on Education, 2004); in addition, information 
received from an interview source placed the commencement of ACE’s involvement 
sometime in December 2000. Considering that the USTR issued its communication on 
higher education and GATS on December 18 of that year, such timing is indeed 
plausible.  
According to its mission statement, “ACE, the major coordinating body for all the 
nation’s higher education institutions, seeks to provide leadership and a unifying voice on 
key higher education issues and to influence public policy through advocacy, research, 
and program initiatives” (American Council on Education, “Mission Statement,” n.d.). 
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Among its 15 strategic priorities are the following: (1) “Identify emerging federal and 
state policy issues and assess their implications for higher education,” (2) “strengthen 
higher education’s voice in public policy by developing a unified position on legislative 
and regulatory issues,” (3) “develop and nurture a diverse pool of future leaders,” (4) 
“support current higher education leaders,” (5) “identify emerging issues and provide a 
forum for national cross-sector discussion,” and (6) “support higher education in the 
advancement of access and diversity, lifelong learning, and internationalization” 
(American Council on Education, “Strategic Goals,” n.d.). As such, ACE has a broad 
mandate encompassing representation, leadership development, and service.  
Higher education’s inclusion in GATS was not seen as an immediate threat by ACE, 
or indeed for other higher education organizations. GATS was one of many issues vying 
for the organization’s attention and, even at the time, was not ACE’s highest priority, 
according to one interview source. Non-profit organizations, including higher education 
institutions, had been engaged in education activities abroad for years before the 
emergence of GATS. Nor was it a rapidly evolving situation, with events unfolding on a 
daily basis. Indeed, ACE members were not aware of the possibility that higher education 
would be included as part of GATS prior to or at the time it was proposed by the USTR. 
Even when the issue was first brought before the ACE commission by staff, commission 
members did not know what “problem” was being raised for their attention. Nevertheless, 
when it emerged, the GATS issue was one that the organization, at least at the staff level, 
couldn’t ignore. According to one interview source, ACE does not like the idea of any 
federal authority having any kind of say in directions for American higher education. The 
USTR’s work with regard to higher education trade certainly qualified as the sort of 
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activity ACE frowned upon. The group’s viewpoint was that the federal government’s 
work with higher education trade and GATS was an intrusion into U.S. higher education 
autonomy. ACE, moreover, would involve itself with “anything that [kept] the federal 
government out of [U.S.] higher education.” ACE, therefore, became a player in the 
higher education trade policy debate and, indeed, took the lead on behalf of the other 
higher education presidential associations. That leadership role was one that the other 
presidential associations willingly ceded to ACE; with regard to GATS, “their eyes glaze 
over,” said one interview source. 
Phase 2: Request—June 30, 2002 
The USTR made its first negotiating moves regarding higher education and GATS in 
the latter part of 2000, in the last months of the Clinton administration. On January 20, 
2001, George W. Bush was sworn in as President of the United States and began his 
administration. In terms of the USTR’s work on GATS and higher education, the advent 
of a new administration had no effect, and its work continued. The next few months, 
however, would prove to be a tumultuous period from the perspective of higher education 
trade and GATS, as higher education organizations became increasingly aware of the 
situation and began to make their positions known to the USTR and to each other. This 
section describes the events occurring in the period between the United States’ first 
statement on its position on higher education trade and the release of its request to other 
WTO members to open its markets to U.S. higher education.  
CHEA’s Involvement in the Issue 
In early 2001, The Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA) became 
intensely involved in GATS and the formulation of higher education trade policy. CHEA 
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was formed in the mid-1990s as a successor organization to the Council on 
Postsecondary Accreditation (COPA), an organization of accrediting groups that 
disbanded in 1992. Like COPA, CHEA is a private, nonprofit organization concerned 
with accreditation activity in the United States. However, unlike COPA, CHEA’s 
membership includes not only participating accreditors but also approximately 3,000 
colleges and universities, which makes it the “largest institutional higher education 
membership organization in the United States” (Council on Higher Education 
Accreditation, 2003, p. 1). CHEA is governed by a board comprised not of accrediting 
agency heads but of college and university presidents and other institutional 
representatives. Its mission statement declares that the organization will serve “students 
and their families, colleges and universities, sponsoring bodies, governments and 
employers by promoting academic quality through formal recognition of higher education 
accrediting bodies and will coordinate and work to advance self-regulation through 
accreditation” (Council on Higher Education Accreditation, 1996, p. 1).  
Seven principles underlie CHEA’s mission and commitment to its work, two of 
which are of particular importance with regard to its GATS activities: advocacy and core 
values. “CHEA will be a forceful and articulate advocate for voluntary accreditation of 
higher education to the public, government, and other interested individuals, groups, and 
countries” (Council on Higher Education Accreditation, 2003, p. 2). In its advocacy 
work, it deals with the U.S. Congress as well as executive entities, particularly the U.S. 
Department of Education, and represents U.S. accreditation to international groups 
(Council on Higher Education Accreditation, 2003). Also, “CHEA will maintain the core 
academic values central to higher education and quality assurance. These include, for 
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example, the values of general education, collegiality, and academic freedom” (Council 
on Higher Education Accreditation, 2003, p. 2). 
Like other higher education institutions and groups, CHEA had been engaged in 
international activities with regard to accreditation and quality assurance in the years 
prior to involvement in the GATS issue and would be doing so with or without the 
existence of GATS. In 1999, for example, the organization conducted a survey of CHEA-
affiliated accrediting bodies and sought information on accreditors’ activities in the 
international arena. CHEA also held an invitational seminar in 2000 on international 
issues in quality assurance. The GATS treaty itself first came to CHEA’s attention in 
1999 not through the USTR but through another U.S. higher education group, the 
Association of American Universities, which had been conducting some GATS-related 
work on its own. CHEA thought that GATS could be significant, but because trade policy 
is not part of CHEA’s mission, it did not raise any alarms for the group at that time. 
CHEA thus monitored the GATS situation as part of its international work. In similar 
fashion to ACE’s involvement, GATS was not a high priority until, according to one 
interview source, “they put accreditation in it.” In reality, accreditation was not included 
as part of the GATS higher education negotiations per se, but a fear existed that what was 
included in GATS would carry the perception of including accreditation, in the guise of 
regulation, and subsequently impinge upon accreditors’ activities.  
On January 25, 2001, CHEA held an international seminar during which the WTO 
and implications for quality assurance were discussed. Participants noted that, in general, 
there had been limited involvement and consultation of governments worldwide with the 
higher education community, which was of great concern to them. Also of concern was 
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the high degree of ambiguous language in GATS. Participants agreed that they needed to 
know much more about GATS than they did, that some type of collective action needed 
to be taken, and that they needed to be fully involved in any deliberations regarding 
higher education and GATS. CHEA was asked to (1) convene a meeting devoted to the 
WTO, higher education and quality assurance and (2) assist in information sharing about 
the WTO and higher education issues. CHEA did, in fact, engage in information sharing 
through the issuance of statements addressed to WTO members, including but not limited 
to the United States. 
The Beginnings of an Alliance 
By the beginning of 2001, then, two of the biggest higher education organizations in 
the U.S. not only had been alerted to the possibility that higher education trade would be 
a part of the U.S. agenda for GATS, but also had become sufficiently motivated to take 
action with regard to that inclusion. Their reaction and subsequent actions made them, 
according to one observer, the most outspoken critics of the U.S. higher education trade 
proposal (Foster, 2002). 
Some of the parties involved in trade and higher education were puzzled by the 
intensity of ACE and CHEA’s reaction. ACE and CHEA appeared to have been caught 
off guard by the USTR action of including higher education in GATS, despite what the 
USTR, CQAIE/NCITE and other groups said were numerous attempts by the government 
and other organizations to bring higher education groups into the loop. According to one 
interview source, it was partly a case of not understanding the issue; ACE really didn’t 
understand higher education trade and GATS because the group’s primary concern with 
regard to international education is foreign students entering the U.S., not American 
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students and/or institutions venturing into foreign territory. Bernard Ascher of the USTR 
also commented that ACE and CHEA did not understand GATS and did not take it 
seriously even though federal trade officials warned them long before the U.S. proposal 
submitted that higher education could become part of GATS (Foster, 2002). Indeed, the 
USTR had been engaged in educating the higher education community about GATS and 
higher education trade; for example, a day-long professional development session for the 
Association of Specialized and Professional Accreditors [ASPA] in 1995 featured both 
Marjorie Peace Lenn and Bernard Ascher speaking on the topic of higher education trade. 
At least one of the attendees at that session was a higher education institution president. 
However, ACE and CHEA contend that their groups were never fully informed about the 
USTR’s plans with regard to higher education trade. ACE’s Terry Hartle commented that 
he had never been briefed on the issue (Foster, 2002). In addition, Fred Hayward of 
CHEA, in a speech to CHEA members, said that “the [December 18, 2000] proposal 
went to the World Trade Organization without being seen by the major representatives of 
the higher education community” (Foster, 2002, p. A33). Hayward had learned of the 
proposal sometime in early 2001, not through the USTR, but through the European 
University Association, a group of university presidents that would later be a signatory to 
a declaration on higher education and GATS (Foster, 2002).  
According to one interview source, the shock that decisions concerning higher 
education could be made by the U.S. federal government without any consultation with 
higher education institutions, U.S. states or any other groups with primary responsibility 
for education really brought the U.S. higher education community together and engaged 
it in the policy over GATS and higher education. Before that, higher education “had been 
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sleeping a bit.” And as the umbrella organizations for U.S. higher education and higher 
education accreditation, the logical leaders in higher education’s backlash against the 
federal government were ACE and CHEA. 
The forming of an alliance between ACE and CHEA was a logical move. The two 
groups have overlapping membership but differing expertise, one handling the specific 
concerns regarding accreditation and quality assurance with the other dealing with 
broader issues facing U.S. higher education. In fact, ACE and CHEA have been working 
together, as one interview source termed it, “forever.” CHEA was housed for a time in 
ACE’s offices after it formed in the mid 1990’s. ACE’s then president Stanley Ikenberry 
favored a linkage with CHEA because of the importance of quality assurance in cross-
border education, an issue on which both groups were working. And neither group 
wanted an international agreement that removed institutional or accreditor autonomy.  
ACE and CHEA recognized the benefits of working together on GATS. Over the next 
four years, they worked together on advocacy with federal government officials and put 
their names to a statement about higher education and GATS. ACE and CHEA also 
worked together to get some language into U.S. schedules on higher education—and they 
succeeded. The specific actions undertaken by the groups will be discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
ACE and CHEA’s Stands and Strategies for Dealing with GATS 
As noted earlier, ACE was very wary of federal governmental involvement in general 
in higher education and saw that involvement as an intrusion on higher education 
autonomy. Specific concern over higher education trade and GATS linked ACE’s blanket 
dislike of federal government involvement of higher education affairs with fears over a 
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formal linkage of higher education and trade. “The language of trade is different from 
that of higher education,” said an interview source; therefore, “when trade starts [getting 
involved] in education, the chance of mischief is considerable.” Citing its previous and 
continuing work in international higher education, ACE also remained confused over the 
USTR’s motives for including higher education in GATS. “What is the problem that the 
USTR is trying to solve by including higher education in GATS?” inquired an interview 
source. “This is all about opening up markets in developing countries. It’s not in ACE’s 
interest.” 
The two groups appeared to have a mistrust of NCITE and its close involvement with 
the USTR in higher education trade. In 2001 the International Trade Administration, a 
division of the U.S. Department of Commerce, cited the NCITE as the U.S. government’s 
“advocate on matters of international trade policy” concerning education and training 
(Foster, 2002, p. A33). The working relationship between NCITE and the federal 
government did not make either group comfortable. An article in The Chronicle of 
Higher Education stated that “[o]pponents of the trade proposal fault the Office of the 
U.S. Trade Representative…for offering [the proposal]. They say the trade office has 
been too heavily influenced by the [NCITE]” (Foster, 2002, p. A33). 
The USTR and NCITE, for their part, believed that ACE chose to characterize the 
NCITE as the for-profit sector in higher education, a group which the ACE has always 
opposed because of issues including those dealing with educational quality and levels of 
federal educational loan defaults. Bernard Ascher of the USTR commented that 
opponents of higher education in GATS were attempting to “tar the trade proposal’s for-
profit supporters as second-class educational providers” (Foster, 2002, p. A33). 
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Proponents of higher education trade policies also accused ACE and CHEA of political 
posturing. According to trade proponents, by using the language of higher education 
values and by seeking a very public display of what was included in the proposal, ACE 
and CHEA merely were protesting to hide the fact that previously they had no idea what 
was happening but that, according to an interview source, they were finally paying 
attention to the issue. The source contended further that ACE/CHEA and other groups 
that eventually joined them to express their opposition really didn’t know how to deal 
with the issue of higher education trade; therefore, the groups used the “old” rhetoric of 
“higher education values” and applied them to a “new” situation. That language was 
readily apparent in the declaration on GATS and higher education which will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
Clearly, there was plenty of mistrust to go around. Realizing that GATS was not 
going to disappear, however, ACE concluded that constructive engagement over GATS 
was better than any stonewalling attempts it could make. Although ACE often advocates 
policy directly with members of Congress, the organization did not see the GATS issue 
as one that could be addressed through such means. “GATS wasn’t clear-cut and 
transparent enough to take to Congress for solutions,” according to one interview source. 
Instead, ACE sought to develop relationships directly with those with the authority for 
formulating the policy, the USTR on a primary level and trade representatives around the 
world on a secondary level. It urged other associations to talk with trade representatives, 
but ACE itself took the lead in development of a relationship with USTR representatives. 
As will be discussed later in this chapter, it was a strategy that proved to be effective in 
influencing the development of the GATS/higher education trade policy. 
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Because CHEA shared ACE’s belief did that the language of higher education was 
not well understood by those drafting the schedules for GATS (in other words, the USTR 
and other GATS negotiators), the group also set out to influence the thinking on GATS. 
Like ACE, CHEA did not do what one interview source termed a “political” campaign 
through the Congress but instead favored an advocacy approach and directed its 
statements on GATS to all WTO members, not just the U.S. parties responsible for 
formulating trade policy. CHEA’s belief is that some “international architecture,” as it 
was termed by an interview source, is needed in the structure of quality assurance 
practice. Establishment of that structure, however, should not be done through 
government policy and certainly not in any treaty. “The problem,” according to an 
interview source, “is that treaty language supersedes law.” In that case, what would 
happen to the American system of quality assurance if GATS indicated, implicitly or 
explicitly, that certain practices designed to ensure educational quality were, in fact, in 
violation of treaty provisions?  
No matter what the reasons for action or inaction, by mid-2001 participants on both 
sides of the higher education trade issue were aware of what was at stake. The dialogue 
began in earnest. In May 2001, the USTR prepared a statement to explain the trade 
agreement proposal to American university and college officials. Then in June 2001, 
representatives of ACE and CHEA met with Joseph Papovich, the Assistant U.S. Trade 
Representative for Services, Investment and Intellectual Property, to discuss the U.S. 
position regarding inclusion of higher education services in WTO negotiations. ACE 
President Stanley Ikenberry and CHEA President Judith Eaton followed that meeting 
with a letter to Mr. Papovich which underscored the points made in the meeting. In the 
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letter, Ikenberry and Eaton sought to educate Papovich about the unique features of U.S. 
higher education, including its large mix of private and public institutions, its large non-
profit sector, and its values of institutional autonomy and decentralized governance. The 
letter also reiterated ACE and CHEA’s “serious reservations” (Council for Higher 
Education Accreditation, 2001, p.1) about higher education’s inclusion in GATS and 
stated that such inclusion was not in the best interests of U.S. institutions or of the 
country as a whole. In addition, the letter expressed ACE and CHEA’s doubts as to 
whether a common set of rules governing trade in higher education services could be 
developed worldwide without undermining features of the U.S. system. The letter asked 
if GATS was the appropriate mechanism for promoting trade of higher education and 
reminded Papovich that U.S. higher education institutions have been able to forge 
international partnerships without any treaties. 
The letter continued by reiterating ACE and CHEA’s concerns with regard to some of 
GATS’ language and its effects on U.S. higher education. The phrase and definition of 
the exercise of government authority continued to be a major point of contention. 
Ikenberry and Eaton stated the impossibility of distinguishing between public and private 
education in the U.S. higher education system. Would actions taken by public institutions 
be considered measures under GATS? Would public institutions lose autonomy? In the 
meeting, Mr. Papovich had sought to reassure ACE and CHEA that the USTR did not 
intend to “discriminate” between institutions on this basis, but the groups were skeptical 
that language assuring such a status could be developed.  
CHEA’s Fred Hayward had noted that in trade agreements, “there is always a 
pressure to centralize decision making and authority” (Foster, 2002, p. A33). ACE’s 
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Terry Hartle stated further that the decentralized system in place in the U.S. meant that 
the federal government cannot make commitments to foreign governments about 
American higher education institutions, even public ones: “Because public education is 
under state governments, we don’t think the Department of Education can tell states, this 
is how you should do it” (Foster, 2002, p. A33). Ikenberry and Eaton echoed those 
sentiments in their letter. They reminded Papovich that U.S. higher education is highly 
decentralized and that most of the governance and regulation of private education is not a 
government function, although they acknowledged that quality assurance must be a 
consideration. In addition, they urged that U.S. proposals should explicitly recognize the 
special needs of developing countries and that any regulations should not erode U.S. 
institutions’ public service role. They also stated that the federal government’s heavy 
focus on private, for-profit institutions has led to the perception that the U.S. is trying to 
privatize higher education worldwide and asked whether that perception would impede 
the ability of U.S. institutions to partner with higher education institutions in other 
countries. 
However, Ikenberry and Eaton ended their letter on a positive note. ACE and CHEA 
expressed their desire to work closely with the USTR as it developed its policy toward 
higher education and GATS and pledged to include the USTR in ACE and CHEA events 
that were being planned. 
A New International Environment and a New Declaration 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 did not appear to throw the USTR’s work 
on higher education trade policy into a state of disarray. Entrance into the U.S. for 
purposes of study was affected by the attacks: Changes in the process for obtaining 
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student visas resulted in a severe drop in the number of foreign students applying to U.S. 
higher education institutions (Levin, 2006). In addition, some speculation existed that 
online learning would be favorably affected after September 11 because of increased 
scrutiny on foreign students entering U.S. to study (Sedgwick, 2002). Neither of these 
events, however, occurred as a result of changes in approach to the language included in 
the higher education trade schedules, nor did the schedules change because of the attacks. 
Indeed, as will be discussed later in this chapter, only flight instruction was affected.  
But on September 28, 2001, ACE and CHEA, together with the Association of 
Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) and the European University Association 
(EUA), organizations similar in composition and function to ACE, released a document 
entitled the Joint Declaration on Higher Education and the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services. The four organizations had worked on various issues related to international 
higher education in previous years and had maintained their association with one another, 
a collaboration that continues to this day. Like ACE and CHEA, AUCC and EUA had 
grave concerns over GATS and the effects that the agreement might have on higher 
education in their respective domains (Association of Universities and Colleges of 
Canada, 2001; European University Association, 2001).  
The four-page statement, copies of which were sent to the Office of the United States 
Trade Representative as well as to the Government of Canada, the European 
Commission, the countries that formed the European Higher Education Area, and WTO 
members, had its genesis from the shock wave that GATS represented for the signing 
organizations, at least for the staff members of those groups. The presidents of three of 
the four signatories (AUCC, ACE and EUA), according to one interview source, said that 
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GATS “hit them in the face.” Thus, the presidents of the associations, with prompting 
from senior staff, initiated the movement to develop the statement of their own initiative, 
not because the member universities pushed for it. 
In the declaration, the associations began by reiterating what they considered to be the 
principles and values of higher education. The first point made was that higher education 
is not a commodity but, rather, exists to serve the public interest as WTO members have 
recognized through the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) and other international bodies. In addition, the authority to regulate higher 
education must remain in whatever “competent bodies” (American Council on Education, 
Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, Council for Higher Education 
Accreditation, & European University Association, p. 1) have been designated by any 
country and that education exports must complement, not undermine, the efforts of 
developing countries to develop/enhance their own higher education systems. The groups 
continued by stressing other key points: that the quality of higher education is a key 
objective both domestically and internationally, that international higher education 
cooperation must operate under a rules-based regime, that higher education is 
significantly different from most other service sectors, and that public and private higher 
education systems are intertwined and interdependent. 
The declaration continued: 
 
Our member institutions are committed to reducing obstacles to international 
trade in higher education using conventions and agreements outside of a trade policy 
regime. This commitment includes, but is not limited to improving communications, 
expanding information exchanges, and developing agreements concerning higher 
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education institutions, programs, degrees or qualifications and quality review 
practices. 
Our member countries should not make commitments in Higher Education 
Services or in the related categories of Adult Education and Other Education Services 
in the context of the GATS. Where such commitments have already been made in 
1995 [the last year in some member countries made higher education commitments], 
no further ones should be forthcoming. (p. 4) 
One of the declaration’s sections contained the groups’ rationale for making such a 
recommendation. The associations contended that very little was known about the 
consequences of including higher education trade in GATS. They also reminded the 
readers that, although some barriers existed, no major problems overall with trade in 
education services were apparent. GATS Article I.III (exercise of government authority) 
continued to be of concern. The groups held that the article is ambiguous and open to 
interpretation and that it is difficult to clearly define which education services are 
supplied on a commercial basis. Finally, the groups stated that too many of the countries 
represented by the four-association coalition had not undertaken effective consultation 
with affected stakeholders. 
Recipients of the declaration and other groups not involved with its writing were 
puzzled and struck with what was perceived as a somewhat adversarial tone in what one 
interview source called a “hate statement.” For its part, the USTR had an impression that, 
through work prior to the statement, a consensus point had been reached with ACE and 
CHEA. The declaration, however, made it clear that USTR officials had not reached such 
a point. According to an interview source, that realization left officials feeling rather 
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betrayed in this regard because if ACE and CHEA still had such strong beliefs despite 
their dialogue with the USTR, clearly there were miscommunications and some big 
misunderstandings remaining between the USTR and opponents of higher education trade 
in GATS.  
Surprisingly enough, the presidents of the ACE member institutions also questioned 
the action that their own organization had just taken. After the statement was released, 
ACE presidents criticized ACE’s new president David Ward, who signed the declaration 
on behalf of ACE. The institutional presidents sharply questioned the rationale of issuing 
the declaration. ACE, in turn, arranged a meeting with its members and top officials from 
the USTR, a meeting which was described as very adversarial in its tone. ACE’s member 
presidents became aware at the meeting that the USTR was making trade commitments in 
higher education on behalf of higher education but without the input of higher education 
institution presidents. That fact left the presidents feeling distressed but also educated on 
the situation with which their organization was dealing. The presidents’ unhappiness was 
not helped by a speech given by Robert Zoellick, the U.S. Trade Representative, on the 
topic of higher education trade and GATS. It was a speech that, according to an interview 
source, did not deviate from a script, and to the audience, “it was clear that [Zoellick] did 
not understand higher education.” Only after ACE began to monitor in earnest the 
unfolding GATS events and after the exit of two of the primary players in the USTR 
policy on higher education trade (Bernard Ascher retired in 2002 and Robert Zoellick left 
the position as U.S. trade representative in 2005 to become a deputy to Condoleeza Rice 
at the State Department) did the presidents’ angst recede. 
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Whether or not ACE and CHEA were aware of the impending addition of higher 
education trade to the U.S.’ GATS proposal, and whether or not the USTR was aware of 
the force with which ACE and CHEA would voice their concerns, all parties were aware 
of each others’ positions by mid-2002. On March 19, 2002, the USTR requested 
comment on the general U.S. negotiating objectives and on item-specific priorities in 
follow-up to the November 2001 Doha ministerial. CHEA submitted its comments in 
response to the notice in a letter dated April 30, 2002. CHEA noted that its members  
are not facing any significant obstacles in making their services available outside the 
U.S.; therefore, we are not requesting USTR to seek any commitments from other 
WTO Members with respect to education and testing services.…However, to the 
extent that USTR seeks or offers commitments in educational and testing services, we 
respectfully and urgently request that such commitments not be sought or made in 
any way that would undermine the current discretion of [U.S.] accreditation 
organizations and quality assurance agencies to determine which institutions and 
programs will be eligible for a review and the outcome of such reviews….CHEA 
would strongly oppose any WTO commitments that have the potential to interfere 
with the freedom of U.S. accrediting organizations and quality assurance agencies 
with respect to these critical organizational purposes” (Council on Higher Education 
Accreditation, 2002, p. 1). 
A Meeting of Interested Parties 
On May 23 and 24, 2002, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) held a forum on trade in educational services at the U.S. 
Department of Commerce in Washington, DC. Planning for it began in 2001, although it 
160
is not clear whether the event was precipitated by the confusion and outcry from the U.S. 
higher education community. According to one observer, however, the forum allowed for 
frank exchange of views and an opportunity for each side to hear the other’s arguments 
(Hirsch, 2002). 
The OECD is an organization of 30 member countries (including the U.S.) focused on 
promoting market economies. It “produces internationally agreed instruments, decisions 
and recommendations to promote rules of the game in areas where multilateral agreement 
is necessary for individual countries to make progress in a globalized economy” (The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “About OECD,” para. 3, 
n.d.). The OECD tries to raise awareness on economic issues; to fulfill that objective it 
publishes numerous reports and statistical analyses. The organization also holds forums 
and conferences designed to bring together stakeholders in various issues together at the 
international level with individuals directly engaged in negotiating various agreements. It 
was such a gathering that the OECD hosted in Washington in 2002, the first held on 
international services trade (Hirsch, 2002). The forum was co-sponsored by CQAIE, the 
group led by Marjorie Peace Lenn, and was presented as CQAIE’s regular yearly 
conference. It was not invitational but was open to anyone who desired attendance and 
could pay the $550 attendance fee. 
Many questions remained about the reasons GATS actually was needed to regulate 
higher education trade and to the effects of GATS on the public mission of higher 
education. “To critics of GATS, [the forum] showed clearly that it is a very long way 
from being a charter to destroy public higher education. To its supporters, the forum gave 
some idea about what is feared from GATS—and the need to continue the dialogue” 
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(Hirsch, 2002, p. 9). According to the OECD, the forum occurred around the time when 
ACE learned about a U.S. “soft offer” to open up the U.S. market to foreign providers.  
According to Hirsch (2002), the most obvious divisions were between different actors 
within countries (ACE and students vs. USTR) and different actors within the higher 
education community (degree vs. non-degree granting, or non-profit vs. for-profit). ACE 
President David Ward offered remarks on behalf of his organization. He asked what, 
exactly, the problem is that needs to be solved by GATS. Quality, he noted, is an issue 
that must be addressed but one that can be addressed independently of GATS. He drew a 
line between career colleges and not-for profit higher education and, implying that non-
degree training programs are for-profit entities, stated that such training (mainly 
vocational and professional) is very different from other forms of higher education. 
According to Ward, “[C]areer colleges, which do not give degrees but may give diplomas 
or certificates in specific training areas, may well have problems that can be addressed 
through trade discussions. I do understand that problem. That is not, however, a problem 
for not-for-profit higher education…Therefore, if training, in a very specific vocational 
and professional way, has problems in international delivery, then that should be the 
problem addressed” (American Council on Education, 2002, p. 2).  
To GATS advocates, however, the agreement would help to clarify the rules of a 
game already being played and to bring about transparency (Hirsch, 2002). According to 
Bernard Asher, “The U.S. proposal is intended to provide assurance of market access and 
national treatment for providers of education and training on a commercial basis, as well 
as for cooperative ventures, which meet regulatory requirements of the host country” 
(Sedgwick, 2002, p. 4).  
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John Yopp of Educational Testing Services added that this forum was the first 
attempt to bring together all the stakeholders in the higher education/GATS debate. “If 
they had done that earlier,” he remarked, “you wouldn’t have this appearance of 
polarization” (Sedgwick, 2002, p. 8). 
Requests for Removal of Trade Barriers  
In June 2002, the U.S. made its next move toward the fulfillment of its higher 
education trade policy by submitting its request to other WTO members. As explained in 
chapter 1 of this study, the request phase of GATS negotiations involves a member’s 
asking other members to open their markets to the service in question. The U.S. 
submission asked for virtual open markets in the areas of cross-border trade, consumption 
abroad, and commercial presence. 
In its request, the U.S. asked that all WTO members “undertake full commitments 
for market access and national treatment in Modes 1, 2 and 3 for higher education and 
training services, for adult education, and for ‘other’ education. Consistent with the 
commitments, countries remain free to review and assess higher education and training, 
by governmental or non-governmental means, and to co-operate [sic] with other 
countries, for purposes of assuring quality” (Knight, 2003, p. 7).  
The U.S. request also delineated specific examples of barriers that existed to higher 
education trade worldwide and asked that the countries involved remove those barriers. 
Among the examples of trade barriers cited in the request were the following: (1) a ban 
on education services provided by foreign companies and organizations via satellite 
networks (China), (2) a ban on for-profit operations in education and training services 
(China), (3) ownership limitations on joint ventures with local partners (Egypt, India, 
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Mexico, Philippines, and Thailand), (4) a quantitative limitation on education institutions 
(Ireland), and (5) a requirement that foreign entities teach only non-national students 
(Turkey and Italy). The U.S. request also asked Israel and Japan to recognize degrees 
issued by accredited institutions of higher education (including those issued by branch 
campuses of accredited institutions) and to adopt a policy of transparency in government 
licensing and accrediting policy with respect to higher education and training. 
Phase 3: Offer—March 31, 2003 
Offers from each country to provide access to its domestic market were due on March 
31, 2003. The United States submitted its offers by the target date. During this time 
period, from the submission of the U.S. request to its offer, the Trade Promotion 
Authority, the legislation giving the USTR authority to negotiate trade packages on 
which Congress must vote in their entirety, went into effect on July 1, 2002. In addition, 
ACE continued to monitor GATS developments and provide information, while other 
organizations continued their work in bringing together stakeholders for discussion and 
bridge building. 
Continuing Efforts to Monitor and Educate 
ACE was true to its strategy of monitoring the situation with regard to GATS and 
informing its membership on the latest developments. In August 2002, ACE released a 
GATS information paper that provided an overview of the agreement and the 
implications the organization saw for higher education. In the paper, ACE stated its 
intention to take an “informed observer and educator approach:” It would monitor GATS 
discussions and inform its constituents of the results of those discussions, maintain 
contact with the USTR and other major actors representing U.S. interests regarding 
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GATS, and work with higher education stakeholders abroad to understand their interests 
and concerns. The paper’s conclusions restated in part ACE’s position on GATS, that the 
potential dangers to higher education posed by the agreement outweigh the benefits 
(American Council on Education, 2002a). 
On October 17 and 18, 2002, UNESCO held the First Global Forum on International 
Quality Assurance, Accreditation and the Recognition of Qualifications in Higher 
Education in Paris. UNESCO is a specialized agency of the United Nations that aims to 
help governments develop “good policies” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, 2002, p. 38) in the areas of education, natural and social sciences, 
culture, and communication. UNESCO serves as a clearinghouse and a “laboratory of 
ideas and a standard-setter…helping Member States to build their human and institutional 
capacities in diverse fields” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, 2003, p. 2). The UNESCO constitution states in part:  
“…[t]he States Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities 
for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free 
exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and increase 
the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for 
the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each 
other’s lives” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
2002, p. 37).  
UNESCO involvement has been through its Forum on International Quality 
Assurance, Accreditation and the Recognition of Qualifications. The Forum “aims to 
provide a platform for dialogue between a wide range of higher education providers and 
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stakeholders and to link existing frameworks dealing with international issues of quality 
assurance, accreditation and the recognition of qualifications” (United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 2002, p. 1). 
The topic of this particular Forum meeting was globalization and higher education, so 
the meeting centered on worldwide issues rather than on U.S. actions and intentions. 
Marjorie Peace Lenn (in her CQAIE role) and CHEA’s Judith Eaton were present at this 
meeting. The two had been present at an expert meeting on the impact of globalization on 
quality assurance, accreditation and recognition of qualifications held September 10-11, 
2001, which served as a lead-in to the development of the Forum. The list of conference 
participants did not include a representative from ACE, but because that organization’s 
focus is not primarily on accreditation and qualifications, it is not surprising that no one 
from ACE was in attendance, especially given that a CHEA representative was present. 
WTO officials were unable to attend because of financial restrictions but offered advice 
to inform discussions related to GATS.  
In statements at the beginning of the meeting, John Daniel, the deputy secretary-
general, cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which identified education as 
a human right. He also identified three main groups of stakeholders to benefit from the 
forum’s discussions: governments, citizens, and academic communities. Participants at 
the meeting agreed on “a need to build bridges between education (i.e. academic values 
and principles) and trade in higher education services.” In addition, participants 
suggested that UNESCO and the WTO as well as the OECD “could act as 
complementary organizations providing a joint forum for discussing both the cultural and 
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commercial aspects of trade in higher education” (United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization, 2002, p. 5). 
The U.S. Offer 
In March 2003, the U.S. published its initial offer outlining what service markets, and 
to what extent, it proposed opening to other WTO members. The initial U.S. offer 
technically did not include higher education, but instead included the following language, 
appearing for the first time: 
The United States is considering [emphasis added] including in its offer 
commitments on Higher Education Services (including training services and 
educational testing services, but excluding flying instruction). These commitments 
would include, inter alia, the following limitations: 
Nothing in this agreement will interfere with the ability of individual U.S. 
institutions to maintain autonomy in admissions policies, in setting tuition rates, and 
in the development of curricula or course content. Educational and training entities 
must comply with requirements of the jurisdiction in which the facility is established. 
The granting of U.S. Federal or state government funding or subsidies may be 
limited to U.S. schools. Scholarships and grants may be limited to U.S. citizens 
and/or U.S. residents of particular states. Tuition rates may vary for in-state and out-
of-state residents. 
Additionally, the commitments would make clear that: Admission policies include 
considerations of equal opportunity for students (regardless of race, ethnicity or 
gender), as well as recognition of credits and degrees; state regulations apply to the 
establishment and operation of a facility in the state; accreditation of the institution 
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and its programs may be required by regional and/or specialty organizations; required 
standards must be met to obtain and maintain accreditation; foreign-owned entities 
may be ineligible for Federal or state funding or subsidies, including land grants, 
preferential tax treatment, and any other public benefits; and to participate in the U.S. 
student loan program, foreign institutions established in the United States would need 
to meet the same requirements as U.S. institutions. (The Office of the United States 
Trade Representative, 2003a, pp. 57-58) 
Similar language was included in a USTR Trade Facts paper dated March 31, 2003 
as one of five bullet points in a section entitled “What the U.S. is Not Offering:” 
Non-Interference with U.S. Education Institutions: Nothing in the offer will interfere 
with the ability of individual U.S. education institutions to maintain autonomy in 
admissions policies, setting tuition rates, and developing curricula or course content. 
The offer does not apply to public elementary or secondary schools, or to public 
funding. There is no intention to promote the privatization of public educational 
institutions. (The Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2003b, p. 3) 
The language regarding higher education would eventually find its way into an 
updated U.S. GATS offer and was the first public indication of the concessions that were 
made by the USTR to be responsive to ACE and CHEA’s concerns. The final outcome of 
ACE and CHEA’s efforts to affect the U.S.’ higher education offer will be discussed in 
greater detail in the next section. 
Phase 4: Revision—May 31, 2005 
The two years following the submission by the United States of its offer to open its 
higher education markets were among the most tumultuous in the Doha Round, but that 
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turmoil had nothing to do with trade in higher education. Trade talks at the WTO’s 
ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003 collapsed over issues related 
to agriculture, foreign investment, competition, and transparency in government 
procurement. As a result, all Doha Round negotiating schedules were thrown into 
disarray, and the target date of January 1, 2005 for completion of the round became 
impossible. July 2004 talks in Geneva, Switzerland, however, established new schedules 
for completion of the round, and a new target date of May 31, 2005 was set for revised 
services offers. The U.S.’ revised offer for education trade had a key addition, the result 
of collaboration between parties that were at odds with one another. 
A More Tempered Approach to Higher Education Trade 
 
The September 2001 Joint Declaration on Higher Education and the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, developed by ACE, AUCC, CHEA, and EUA, puzzled 
many of its recipients and readers, who perceived it as a “hate statement” or, at the very 
least, an overreaction to the situation at hand. According to sources interviewed for this 
study, with the passage of time, even the organizations involved in writing the 
Declaration began to view their statement in a similar fashion. Each of the organizations 
involved had concerns which drove them to produce the statement. European education 
ministers saw and were responding to an erosion of public support for education. ACE 
and CHEA were concerned about for-profit higher education institutions, which did not 
constitute the majority of their memberships but whom they saw as driving the U.S. 
proposal (Foster, 2002). And the AUCC was concerned about issues regarding the export 
of higher education and the various implications for the higher education systems of the 
importing countries. These factors, when combined with the suddenness with which the 
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groups appeared to be confronted with the reality of higher education’s inclusion in a 
trade agreement, probably contributed to the declaration’s strong tone. 
In January 2005, ACE, CHEA and AUCC joined with the International Association 
of Universities (IAU) to issue a new statement entitled Sharing Quality Higher Education 
across Borders: A Statement on Behalf of Higher Education Institutions Worldwide. The 
EUA, heavily involved in efforts to develop a European area of higher education as 
delineated in the European education ministers’ Bologna Declaration of 1999, did not 
participate in drafting the statement but did endorse the final draft. The organization’s 
nonparticipation was most likely influenced as well by the European Union’s decision not 
to make any new education commitments beyond those already made in the Uruguay 
Round. This new statement used somewhat softer language that presented the 
organizations more as partners and advisors in issues regarding higher education trade 
rather than opponents. Addressed to higher education institutions and their associations 
worldwide as well as to national governments and their intergovernmental associations, it 
acknowledged the trends of the internationalization of higher education institutions and 
the growth of market-driven activities. It also offered seven cross-border higher education 
principles, which the organizations designed to guide the actions of all the stakeholders to 
which the statement was addressed. From those principles, the statement made 
recommendations to higher education institutions and national governments. It urged 
higher education institutions to become familiar with the issues surrounding cross-border 
education and trade. It also recommended the development of partnerships between 
higher education and governments and intergovernmental associations. The statement 
specifically addressed the use of trade instruments in higher education trade: 
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Some governments seek to manage cross-border higher education through 
multilateral and regional trade regimes designed to facilitate the flow of private goods 
and services. There are three main limitations to this approach. First, trade 
frameworks are not designed to deal with the academic, research, or broader social 
and cultural purposes of cross-border higher education. Second, trade policy and 
national education policy may conflict with each other and jeopardize higher 
education’s capacity to carry out its social and cultural mission. Third, applying trade 
rules to complex national higher education systems designed to serve the public 
interest may have unintended consequences that can be harmful to this mission. 
Thus, we believe that international agreements and policies for cross-border 
higher education—particularly in the context of WTO and other trade discussions—
should address these limitations. They should respect the right of governments and 
competent bodies within nations to regulate their higher education systems, to 
safeguard the public investment in higher education to achieve their cultural social 
and economic goals, and to promote access and equity for students. (American 
Council on Education, Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, Council 
on Higher Education Accreditation, & International Association of Universities, 
2005, pp. 4-5) 
The sponsoring organizations went to great lengths in the new statement to 
demonstrate the statement’s support in the larger higher education community. In a 
deviation from the joint declaration, which was signed only by the presidents of the four 
organizations which produced it, the quality higher education statement, while produced 
by three of the same four organizations, included other higher education membership 
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associations as signatories. Additionally, the statement included a “note to reader” 
explaining that a draft of the document had been circulated for comment from May to 
September 2004 to higher education organizations worldwide. “This final version has 
benefited from the commentary,” the note concluded (American Council on Education et 
al., 2005, p. 1), implying that the comments and input received from the higher education 
community were considered and were included as appropriate in the version that ACE, 
CHEA, AUCC, and IAU released. 
A Revised Services Offer from the U.S. 
The disruption of the Doha Round trade talks at the WTO ministerial in September 
2003 made the original January 1, 2005 target date for conclusion of the round a virtual 
impossibility. However, talks in July 2004 in Geneva, Switzerland revived the 
negotiations and developed new schedules for completion of the round, including a target 
of May 31, 2005 for submission of revised services offers. The USTR took the 
opportunity to submit a revised offer, this time with a key addition. 
A subsector of Higher Education Services (and its UN CPC code 923) was formally 
added to the U.S. service offer under educational services. It included the following 
provisions: 




Presence of natural persons (i.e. temporary employment)—unbound, except as 
indicated in the horizontal [across all service sectors] section 
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Limitations on national treatment: 
 
For all modes of supply, the following statement applies—The granting of U.S. 
federal or state government funding or subsidies may be limited to U.S.-owned 
institutions, including land grants, preferential tax treatment, and any other public 
benefits; and scholarships and grants may be limited to U.S. citizens and/or residents 
of particular states. In some cases, such funding, subsidies, scholarships, and grants 
may only be used at certain state institutions or within certain U.S. jurisdictions. (The 
Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2005b, p.68) 
The education subsector also contained the following footnote:  
 
For transparency purposes, individual U.S. institutions maintain autonomy in 
admission policies, in setting tuition rates, and in the development of curricula or 
course content. Educational and training entities must comply with requirements of 
the jurisdiction in which the facility is established. In some jurisdictions, accreditation 
of institutions or programs may be required. Institutions maintain autonomy in 
selecting the jurisdiction in which they will operate, and institutions and programs 
maintain autonomy in choosing to meet standards set by accrediting organizations as 
well as to continue accredited status. Accrediting organizations maintain autonomy in 
setting accreditation standards. Tuition rates vary for in-state and out-of-state 
residents. Additionally, admissions policies include considerations of equal 
opportunity for students (regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender), as permitted by 
domestic law, as well as recognition by regional, national, and/or specialty 
organizations; and required standards must be met to obtain and maintain 
accreditation. To participate in the U.S. student loan program, foreign institutions 
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established in the United States are subject to the same requirements as U.S. 
institutions. (The Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2005b, p.68) 
Such lengthy footnotes were not apparent in other sections of the schedule. Here, 
however, was a statement on the limitations of the U.S. offer with regard to trade in 
higher education, a compromise of sorts between the inclusion and exclusion of higher 
education trade in GATS. 
The statement resulted directly from discussions between ACE/CHEA, who together 
drafted the footnote language, and the USTR. For ACE and CHEA, three main concerns 
existed: institutional autonomy, tuition rates, and accreditation, all of which were 
addressed in the footnote. For its part, the USTR relied on ACE and CHEA’s knowledge 
and, recognizing its own lack of expertise in the specifics, allowed the groups to provide 
the language as they saw fit.  
The inclusion of the footnote served to calm the concerns of ACE and CHEA for 
the time being, even though, according to one interview source, the rights of higher 
education institutions with regard to the issues would have been preserved in any case. 
Said the source, “We knew it was there [i.e., the rights] but some parties wanted to see it 
in print, and if that’s the way it gets done [i.e., the offer], so be it.” Other sources were 
not so sanguine: “When you see what can happen [in trade agreements], you want 
specific language included, not merely assumed to be there.”  
Phase 5: Jeopardy—January 31, 2007 and Beyond 
As of January 31, 2007, the United States had a request for other WTO members to 
open its markets to U.S. higher education ventures. It also had made an offer that 
virtually completely opened U.S. markets to foreign higher education institutions. As far 
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as higher education trade provisions are concerned, according to an interview source, the 
U.S. probably will go no farther. However, the USTR asked other WTO members to take 
the next step: In proposing the opening of U.S. markets almost completely to other 
countries, the USTR believed it had the “moral authority,” in the words of an interview 
source, to request more opening up of higher education markets in other countries. The 
U.S. put its position out there for others to see, using language designed to focus on what 
the most constructive elements are, what the U.S. wants, and why it has taken such a 
position. In addition, the USTR hoped that the higher education funding language that 
had been included in the U.S. offer could persuade other countries to think about their 
offers. 
If other countries have done such thinking, it hasn’t resulted in much action as far as 
higher education trade is concerned. Education services were among the least committed 
of all sectors subject to GATS (Sauvé, 2002), and the sector still held that distinction as 
of January 31, 2007. Among the reasons given for the lack of commitments were the 
status of education in general and higher education in particular as governmental 
functions and the lack of time and human resources to study the situation with higher 
education trade and prepare for negotiations. Whatever the case may be, only 45 of the 
145 WTO members had made commitments to education (Knight, 2002), and of those 45, 
only 21 members made commitments to higher education (Knight, 2002), most of them 
having been made during the Uruguay Round. In addition to the United States, the 
European Union (with clear limitations on all modes of trade except consumption abroad) 
and Australia (a commitment covering provision of private postsecondary education 
services, including the university level) addressed the issue of higher education trade in 
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their negotiations (Knight, 2002, 2003). New Zealand also submitted a negotiating 
proposal outlining its interests and issues and suggested that education may be one of the 
least committed service sectors because of the recognition of its public good element and 
the high degree of government involvement in its provision (Knight, 2002, 2003). Very 
few developing countries submitted either requests or offers. The Congo, Jamaica, 
Lesotho, and Sierra Leone, all of which have made full unconditional commitments in 
higher education, are exceptions to that rule. 
Within the U.S., the battles over higher education trade and GATS subsided 
momentarily after the development of the footnote, but regular dialogue among the 
interested parties continued. CQAIE and CHEA met regularly to discuss quality/trade 
issues, as did ACE, CHEA, and the USTR. According to an interview source, ACE and 
CHEA were pleased with the care that the USTR paid to their concerns, even though the 
groups did not believe that they really shaped the USTR’s actions beyond the footnote 
that was added to the higher education schedule. CHEA believed, however, that the 
language in the U.S. offer was sufficient to prevent accreditation from being included in 
GATS. For CHEA, the language in the footnote was the most important item. Such also 
may have been the case for ACE. The group’s president, David Ward, was made a 
member of the ITAC committee Number 10 (Services and Finance Industries). However, 
he did not attend any meetings and subsequently was removed from the committee for 
inactivity.  
In addition to maintaining a regular dialogue with the USTR, ACE and CHEA, 
together and separately and in sometimes in conjunction with other groups, continued to 
try to influence the products of other countries’ higher education GATS work through 
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educating and continuing to raise the consciousness of other countries and institutional 
presidents to issues of international higher education as well as higher education trade. 
Together with the AUCC and the IAU, ACE and CHEA developed a follow-up to the 
higher education across borders statement. The document was designed to be a checklist 
to serve as an implementation tool for presidents of higher education institutions in 
dealing with international issues. Issues regarding the expansion of U.S. accreditation 
activities in other countries and the question of “diploma mills” and their impact on 
quality of higher education continued to be projects for CHEA and will be for the 
foreseeable future. For CHEA, the aim was to be “responsible world citizens,” according 
to an interview source. 
As for the USTR, its work on GATS continued even if its efforts on higher education 
had been completed, at least for the time being. In attempts to hasten the completion of 
the Doha Round talks, the WTO turned to the concept of plurilateral negotiations, which 
refers to negotiations in groups. One group was established for education services 
(including the U.S., New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia, and Taiwan). According to an 
interview source, if the WTO were to miss its new end-of-2006 deadline for completion 
of the Doha Round, the U.S. would probably “take a break” on its WTO work. 
Whether the U.S. actually took a break is questionable, but the WTO did, in fact, miss 
its 2006 deadline for completion of the round. The Doha talks were declared suspended 
by the WTO Director General Pascal Lamy in August 2006 after a blockage resulting 
from a standstill on agriculture items in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Because the WTO views the Doha negotiations as a single undertaking, “nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed” in the language of the WTO (World Trade 
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Organization, 2005a, p. 96). Requests and offers can be submitted until the end of the 
Doha Round; no commitments will be final until the round is declared concluded.  
In the midst of the suspension of talks, the USTR received an 11th-hour letter dated 
August 14, 2006, from the National Education Association (NEA), requesting that the 
U.S. withdraw the higher education sector from its GATS offer. The NEA is an 
organization of U.S. educators primarily at the K-12 level, but it includes postsecondary 
education professionals as well. It is a member of Education International (EI), an 
organization of teachers’ organizations and unions worldwide. Although EI supports the 
idea of free and fair trade as promoted by the WTO, it does not believe that basic social 
services such as education (including higher education) should be tradable commodities. 
EI advocates primarily at the supranational level; that is, with the WTO, UNESCO and 
other intergovernmental agencies. The organization seeks to alert its affiliates to GATS-
related issues and to mobilize the affiliates to act within their own domestic arenas.  
Although the NEA had been monitoring GATS developments and providing 
information to its membership, its involvement in directly affecting U.S. higher education 
trade policy appeared limited and certainly not at the level of ACE and CHEA. 
According to interview sources, NEA and other teacher unions “had their say” on GATS, 
but U.S. officials did not have many dealings with these groups, and no focused effort on 
NEA’s part to put pressure on the USTR was being made. In May 2005, NEA staff met 
with Bernard Ascher’s replacement at the USTR, Christopher Melly, “to better 
understand the USTR intentions for higher education and to express our concerns” 
(National Education Association, 2006, p. 1). In addition, the NEA issued a report on 
higher education and international trade agreements but had commissioned the work from 
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an outside organization. The August 2006 letter was an attempt to take advantage of the 
suspension in talks: “We wanted to make our concerns about this proposal known to you 
at this time even though we realize that an impasse has been reached in the Doha 
Round…We realize that the talks broke down over other issues, but respectfully suggest 
that this impasse gives you an opportunity to revisit this critical area” (National 
Education Association, 2006, p. 1). The NEA made no contact with the USTR 
immediately prior to sending the letter and sent no follow-up correspondence even after 
the USTR sent a response inviting the NEA to contact its office.  
Fortunately for the WTO, informal talks among trade ministers attending the World 
Economic Forum annual meeting in January 2007 in Davos, Switzerland, revived the 
Doha talks. WTO General Director Lamy, in comments to the WTO General Council on 
February 7, 2007, said that “we have resumed negotiations fully across the board” and 
added that “political conditions are now more favorable for the conclusion of the Round 
than they have been for a long time” (World Trade Organization, 2007, p. 1). He 
declined, however, to offer an end date for the negotiations. 
Because the Doha Round is not over as of the time of the completion of this study, the 
“final” outcome of the U.S. experience with developing its higher education trade policy 
under GATS is not yet known. Indeed, in a process which involves ongoing negotiating 
and adjusting as new situations arise and new players seek to influence the negotiations, 
“final” may not ever be a possibility. For the higher education community, it means that 
continued monitoring will be necessary to keep current with any developments, but it also 
provides a rich environment for higher education researchers interested in the area of 
higher education and trade. The final chapter will address future research possibilities and 
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make some recommendations for stakeholders after an examination of these research 




Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Chapter 4 presented a synopsis of the development of GATS and the historical, 
economic, and philosophical context in which the U.S. experience with setting higher 
education trade policy can be considered. Chapter 5 continued the discussion by 
describing the participants and the events that occurred since the U.S. conceived and 
began development of its trade policy in higher education. This report concludes by 
considering this information in terms of the research questions and by examining the 
findings in light of the theoretical literature outlined in chapter 2. Directions for further 
research and suggestions to parties interested in involvement in shaping the ongoing 
policy development process will be offered at the end of the chapter. 
The Research Questions Revisited 
 
Chapters 1 and 3 presented the three major research questions that provided the 
structure and direction for this study. This section addresses these questions and discusses 
the ability of political models to aid in understanding of higher education policy making 
processes on emerging issues in higher education at the supranational level. 
Research Question 1: Who Were the Major Actors in the Policy Making Process Related 
to the Substantial and Technical Aspects of the U.S. Higher Education Trade 
Negotiations in the Context of GATS? 
The findings of this study identify four major visible players in the process: the 
United States Office of the Trade Representative (USTR); the Center for Quality 
Assurance in International Education (CQAIE) and its related committee, the National 
Committee for International Trade in Education (NCITE); the American Council on 
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Education (ACE); and the Council on Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA). Two 
other players served visible minor or supporting roles: the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Additional visible minor players include the 
National Education Association (NEA), which made a last-minute appearance but was 
not as active in the earlier stages of the process. The NEA produced, through a third 
party, a background information paper on GATS but did not attempt much in terms of 
direct influence other than a 2005 meeting with the USTR and a 2006 letter to the Trade 
Representative. The WTO itself, while not an actual player in the U.S. policy making 
process, certainly warrants mention as a major hidden player: As the organizations 
through which nations developed GATS and will continue to implement, interpret and 
enforce it, the WTO is the entity through which the game rules are set and maintained. 
Another major hidden player should be acknowledged: the agricultural interests who, 
through their influence on the entire Doha round, managed to stop the entire negotiating 
sequence twice and to put the completion of the round in doubt at times. 
a. Who were the major actors at each stage of the process? 
The WTO, although comprised of member nations who, together, determine the 
content of trade agreements and the rules by which they are governed, functions as the 
singular entity or body through which the formal game rules (Allison, 1971) are enforced. 
All WTO members must adhere to those rules. As the rule-setting entity, the WTO’s 
influence is always present, although not blatant, and for this reason it might be 
considered as a major hidden player active at all stages of the process, quietly pulling 
strings. Expressed in terms of Kingdon’s (1995) conceptualization of a hidden player, the 
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WTO, through its setting of overall game rules, shapes various alternatives available to 
its members and thus to organizations attempting to influence members’ actions. For 
example, because GATS allows members to decide the extent to which (or, indeed, if)
they will open various service markets to other members, the WTO enables the U.S., 
through the USTR, the alternative of determining whether it will seek to open higher 
education trade and to what extent it will do so. In turn, the alternatives available to ACE 
and CHEA would likely have been different had higher education not been an area under 
negotiation at that time. The groups might have chosen to take no action other than 
sporadic monitoring and probably would not have been motivated to develop the Joint 
Declaration described in chapter 5. 
As the organization that has the ultimate authority for the entire process, the WTO 
also might be seen as the alpha authority, to take Gamson’s (1968) categorization one 
step farther. It is the overall system agent that controls all individual member negotiation 
processes. As a party to that process, the U.S., through the USTR, is in this instance a 
partisan (Gamson, 1968), with the potential to disrupt the system’s orderly functioning. 
With regard to this particular policy making process, the USTR does not appear to be 
acting in a disruptive manner. The USTR followed the WTO timetable for submission of 
requests and offers; it structured its offer schedule along WTO-prescribed lines and has 
used the WTO product classification scheme to categorize the schedule’s contents. In that 
respect, the WTO has influenced the actions of the USTR with regard to the policy issue 
being examined in this study.  
Through the USTR, the agency delegated with the authority to act on the U.S.’ behalf, 
the U.S. was a major visible actor involved at each stage of the policy making process. 
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With the right to determine the extent to which the U.S. would open up its own higher 
education trade markets, the USTR is the beta authority. As such, the USTR acted in 
accordance with the game rules set by the overall (alpha) authority but nonetheless was a 
system agent within its own control domain, that of the U.S. domestic trade arena. The 
power given to the USTR to conduct trade negotiations stipulated that the agency would 
solicit comment from other governmental bodies. After negotiations were completed, the 
USTR would submit the entire package to Congress, which, as a result of the game rules 
set by the TPA, would only have the authority to accept or reject the package in its 
entirety. Thus, other parts of the federal government, even Congress, became partisans of 
the USTR with regard to this and other trade issues.  
CQAIE and its committee NCITE were major visible players primarily in the first 
stage of initiation of the trade negotiation process. The group’s work on the conferences 
it cosponsored with the OECD made CQAIE a player throughout the other stages of the 
process as well (if not quite as directly). Through the NCITE, CQAIE worked in an 
advisory role to the USTR, at the latter group’s request. CQAIE/NCITE and Dr. Marjorie 
Peace Lenn were recognized experts on higher education trade and were advocates of its 
inclusion in GATS. Dr. Lenn also took the lead on higher education trade issues long 
before other higher education groups had addressed the issue and in so doing became a 
policy entrepreneur (Kingdon, 1995). As such, Dr. Lenn took the issue of higher 
education trade, attached it to USTR’s development of trade policy, and then, through 
advice and advocacy, moved it onto the USTR’s trade negotiation agenda. As a body not 
charged with making policy, CQAIE/NCITE is a partisan, attempting to influence the 
actions of the USTR. It submitted comments in response to a call for public comment, 
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much as any other partisan. CQAIE/NCITE’s position as an advisor to the USTR, 
however, and in later stages its role as conference co-convenor, makes for an interesting 
relationship because it could be considered a tool of the USTR, even though it is a 
nongovernmental body.  
In the latter part of the initiation phase and continuing throughout the development of 
the higher education trade schedule, ACE and CHEA became major visible players, 
acting together as counterweights to the pro-trade stance assumed by the USTR and 
CQAIE/NCITE. In tandem, the two groups acted in a partisan role and certainly disrupted 
the orderly functioning of the policy system enacted by the USTR. The joint declaration 
the two groups authored in concert with the AUCC and the EUA had the effect of, if not 
stopping the USTR’s efforts to include higher education in GATS, erecting a roadblock. 
The organizations put the USTR on notice that major higher education organizations had 
serious misgivings about GATS and were in need of some reassurance of what inclusion 
in GATS would and would not do to higher education institutions. 
OECD and UNESCO also were visible players from the request phase forward, albeit 
as minor or sideline players: not directly attempting to influence either the proponents or 
the cynics but rather serving as facilitators to help all parties better understand the GATS 
and its purposes. Each organization, separately and together, conducted and disseminated 
research and sponsored conferences to provide information and to bring interested parties 
together for debate, discussion and, perhaps, bridge building between parties on both 
sides of the issue.  
Two organizations that may warrant closer observation in the future are the NEA, a 
last-minute player, with Education International (EI) as a minor hidden player rooting 
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NEA on from the sidelines. As indicated in chapter 5, NEA has not been particularly 
active in the GATS debate to date, but its submission of a letter to the U.S. Trade 
Representative in the midst of the suspension in WTO trade talks may indicate an 
intention to get more active in the debate, perhaps at EI’s urging. According to Sauvé 
(2002, p. 4), “the current negotiations take place…in the midst of a growing anti-GATS 
campaign, of which public sector unions in the educational field are active players, 
especially in OECD countries…”. Although this information is based on an observation 
from four years ago and refers largely to teacher unions in other countries, it is possible 
that the NEA is poised to be more active in the debate when the negotiations resume. 
Finally, agricultural interests have become players of enormous importance because 
collectively they put a stop to the entire negotiating process, first at the Cancun 
ministerial meeting in September 2003 (after the U.S. submitted its first offer), then in 
2006 (after the U.S.’s revised offer). The agricultural interests are truly major hidden 
players: They are not involved with this particular issue but nonetheless are among the 
most important players in the larger arena of the WTO community. Their refusal to come 
to agreement on agricultural issues was not aimed at stopping higher education trade. 
However, the inability of the agricultural sector to come to agreement on key provisions 
related to another trade agreement threw higher education trade provisions in jeopardy as 
part of the disrupted and seriously delayed Doha talks. Ironically, much of the blame for 
the deadlock was placed on the U.S. for demanding too much of other members in return 
for cutting its farm subsidies. Thus U.S. actions in one trade sector had an influence on its 
ability to set trade policy in the unrelated sector of higher education. 
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b. What were their goals and priorities? 
The USTR, as the U.S. federal agency with authority for establishing trade policy, is 
charged with protecting the trade interests of U.S. entities. With regard to higher 
education trade, therefore, the USTR sought to liberalize trade and to lessen or eliminate 
barriers to trade in international higher education and based its actions upon the 
information it had received from other U.S. agencies as well as from CQAIE/NCITE. The 
USTR also sought to reflect current higher education trade realities in an established 
international trade agreement. To that end, the USTR undertook the writing of GATS 
higher education trade schedules under the regulations of the agreement’s formal trade 
language and attempted to inform and educate its constituent groups on the GATS and its 
provisions. CQAIE/NCITE, likewise, aimed to educate stakeholders on GATS and higher 
education trade issues as well as to provide accurate information on the state of higher 
education trade as needed. Of course, CQAIE/NCITE also had to consider the interests of 
its own constituency, consisting of the CQAIE/NCITE sponsors who already were 
engaged in higher education trade activities and were hoping to see trade barriers 
lessened or removed to make it easier to attract foreign students and/or to operate on 
foreign soil. 
ACE and CHEA, on the other hand, as organizations representing primarily not-for 
profit institutions, were focused not so much on initiating action as on protecting U.S. 
higher education’s core values, such as diversity in higher education institutions and the 
rights of academic freedom and institutional autonomy. The intensity of the language of 
the September 2001 declaration and the subsequent work on the footnote language might 
be explained in part by the groups’ belief in these ideals as higher education rights that 
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are inviolable even within the context of an international trade agreement. Frohock (1979, 
cited in Mazzoni, 1991a, p. 25) noted the distinction between goals expressing interests 
arising from “opportunities to get what one wants or needs” and goals expressing 
rights—“that which is due one by virtue of a just claim.” According to Frohock, 
“Interests are negotiable terms, rights are not.” CHEA’s goal in particular was to ensure 
the continued right and ability of U.S. higher education to regulate itself through the 
accreditation process. The agency was determined that U.S. higher education would not 
be subjected to federal governmental regulation, either through action brought through 
the government itself or via an agreement, such as GATS, to which that government was 
a signatory. Both groups desired to keep the U.S. federal government out of higher 
education. To ACE and CHEA, the possibility of such involvement was an all-too-real 
danger with GATS. 
c. What motivated them to become involved in the policy making process? What was 
at stake? 
As was noted in chapter 4, the USTR was well aware of the growth in the services 
sector in general as well as the growth of higher education both domestically and 
internationally. The USTR also was aware of the U.S.’ position as a worldwide leader in 
higher education. Clearly, the USTR had the motivation to pursue some sort of trade 
provisions in higher education for the benefit of those who wanted to make use of them. 
Likewise, CQAIE/NCITE was aware of the growing market in higher education trade. 
Indeed, through various groups such as GATE and NCITE, CQAIE had been monitoring 
trade issues and GATS years before the USTR put forth a higher education trade 
proposal. Perhaps more importantly, CQAIE/NCITE saw an opportunity to provide 
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information and educate other stakeholders by starting with the USTR and then moving 
on to educate other groups and individuals. As stated earlier in this chapter, 
CQAIE/NCITE was thus able to fill an information and action vacuum by offering its 
expertise. Both the USTR and CQAIE/NCITE saw an opportunity to make trade in higher 
education less cumbersome for their constituents. They were so motivated by the 
possibility and perhaps the promise of a higher education trade market that truly would be 
open and would be easy for higher education institutions to navigate. 
ACE and CHEA, however, saw the situation differently. From the groups’ 
perspective, they were witnessing the capture of higher education by business interests, as 
evidenced through the application of the language of commerce to the realm of education, 
and the subsequent erosion of the core values of higher education that they were working 
to protect. The possibility of a higher education trade market governed by an international 
trade agreement provoked fear and mistrust. It was the fear of the unknown, of an 
untested document with ambiguous language and unsure interpretation. It was a mistrust 
of an agreement that eventually might be used as a tool by the federal government to 
expand its authority into higher education, an expansion which would be inconsistent 
with the U.S. Constitution and its reservation of authority over education matters to the 
states. It was also a fear that GATS could pave the way for federal governmental 
intrusion into areas of institutional autonomy such as decisions on student admissions and 
scholarship awards.  
In addition, ACE and CHEA mistrusted CQAIE/NCITE’s motives because of 
NCITE’s focus on trade liberalization and because of NCITE’s sponsor list, comprised 
largely of for-profit institutions and business. CHEA, in particular, became involved 
189
when it perceived that accreditation, the U.S. higher education community’s system of 
self-evaluation, was becoming a part of the U.S.’ GATS agreement, but not until then. 
ACE may not have had the motivation early on despite admonitions to become involved 
and aware of GATS because the group did not perceive the agreement as an immediate 
issue for its members. Most of ACE’s membership is not-for-profit higher education 
institutions. Once the group saw, however, that the USTR had made its intentions known 
to include higher education in GATS, ACE had the spark it needed to become involved. 
A lack of trust in a process laden with ambiguous terms and fears of inconsistent 
interpretations provided additional motivation. 
OECD and UNESCO, while involved in the U.S. higher education trade policy 
dispute as minor visible players, each had direct connections to at least one of the 
organizations through involvement in related areas, OECD through its work with 
CQAIE/NCITE and UNESCO through work with both CQAIE/NCITE and CHEA. 
OECD also had a connection with Marjorie Peace Lenn and had been in the process of 
organizing forums on the topic. Both Dr. Lenn and Judith Eaton had connections with 
UNESCO through their participation in meetings on quality assurance, accreditation and 
qualification recognition. Although OECD is more focused on economic matters and 
UNESCO on education promotion, the two groups, from their own perspectives, saw the 
need for greater education on GATS as well as for the provision of forums in which 
participants could meet and discuss higher education’s involvement in the trade arena. 
In each case, the players’ goals, stands and motivations were consistent with 
segments of their stated organizational missions: the USTR, to develop and coordinate 
U.S. international trade policy; CQAIE/NCITE, to work toward the liberalization of 
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higher education trade; ACE, to provide leadership on key higher education issues and 
assess emerging issues’ implications for higher education; CHEA, to advance self-
regulation through accreditation; OECD, to promote game rules in multilateral 
agreements and to raise awareness on economic issues; and UNESCO, to help 
governments develop sound policies in areas such as education. It is an illustration of the 
contention that “where you stand depends upon where you sit” (Allison, 1971, p. 176), 
because the priorities and perceptions of each player were indeed shaped, at least in part, 
by their respective missions, and the priorities and perceptions were, in turn, shaping 
interests and goals. These goals became critical enough to prompt each player to act; in 
other words, the goals provided the motivation to become involved.  
d. What resources did each actor command? 
The USTR, of course, had the legal authority granted to it by the U.S. government for 
the development of higher education trade policy. That gave it the ability to set the 
agenda; that is, to determine that higher education trade would be included as part of the 
U.S.’ GATS schedules.  
A key resource for each of the partisan groups was expertise and the legitimacy or 
credibility that comes through that expertise. For CQAIE/NCITE, that expertise came 
through a very active, highly regarded director; for ACE and CHEA, the expertise of its 
staff; for OECD and UNESCO, the expertise to conduct studies on the issues surrounding 
higher education and trade. Each singular group also possessed legitimacy in that each 
was recognized as a leading group in the expertise areas in which they operated. 
CQAIE/NCITE’s legitimacy was drawn from its role as a niche player; it was performing 
a function that did not appear to be conducted by any other U.S. organization. For ACE 
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and CHEA, legitimacy originated in part through their large memberships of U.S. higher 
education institution presidents of diverse mission, size, and governance. OECD and 
UNESCO derived their legitimacy through their nation members. OECD’s and 
UNESCO’s status as supranational organizations also gave them a global arena to make 
results of their research and fieldwork available through avenues such as publications, 
conferences, and web sites.  
Each of the partisans appeared to recognize the legitimacy and expertise of the other 
partisans, although as noted in chapter 5, some of the ACE staff questioned the 
legitimacy of CQAIE/NCITE to be speaking to the federal government about higher 
education’s stance on trade. Each group, too, had the resource of name recognition. All of 
the groups were known to the other groups as being legitimate higher education 
organizations. Furthermore, the groups were well known within the higher education 
community long before GATS became an issue. The USTR recognized the legitimacy 
and expertise of the partisan groups as well. Because they possessed this legitimacy and 
expertise, the partisans active in this issue were close enough to the federal government 
and to each other to have the opportunity for direct influence. This proximity eliminated 
the need to resort to the use of more extreme strategies such as inciting violence or chaos, 
which is, at any rate, not part of the accepted norms of conduct in the community; those 
will be discussed later in this chapter. Proximity also meant that none of the groups 
needed to expend huge financial resources to attempt to influence other groups or 
individuals to become involved. Such financial resources were, in any event, largely 
unavailable. None of the higher education groups, for example, had access to a political 
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action committee to fund any efforts in attempting to remove higher education from the 
USTR’s GATS agenda.  
Research Question 2. How Did the Actors Attempt to Influence the Policy Making 
Process? 
In his framework for political analysis, Mazzoni (1991a) noted some basic concepts 
that point to likely directions for strategy: gaining access, using voice and threatening 
exit, building coalitions, setting agendas, and controlling the scope of conflict. All these 
elements are evident in the methods used by actors to attempt to influence the 
development of higher education trade policy.  
a. What strategies did actors employ to use their resources to exert influence?  
A key strategy was the use of voice, whether through printed or spoken avenues, to 
attempt to educate other stakeholders concerned with the higher education trade issue and 
to build support for players’ positions. Each of the players took this approach. For 
example, ACE and CHEA, through their Joint Declaration and their Sharing Quality 
Education Across Borders statements; OECD and UNESCO, through issue papers and 
memos on their Web sites as well as the conferences they organized; and CQAIE/NCITE, 
through its papers on the state of U.S. higher education trade, attempted to influence 
through voice. In each case, the players attempted to express their positions through 
reasoned argument and an appeal to the intellect of the other players.  
In addition, ACE and CHEA made particular use of symbolism as they couched much 
of the language of their messages in terms of the enduring values of higher education. As 
noted in chapter 5, ACE and CHEA continued to use their voice through the development 
of guidelines or soft laws, such as its checklist, outlining good practice or policy, on 
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dealing with international issues; it was a step taken to attempt to influence actions that 
governments and other appropriate actors take.  
Even the USTR, with its authority to set the agenda and develop the policy, resorted 
to voice to attempt to quell concerns of skeptics. The USTR met personally with 
representatives of other organizations, attended conferences covering GATS and higher 
education, and published “trade facts” papers on its Web site. In so doing, the USTR tried 
to educate interested parties with regard to what the agency believed that GATS would 
and would not do as well as what actions the USTR would and would not take. The 
USTR’s strategy was, perhaps, one of attempting to “win hearts and minds” in relation to 
the GATS and higher education trade.  
Players also worked through established action channels (Allison, 1971), both official 
and unofficial, in an attempt to exert influence on other players. Direct contact with the 
USTR was an effective strategy for both CQAIE/NCITE and ACE/CHEA because these 
groups were able to express their concerns directly to, and share information directly 
with, the USTR, the actor with the authority for setting higher education trade policy. All 
parties involved in the issue were able to make use of forums and other types of 
gatherings typical in governmental and higher education settings; they did so either as 
conveners (CQAIE/OECD and UNESCO) or as attendees (USTR, ACE, and CHEA). In 
addition, CQAIE/NCITE was able to work through another established formal 
information channel. Marjorie Peace Lenn’s position on the USTR’s ITAC Number 10 
on Services and Finance Industries gave her, and thus CQAIE/NCITE, a true insider’s 
access to the process of setting higher education trade policy. ACE actually managed to 
secure a spot on this committee in 2001 to assure itself direct access. Ironically, ACE 
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President David Ward attended no meetings and was removed from the committee in 
February 2006. His absence and subsequent replacement removed an official action 
channel, and thus an avenue for voice for ACE, in the process of setting higher education 
trade at least for as long as the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) remains in effect. 
In declaring higher education trade an area of consideration in their negotiations 
during the Doha Round, the USTR set the agenda on the issue of higher education trade 
in GATS. Such was the agency’s right as the authority. Furthermore, the TPA, in 
stipulating that Congress cannot make any changes to results of trade negotiations once 
the USTR has finalized negotiations with other countries, presently enables the USTR to 
control the scope of conflict. In other words, any attempts to influence U.S. higher 
education (and, indeed, other sector) trade policy must be directed at the USTR during 
the negotiation process. The U.S. Congress, in essence, becomes another partisan. 
However, the TPA is a tool which the USTR may not have after July 1, 2007. Because 
scope control is pivotal to all other strategies through its determination of the access and 
coalition size as well as the nature of the agenda, that is, whether it is closed or open 
(Schattschneider, 1960; cited in Mazzoni, 1991a), the USTR may find it necessary to 
devise new ways of attempting to meet its higher education trade goals if the TPA expires 
without renewal. The USTR will, nonetheless, be able to control the scope of conflict in 
its ITAC, as that group will continue to meet and continue to be a closed committee. In a 
more international arena, the USTR is attempting to use a strategy of opening the higher 
education markets up completely as a tool to entice other WTO members to take similar 
actions regarding their higher education sectors. To date, such a move does not seem to 
have met with resistance from within the domestic education community, aside from 
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those stakeholders that do not believe that higher education should be part of GATS at 
all. Its effectiveness as a tool in GATS negotiations remains unknown as a result of the 
2006 suspension in trade talks. 
b. How were the influence attempts shaped and constrained by the contextual factors 
of the WTO and higher education environments?  
The arena in which the development of higher education trade policy occurs is one 
formed by the overlap (or, rather, “collision,” a concept that will be discussed later in this 
chapter) of two larger arenas: the WTO/international trade arena and the higher education 
arena. Research Question 1 described the WTO as one of the major hidden players in the 
development of U.S. higher education trade policy. The WTO’s agreements and rules of 
trade engagement are major factors shaping the international trade arena. As the 
institutional force or structure put into place by members, the WTO’s rules serve as the 
force shaping and constraining the trade policy making process and do so through the 
overall game rules that outline what members can and cannot do. In this case study, the 
WTO functions as the large arena in which the member countries operate, certainly when 
they are in the process of interacting with one another. The GATS rules of engagement 
specify, for instance, that no one trading partner can be given preference over another 
(the most favored nation principle) and shape and constrain the options available to WTO 
members in negotiating specific aspects of trade with one another. Even with an 
international agreement overseen by a supranational organization, however, much of the 
actual trade policy development takes place at the national level, although the 
development is, of course, subject to the same restraints as those that occur in member-to-
member negotiations. Thus, the effective size of the arena in the issue being examined in 
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this study is limited to the domestic subarena. In this subarena, the U.S., through the 
USTR, tackles the nuts and bolts of establishing at least a starting point for its global 
negotiations, if not the actual end product. As of January 2007, U.S. development of 
higher education trade policy had extended into the larger international arena only during 
discussion forums, which were designed for an international audience and not just for 
U.S. stakeholders. OECD, CQAIE, and UNESCO provided some of those discussion 
venues, as did ACE and CHEA through their collaboration with their international 
counterparts on various statements of shared principles. 
The GATS agreement itself constrains players’ actions, but not as much as might 
have been imagined with regard to a global trade policy. The looseness of the GATS 
agreement, one that is “flexible” but “not terribly user-friendly” (Sauvé, 2002, p. 3), 
creates considerable room for authorities to set policy and for partisans to attempt to 
influence authorities’ decisions. In the context of the U.S. policy development, the 
GATS’ flexibility gave the USTR the right to decide whether the U.S. would include 
higher education in its current trade plan.  
The WTO has a major authority role that may be called into play in the future: the 
right to hear trade disputes, to make rulings, and to levy and enforce sanctions against 
members who are judged to be out of compliance with its agreements, including GATS. 
This authority role, coupled with an expectation that the WTO could and would use its 
power to decide disputes, might have been an initial factor in motivating ACE and CHEA 
to become involved in the higher education trade issue. No doubt that role is a factor in 
the groups’ continuing involvement. In March 2007, after completion of the study but 
immediately prior to the finalization of this research document, ACE officials expressed 
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concern to the USTR that the 2005 U.S. offer, even with the footnote on institutional 
autonomy, does not protect U.S. higher education institutions from potential GATS 
challenges (American Council on Education, 2007). 
The WTO, within the boundaries of GATS, also establishes each member country as 
the authority over its own requests and offers. The U.S.’ Trade Promotion Authority sets 
a formal action channel that constrains all partisans to attempt to directly influence policy 
development by going directly to the USTR, rather than through any other governmental 
body either at the federal or state/local levels. As stated earlier in this chapter, this 
constraint means that even other parts of government, including Congress, become 
partisans in attempting to shape the GATS commitments. However, Congress becomes 
the authority if and when it will be asked to renew the TPA when the TPA is about ready 
to expire. With a newly elected Congress controlled by the Democrats, who, in their 2004 
party platform pledged to create U.S. jobs, review existing trade agreements, and take 
other trade-related measures that might be considered protectionist (2004 Democratic 
National Convention Committee, Inc., 2004), the renewal of the TPA is not a forgone 
conclusion. In fact, renewal was not considered likely even before the power turnover 
(Bowley, 2006). After July 1, 2007, if TPA expires without extension, Congress will once 
again have the authority to make changes in the content of any trade bill that is put before 
it. With the delay resulting from the suspension in the Doha talks, it is highly unlikely 
that a GATS trade bill will be ready for a vote before July 1. Having a Congress with the 
authority to change pieces of trade legislation creates a new action channel with 
numerous opportunities and consequences for actors in this policy issue. Such 
Congressional authority also would turn the USTR from the authority into a partisan, a 
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major power shift. Finally, Congressional authority to act on trade matters in pieces 
expands the size of the issue arena from that of a governmental agency in the Executive 
Branch to that of the law making body, the Legislative Branch, which is a larger, less 
elite arena that is more open in terms of access to groups and individuals of all types. 
The role and mission of groups are extremely important in this, or indeed, in any 
issue, because roles and missions can lock groups into expected ways to act or, in fact, 
define whether and to what extent the groups will act. Each player in this issue became 
involved at such time as its mission in essence demanded that it take appropriate action. 
ACE and CHEA, too, acted in ways appropriate to organizational mission and along 
expected action channels. CHEA deals with higher education issues as they relate to 
quality of education provided. ACE deals with myriad issues ranging from access to 
affordability; thus, GATS is just another issue raising itself to be addressed, which, of 
course, brings with it issues of time, money and human capital resources. CQAIE/NCITE 
deals with international issues, quality, and trade; its involvement was almost immediate, 
because it was aware of GATS from its inception and saw the obvious applications of its 
work to that of the USTR. 
These roles also, either explicitly or implicitly, dictated proper behavior. Players were 
expected to act in a professional, intelligent manner befitting leading organizations that 
advocate and educate in their respective areas of expertise. The USTR, as an agent of the 
U.S. government, is expected to provide factual information; according to an interview 
source, the USTR cannot engage in language that the agency would consider to be 
propagandistic rhetoric. Also, of course, the USTR is bound by formal action channels 
and methods of operating in accordance with the laws that establish its authority over 
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trade matters. When ACE and CHEA issued their first declaration in 2001, it came across 
as too harsh and even a bit ignorant. The declaration also painted the organizations as 
reactive. Ironically, the negative terms in which GATS proponents viewed ACE and 
CHEA after the declaration might have worked in the groups’ favor: the USTR became 
aware of how much work needed to be done for the agency to get some sort of a buy-in 
from the higher education community. In any case, the language in ACE and CHEA’s 
second statement in January 2005 was softer and more collegial. That language reflected, 
perhaps, a greater feeling of ease at that time about higher education trade and GATS but 
clearly an acknowledgment that they might have been too strident in tone in their 2001 
declaration. 
c. What alliances developed among the actors?  
ACE and CHEA formed a coalition of two groups united by common ideological 
goals, primarily that of maintaining U.S. higher education’s autonomy and preventing 
undue government intrusion into higher education institutions’ affairs, as well as that of 
preserving the values of higher education and its role as a public good, not as a 
commodity. At various stages of the process, ACE and CHEA also joined with the 
AUCC, EUA, and IAU, leading higher education associations worldwide with similar 
values. The ACE/CHEA alliance was certainly natural because they shared many 
members and were the umbrella organizations for higher education in their respective 
areas of expertise. By joining together, they combined their expertise, as well as the 
legitimacy that both groups possessed as spokespersons for the higher education 
community. Because of their overlapping memberships and shared values regarding 
higher education as well as their U.S. scope of operation, their alignment is one that is 
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ideologically grounded. ACE and CHEA’s alliance is thus likely to endure beyond the 
current attempts to influence the development of U.S. higher education trade; their 
relationship could extend to other phases of trade development and, indeed, to other 
issues affecting U.S. higher education. Its alliances with AUCC, EUA, and IAU are, by 
definition, more limited because each of these groups has jurisdiction over a different 
segment of the international higher education arena. However, all five groups, in various 
combinations, collaborated on projects of interest to higher education worldwide prior to 
the joint statements on higher education and international trade. The groups continue to 
maintain their connections and their commitment to working together on issues of mutual 
interest. 
CQAIE/NCITE, on the other hand, aligned itself with different groups, not to oppose 
ACE and CHEA but, rather, to provide proper education and information in an area it had 
monitored for at least half a decade. CQAIE/NCITE aligned itself with the USTR 
because the organization shared the USTR’s goals of liberalization of trade in higher 
education and elimination of barriers to that trade. The group also aligned with the OECD 
to educate stakeholders in higher education trade and to provide forums for discussion. In 
turn, the USTR relied on the information it received from CQAIE/NCITE and used it in 
its reports. This phenomenon, according to one interview source, fascinated certain other 
WTO members: the reliance of a governmental body on a nongovernmental body for 
information and advice was unheard of! The alliance is particularly beneficial to 
CQAIE/NCITE because it provides the group with a powerful avenue for influence. 
According to Mazzoni (1991a, p. 104), “The most potent forms of access link advocate to 
decision maker in cozy personal relationships.” The alliance’s ability to endure, however, 
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is more issue specific because, of course, the USTR’s scope of operations extends beyond 
that of the higher education sector. As long as higher education continues to be discussed 
as part of the development of U.S. trade policy, which is the likely scenario, the alliance 
is relevant. If, however, higher education were to be removed from the U.S.’ schedule of 
GATS commitments for any reason, the dynamics of the CQAIE/NCITE relationship 
would change. CQAIE/NCITE’s power to maintain the alliance with USTR is predicated 
on its ability to provide USTR with information and commentary it needs to support its 
position on the state of higher education trade. If higher education trade were no longer 
relevant to the USTR, then, assuming that CQAIE/NCITE would continue to attempt to 
influence the USTR to restore higher education trade to its GATS schedules, the group 
would be relegated to more of a partisan status.  
Research Question 3. What Was the Outcome of the Influence Attempts? 
As of January 2007, the U.S. has put forth a higher education trade offer in which 
each mode of supply has virtually no limitations on market access by other WTO 
members and for which a footnote stipulates the autonomy that U.S. higher education 
institutions have over their own operations. Each of the four major visible players in this 
policy issue, the USTR, CQAIE/NCITE, ACE, and CHEA, had influence over the 
outcome in certain respects. When all is said and done, however, the unintentional 
influence of the agricultural interests may have the most influence over the ultimate 
outcome.  
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a. What were the differences between what actors sought and what actually 
occurred?  
For ACE and CHEA, the main goal was the protection of the core values of U.S. 
higher education and, by extension, no additional, unwarranted federal governmental 
intrusion that might result from being a signatory to a global trade agreement such as 
GATS. Judging from their reaction to the USTR’s initial position paper in December 
2000, ACE and CHEA also wanted a voice in the process. Such voice would have 
befitted their status as umbrella organizations for higher education, although neither 
group may have realized this need until they saw the initial trade proposal, a document on 
which they had not commented. Their joint declaration of 2001 called for the removal of 
higher education from GATS, but that was more of a means to an end rather than the end 
itself. In 2005, ACE and CHEA had been able to effectively use their voice. The groups 
convinced USTR to include the footnote, with language that the two organizations 
provided themselves, that gave higher education institutions their necessary autonomy vis 
a vis the higher education schedules. Another outcome of ACE and CHEA’s GATS 
efforts was the role they assumed in educating the USTR and other interested parties as to 
what they believed would constitute good practice in higher education trade. The two 
groups achieved their status as “educators” both through their work with USTR on the 
footnote language as well as in their statement on cross-border quality higher education.  
For its part, CQAIE/NCITE aimed to educate stakeholders on GATS and higher 
education trade issues as well as to provide accurate information on the state of higher 
education trade as needed. CQAIE/NCITE worked toward that goal through its surveys, 
through its joint conference with OECD, through Marjorie Peace Lenn’s involvement on 
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the ITAC group, and through its working relationship with the USTR. Of course, the 
group also had a vested interest in the inclusion of higher education trade as part of 
GATS: Many of the NCITE sponsoring organizations were higher education institutions 
either operating overseas or exploring the possibilities.  
The USTR itself looked to liberalize trade and to use its willingness to open U.S. 
higher education markets completely as a tool to get other WTO members to do the same. 
With regard to its policy making on the domestic front, the USTR seemed poised to 
accomplish its goal. Of course, as the authority in charge of the U.S. policy making 
process, liberalization of the U.S. higher education market was almost assured because 
the USTR could set the agenda, define the parameters of the process, and, while paying 
attention to the input of stakeholder groups, determine for itself the ultimate course of 
action. In reality, however, the USTR has yet to reach that goal. Very few WTO members 
have to date even addressed the issue of higher education in the Doha Round.  
b. What compromises and bargains were necessary in reaching the policy outcome?  
As of January 2007, the big compromise in this policy making process was the 
addition of the language contained in the footnote to the higher education trade schedules. 
No other sector of the U.S. services trade schedules contains such a notation. The USTR 
added the footnote to the schedule as a show of good faith to ACE and CHEA, although 
the USTR did not necessarily give anything away by including it because, as noted in 
chapter 4, the U.S. intention in implementing any trade policy was to allow higher 
education institutions to operate as they had before. USTR’s willingness to include the 
footnote may have been influenced in turn by the willingness of ACE and CHEA to work 
together with the USTR in a constructive manner, through direct meetings rather than 
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through “yelling from a distance” via mechanisms such as the joint declaration in 2001. 
ACE and CHEA’s more collaborative approach to the issue, evident in the language in 
the cross-border quality higher education statement, probably played a part in the groups’ 
success in convincing the USTR to add the footnote to the schedules. 
c. What factors were responsible for that outcome? 
Chapter 3 outlined a method for assessing when and how players in this policy issue 
might have had influence, according to the following indicators. First, did the actor have 
the necessary resources? Second, did the actor have the motivation and skill to attempt 
influence? Third, did the actor have a strategy in place to attempt influence? Fourth, 
within the context of the setting, can a plausible sequence of events be constructed that 
combines actors, motivations, resources, and strategy? While the events presented in 
chapter 4 indirectly provide answers to these indicators, an analysis of the interactions of 
players, motivations, resources, and strategy that were responsible for the outcome is 
necessary to integrate the findings, to account for the story, and to identify the relative 
power advantages.  
As evidenced in the narrative of chapter 5 and further examined in this chapter, each 
of the four major visible actors possessed the necessary resources, motivations, and 
strategies to influence U.S. higher education trade during the development of the higher 
education trade policy in the U.S. domestic arena. This section constructs a sequence of 
events that ties these indicators together to create an explanation of these events.  
The events of the U.S. experience in developing its higher education trade policy 
represent what can best be described as a “collision” between two arenas: the 
WTO/international trade arena and the higher education arena. The predominant groups 
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in those arenas possess different values, but both arenas exist in a world in which 
linkages between nations are becoming more pronounced through easier movement of 
information, goods, and individuals. The world is wrapping itself increasingly in the 
language of economics and trade as a way to foster relations between countries and, 
indeed, to improve conditions in impoverished nations. The world also is speaking 
increasingly the language of commerce and expressing interactions in related terms. The 
language of commerce, of course, comes easily to the WTO and to the USTR. That 
language does not come as easily to higher education, defined broadly, but especially not 
to the segment of the higher education community represented by ACE and CHEA and 
their international counterparts. However, the WTO, through GATS, has compelled the 
higher education communities of its member nations to accustom themselves to new 
ways of expressing their activities.  
The USTR, as the authority responsible for developing trade policy for the U.S., 
clearly had the power advantage at the beginning of the higher education trade policy 
making process. Its authority over the outcome of the policy development was a major 
resource that gave it the upper power hand throughout the process. Although GATS 
constrained the USTR’s ability to deny certain trade advantages under the rules of most 
favored nation and national treatment, the agreement also gave the USTR latitude to 
determine the extent to which it would propose opening up U.S. services sectors to 
international trade. Thus, the USTR was able to determine whether higher education trade 
would be part of the U.S.’ Doha Round negotiations. As far as the U.S. was concerned, 
however, the issue of higher education as a tradable service was never in doubt. Indeed, if 
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higher education was defined as a service under the 1988 Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act, its inclusion under GATS was virtually mandated.  
The USTR had another clear motivation for including higher education. The 
information it obtained from the U.S. International Education Study Team and from 
CQAIE/NCITE demonstrated that U.S. higher education was big business and that some 
type of international trade framework was needed in order to ease trade barriers. 
CQAIE/NCITE, as an organization concerned with international quality and trade issues 
in higher education, and with a recognized expert in issues of higher education trade as its 
director, became a right-hand player for the USTR. As the USTR began its development 
of higher education trade policy, CQAIE/NCITE offered critical information poised to 
exert influence on the USTR from the start. The group was motivated by its ongoing 
research on trade issues, by the makeup of its members, and by the opportunity to aid in 
the lessening or even removal of barriers to trade in higher education, a role in helping to 
set the agenda with regard to U.S. higher education trade. CQAIE/NCITE was aided by a 
global environment defined increasingly in economic terms. The group’s strategy of 
educating and advocating had, perhaps, some influence on the USTR’s actions. 
Considering that the USTR was already predisposed toward including higher education in 
its offer, however, a more likely scenario is that CQAIE/NCITE’s influence was limited 
to providing the last bit of impetus necessary to convince the USTR that any moves 
toward including higher education were in the U.S.’ interests. In any case, the USTR’s 
authority and the prevailing global trade climate, the corroborating information it 
received on the value of higher education trade, and its “mandate” from U.S. trade laws 
all contributed to its development of an initial GATS trade position on higher education 
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in December 2000 as well as its subsequent request and offers to other WTO members on 
higher education trade. 
ACE and CHEA’s initial reaction was twofold: first, concern over the effect of higher 
education’s inclusion in the trade proposal on the autonomy and freedom of U.S. higher 
education institutions, and second, indignation over what they claimed was lack of 
consultation on an issue that clearly would impact their constituencies. The two groups’ 
shared belief in autonomy and freedom from undue federal governmental control in 
higher education governance would have lent itself to a general stand against higher 
education involvement in any supranational trade agreement. The pro-higher education in 
GATS groups charged that they informed ACE and CHEA of the reality of GATS and of 
possible higher education inclusion. In addition, the Federal Register notice of April 14, 
1999 requested comment concerning issues such as the agenda and scope of its WTO 
negotiations and specifically sought consultation from nongovernmental bodies. Whether 
the information and request for comment qualify as “consultation” is a matter that is 
likely one of differing viewpoints by the groups involved. Given ACE’s wide 
involvement in issues affecting its constituency (such as access and affordability) and 
CHEA’s focus on quality assurance and accreditation, notification of the possibility of 
higher education’s inclusion in GATS might have been viewed as a general, vague heads-
up that was essentially filed away in their respective portfolios of “possible future 
issues.” The Federal Register notice was of a general nature and did not specifically 
mention higher education. In addition, the groups might have expected to be consulted 
more fully prior to any development of a U.S. higher education trade policy as part of a 
diplomatic protocol recognizing their positions as leading organizations of higher 
208
education institutions in the U.S. Whatever the expectations might have been, additional 
consultation did not occur. Only when ACE and CHEA realized that higher education’s 
inclusion of GATS was imminent—perhaps representing an incremental step in a 
struggle over control of higher education in the U.S.—and that the values of higher 
education in which they believed could be in jeopardy did they truly possess the 
motivation to act to attempt to influence the USTR  
Seeing, perhaps, that they had been caught by surprise and wanting to make a strong 
response to give an appearance of decisive action, ACE and CHEA used voice and the 
symbolism of higher education as a public good to attempt to influence the USTR. They 
made these attempts both in direct meetings and in written documents. The groups joined 
together with two other higher education organizations in a show of international 
solidarity bolstered by the combined numbers of member institutions, by their combined 
expertise, and by their respective positions of leadership. The joint declaration, in which 
the four groups urged that higher education not be part of any GATS commitments, was 
confrontational in tone. This attempt by ACE and CHEA to convince the USTR to 
remove higher education from its trade agenda only served to make them look reactive 
and, perhaps, a little ignorant in the eyes of the USTR. Ultimately, any appearance of 
ignorance, while not an intentional strategy for ACE and CHEA, may have actually 
worked in their favor. An appearance of ignorance might have served as a notice to the 
USTR that, insofar as the higher education community was now forced to accustom itself 
to the language of commerce, the USTR, in turn, needed to at least familiarize itself with 
the language of higher education. The ignorance also might have indicated that the 
USTR, as well as more globally oriented groups such as the OECD and UNESCO, 
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needed to provide more education for stakeholders on GATS’ purposes and limitations 
and to offer more opportunities for stakeholders to gather to air their concerns. OECD 
and UNESCO, in turn, through their conferences and reports, may have exerted influence 
by easing concerns about GATS, although the findings in this study do not clarify the 
extent to which such concerns may have been eased.  
From 2001 through 2006, perhaps aided by the opportunities for exchange of 
information and airing of viewpoints, ACE and CHEA’s strategy showed a shift from one 
of confrontation to one of collaboration. The more collaborative stance is evidenced in 
part by the joint statement on quality higher education across borders that they released 
with the AUCC and the IAU in January 2005. In addition, working directly with the 
USTR staff, ACE and CHEA directly influenced the scope of the application of GATS to 
U.S. higher education. The footnote added to the higher education schedules perhaps 
represented ACE and CHEA’s greatest success in their efforts, during the time period 
covered under this case study, to shape the U.S.’ higher education trade policy. The two 
groups were able to apply their knowledge about higher education and their belief in U.S. 
higher education autonomy through their work on that footnote. If power indeed is, in the 
words of Dahl (1957, p. 202), the extent to which “A can get B to do something that B 
would not otherwise do,” then ACE and CHEA, by influencing the USTR to add 
language that it had not considered critical enough to add previously, held more power 
over the USTR than did CQAIE/NCITE, even with the latter group’s role as a major 
advisor to the USTR. 
One point needs to be made about the influence of a major hidden player in the 
development of U.S. higher education trade policy. The two suspensions of Doha Round 
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talks over agricultural issues means that ultimately, the players with the most power over 
higher education policy at this moment may be the agricultural interests. The WTO 
policy of “nothing decided until everything decided” means that no new schedules are 
final until everything has been agreed upon and the round is declared concluded. Until 
then, nothing, including the higher education provisions, that the U.S. has added to its 
services schedules as a result of Doha negotiations is in force. The U.S. domestic trade 
arena, of which higher education is a part, is contained within the larger WTO structure. 
As such, all of the policy developed within that structure is subject to the actions, whether 
intentional or unintentional, of numerous other players. Ultimately, higher education is 
just a very small part of a much larger trade agenda and a much larger struggle. 
To What Extent Do Political Models Help Us to Understand Policymaking Processes 
with Regard to Emerging Issues in Higher Education at the Supranational Level? 
Chapter 1 of this study outlined the needs that Knight (2002) identified for further 
scholarship on the issue of GATS and higher education. Those needs include (1) 
understanding the perceived rationale and benefits of liberalization of higher education 
trade; (2) understanding better the anticipated outcomes to assist in policy development; 
(3) identifying the diverse perspectives, goals and expectations from liberalization in 
higher education trade; and (4) examining trade liberalization from the perspective of 
winners and losers. The examination of the U.S.’ experience with development of higher 
education trade policy in this study offers some answers, at least from the perspective of 
the United States’ higher education policy making arena, that are inherent in the needs for 
future study that Knight outlined. Clearly, as the agreement continues to be developed in 
terms of negotiated schedules and clarifications or interpretations of terms, researchers 
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should continue to study GATS and higher education trade to provide a fuller, more 
detailed picture that includes the experiences of other countries both in the domestic and 
international arenas. 
This study has isolated the pieces of the higher education trade policy making 
experience in the United States: the key players, their roles and relationships to one 
another, their goals, the resources and strategies through which the players have 
attempted to achieve those goals, and the arena in which this policy making issue occurs. 
The study has utilized rich description not only to describe and analyze the individual 
components that comprise the Mazzoni framework but also to illustrate the interactions as 
a whole. From an analysis of those components and the construction of the story, it also 
has illustrated how the components combined to create conflict, the necessary precursor 
to political activity. The authority/partisan relationship between the USTR and 
ACE/CHEA as well as between the USTR and CQAIE/NCITE created a state of 
interdependence. Actors possessed heterogeneous goals for higher education and held 
competing interpretations of the need to regulate higher education trade. These factors, 
combined with the ambiguity in GATS terminology, led to a conflict situation. 
In addition, the actors involved in this policy issue aligned themselves according to 
the clear differences of opinion on how the issue should be handled. The policy making 
process for U.S. higher education trade in essence represents a conflict of cultures, one of 
trade and commerce and knowledge as profits vs. one of education as basic right. 
According to Morgan (1986, p. 155), “conflict arises wherever interests collide.” Thus, a 
conflict situation existed and turned into a political situation because actors were 
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motivated to use their resources at that time to attempt influence for possible goal 
attainment. 
The Mazzoni framework’s basic categories have proven themselves to be useful in 
the context of the data analysis and results reporting in this particular study; they are 
enduring constructs that are grounded in literature and that help build an overall picture 
of the higher education trade policy making process. However, the categories are also 
large and rather unrefined; thus, the framework is so broad and covers so many dynamics 
that detailed analysis of any one variable may become unwieldy. In this respect, the 
Mazzoni model is an orienting framework that allows the researcher to uncover the 
political dynamics in a policy issue that has been relatively unexplored. Once the overall 
story is unpacked and interpreted, the findings can be refined through the use of finishing 
frameworks, which delve more deeply into particular aspects of the process through the 
use of more focused theories. Some of those possibilities will be discussed in the 
following section. 
Directions for Future Research 
 
This study shows how actors, once motivated to become involved in the policy setting 
process in higher education trade policy, use their resources and apply strategies to 
influence the development of higher education trade policy in the United States. As the 
narrative illustrates, the conclusion of this process is yet to be seen. The yet-to-be-
determined final outcome of the U.S. process and the relatively unexplored territory of 
higher education trade policy research raise interesting directions for future research both 
in terms of substantive and theoretical work. This section offers suggestions for the 
course of future research in this policy area. 
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Continued Monitoring and Analysis 
Because of the most recent suspension of the Doha Round talks, the United States has 
not yet ,as of this date, completed its work on any of the higher education trade 
provisions it has sought to make effective. Continued monitoring of the U.S. efforts and 
analysis of the process should pick up where this particular study stopped. Recent 
developments serve to underscore the importance of continued monitoring. On March 6, 
2007, after the completion of this study, ACE and CHEA submitted new correspondence 
to the USTR. In that letter, the two groups expressed concern that U.S. public and private 
higher education institutions would be subject to differential treatment under GATS and 
reiterated their position that a U.S. higher education commitment could undermine 
institutional autonomy. In addition, they stated their members’ concerns that U.S. higher 
education would be used as leverage by the USTR to extract concessions from other 
WTO members in other areas under negotiations in the Doha round. Perhaps most 
interestingly in light of the analysis of the current study, the groups questioned whether 
the footnote which they succeeded in adding to the schedules would be sufficient to 
protect U.S. higher education institutions from any dispute settlement challenges under 
GATS (American Council on Education & the Council for Higher Education 
Accreditation, 2007). What result this recent attempt by ACE and CHEA to influence 
higher education trade policy remains to be seen. 
A study of particular interest would be an analysis of the process if and when it 
continues after the expiration of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). This authority 
grants USTR the right to negotiate a trade package but gives Congress only the ability to 
pass or reject that package as a whole. The TPA is due to expire on July 1, 2007 unless 
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Congress grants another extension. With a Democratic Congress that is considered to be 
more protectionist in terms of trade, an extension is not guaranteed, although according to 
an interview source, the TPA is “not dead” and may, indeed, be extended for a “good 
reason,” such as a significant breakthrough on a major item being negotiated through the 
WTO. If, however, the TPA is not extended, the implications for higher education trade 
policy could be enormous. Congress would then have the authority to treat trade 
legislation as it would any other bill and could debate and amend any elements of the 
trade provisions that the U.S. has negotiated within the bounds of the GATS before it 
votes for or against it. The House and the Senate could initially pass different versions of 
the package, after which the two versions would be debated in a Conference committee to 
resolve differences and to develop one bill on which both houses would act. At the end of 
this process, the trade provisions could look very different than what the USTR intended. 
Authority in Congress also means that parties wishing to influence the bill’s outcome 
would act presumably through Members of Congress rather than through the USTR. 
Thus, the higher education trade policy making process would be accessible to more 
individuals and groups.  
The expiration of the TPA could conceivably bring about changes in actors, 
resources, strategies, and motivation as well as in settings. Not only would the expiration 
bring about a change in an action channel, it also would create an arena shift which, as 
indicated by Mazzoni, “can change the key actors, relevant resources, incentives for 
action, influence relationships…and hence winners and losers” (1991b, p. 116). That 
arena shift could also expand the scope of conflict (Schattschneider, 1960, cited in 
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Mazzoni, 1991a) from one basically limited to a single governmental agency to the entire 
Congress. 
States’ Role in Higher Education Trade Policy 
Amendment X to the United States Constitution stipulates that powers not exclusively 
delegated to the federal government or prohibited to the states are reserved for the states. 
Responsibility for all education matters, including higher education, is thus a state 
prerogative. With regard to higher education trade policy, however, the states’ voices 
have been largely absent. In 2006, the governors of Iowa, Maine, and Michigan wrote to 
U.S. Trade Ambassador Susan Schwab to ask that the trade negotiations not bind states to 
global agreements. The governors cited their concerns that state higher education policies 
could be in danger of being compromised (Foster, 2007). However, according to an 
interview source, states have not listed higher education as one of their numerated 
problems with GATS.  
Given the state role in higher education and the stakes involved, the states should 
have emerged as a major visible player in the current study, but that was not the case. The 
reasons for the lack of participation are not clear but could include factors such as 
innocuous or broad language in federal calls for comment on negotiations and state focus 
on more pressing issues. In addition, nonparticipation could be the result of a belief that 
concerns already were being voiced by other groups on the states’ behalf: according to an 
interview source, ACE “seems to be speaking for [the states].” Future research should 
examine the nonparticipation of states in the higher education trade policy making 
process in the context of these possible factors and can incorporate the work of scholars 
such as Cobb and Elder (1983, 1984, cited in Mazzoni, 1991a) on noninvolvement.  
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Higher Education Trade Policy at the Supranational Level 
At present, the bulk of the policy making process has centered on the domestic arena, 
with U.S. actors attempting to influence the USTR to have an impact on higher education 
trade policy. The eventual shift to the international arena, in which the USTR will attempt 
to convince other WTO members to open up their markets to higher education trade, 
represents a change to the arena and also means that the USTR is no longer the authority 
but, rather, becomes a partisan. The shift also may raise issues of agenda setting as other 
WTO members determine, on their own volition or as a result of other players’ influence, 
whether and to what extent they will place higher education trade policy on their GATS 
agendas for the Doha or any subsequent trade rounds. 
Individual Country Studies 
This study examined the experience of the United States with regard to the 
development of GATS higher education trade policy. Future studies might analyze the 
experiences of other WTO members in the development of their own higher education 
trade policies. Because relatively few members have included offers on education, let 
alone higher education, in their GATS schedules, the pool of potential subjects is small. 
However, the determination not to negotiate higher education trade at this time also 
would be a useful contribution to the body of work in this area.  
In studies of other countries’ experiences, researchers should pay attention to the 
assumptions which support political theoretical frameworks in general and the Mazzoni 
framework in particular. Mazzoni designed and applied his framework in the study of K-
12 education in the U.S., although, as this study demonstrates, his framework also is 
useful in the study of other educational levels. The basic categories can provide a 
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structure for outlining the findings; the theory and assumptions that support the 
framework itself, however, are based on political processes as they apply in the U.S. Any 
research examining similar issue dynamics in other countries needs to first determine that 
the political activities of a particular country’s population are consistent with the 
assumptions attached to the Mazzoni framework. Of particular concern in this regard are 
assumptions about the pluralistic nature of policy making and the dispersion of power 
among participants. Mazzoni’s framework stresses the importance of human agency in 
political action: Players in an issue conflict have the ability to significantly affect the 
thoughts or actions of others. That ability results in part from a policy making process in 
which many parties have the right to participate and in which the resources which enable 
the exercise of power are broadly available. In a country under the rule of a dictatorship, 
for example, power is not broadly dispersed and policy making is not pluralistic. Thus, 
the assumptions of the Mazzoni framework would not apply, and in those instances 
researchers would need to seek other theories or frameworks to examine higher education 
policy making dynamics.  
The Role of Facilitators and the Media in Higher Education Trade Policy 
This study identified the OECD and UNESCO as facilitators that, while not directly 
involved in the setting of U.S. higher education trade policy, played a role in the policy 
issue by holding conferences and developing analyses and other printed materials for use 
by higher education stakeholders and others interested in the shaping of higher education 
trade policy. Future studies could address in greater detail the role of these organizations, 
in particular how their actions help to frame the issue and/or give it visibility.  
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Chapter 2 of this study described McLendon and Peterson’s (1999) research on the 
press as an actor in state higher education policy making. They found that the press, a 
crucial player in swaying opinion, could help to determine winners and losers in a 
conflict. While the press did not emerge as a player in this policy making issue, actual or 
potential roles served by the media and by other communications mechanisms, in 
particular The Chronicle of Higher Education and the Federal Register, could be the 
focus of future study. Such studies could examine the extent to which these publications 
and other communication outlets help to shape the higher education trade policy issue 
and the outcomes of the policy making process.  
 Soft Laws 
As noted in the previous section, international groups in the U.S. higher education 
trade policy arena engaged in efforts to facilitate the process by providing factual 
information to stakeholders in higher education trade. Future studies might concentrate 
specifically on the efforts of these organizations to develop international policies with 
regard to higher education trade. These policies include the writing of soft laws, sets of 
guidelines for good practice in areas such as quality assurance that do not have the force 
of law (i.e., they cannot be enforced like the provisions of the WTO trade agreements) 
but, nevertheless, become de facto law because they are adopted by governments or 
related associations for their own use in setting standards in a particular area. Such soft 
laws may increase in number and usage as a way of providing international guidelines 
that prevent the adoption of potentially inflexible standards as part of trade agreements. 
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Applications of Other Political Models to Study of Higher Education Trade 
This study utilized the Mazzoni model of policy making to analyze the process of 
U.S. higher education trade policy development. As noted in chapter 2, the application of 
Mazzoni is particularly useful for issues that are either new or relatively unexplored. The 
findings of the study noted certain themes, most notably those of action channels and 
game rules (Allison, 1971), authorities and partisans (Gamson, 1968) and agenda-setting 
and visible/hidden participants (Kingdon, 1995) in the development of U.S. higher 
education trade policy. The work of each of these scholars might be applied to this study, 
as well as to future studies, to examine such aspects of the policy making process in 
greater detail. In addition, as noted earlier in this section, other models and theories might 
be appropriate to the study of the U.S. experience as it progresses, in particular arena 
shifts (Bolman & Deal, 1997; Gamson, 1968; Mazzoni, 1991b), scope of conflict 
expansion (Schattschneider, 1960, cited in Mazzoni, 1991a), and the role of language in 
shaping awareness of and participation in issue resolution (Cobb and Elder, 1983; 
Edelman, 1964; Stone, 2002).  
Recommendations for Potential Policy Actors in Higher Education Trade 
As stated previously in chapter 2 of this study, political models are limited in their 
ability to predict policy outcomes. Moreover, they are not structured to determine the 
quality of any outcome associated with policy making. With those caveats, however, 
interested parties still can gain insights from political analyses to assist them in devising 
general strategies for involvement and possible influence in the policy making process in 
higher education trade. 
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Continued monitoring of developments in higher education trade policy, both at the 
domestic and international levels, is critical. One area that warrants particular mention is 
that of non-WTO trade agreements that might be reached and might include higher 
education. These include bilateral (between countries) and regional (e.g., NAFTA) 
agreements. With the difficulties presented in negotiating large, multilateral trade 
measures such as those contained within WTO agreements, nations may attempt to 
conduct more of these types of agreements either as temporary or permanent measures. 
Another area that merits watching is the drafting of soft laws either by a domestic or an 
international organization. The better a potential player is at monitoring these and other 
developments, the more opportunity the player will have at finding a policy window 
through which he or she may be able to enter the policy making process.  
The findings of this research also underscored the importance of action channels in 
attempting to influence the outcome of this policy issue. In order to have an opportunity 
to influence policy, access to relevant channels is essential. Again, potential actors should 
familiarize themselves thoroughly with the issue of higher education trade. They also 
should monitor developments to determine who has the authority for developing policy 
and, as a corollary, in which arena that development is to take place. As this study 
demonstrates, that authority is often an agency in the U.S. Executive Branch, where the 
policy may be already developed before any action is taken by Congress if, indeed, 
Congressional action is necessary at all. Access may be possible through involvement 
with a group or groups that have a direct action channel to federal policy makers. The 
advantage in such involvement is that actors have access to the collective expertise of 
those groups and the individuals comprising them. Of course, potential actors must be 
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certain that such groups actually have involvement in the same issue and share the same 
commitment to it. In the event such connection is not possible, other channels exist for 
involvement at some level. The U.S. Federal Register is one such avenue; it publishes 
notices for written public comment on proposed actions and/or legislation and also 
provides notices of public hearings that are to be held on certain policy issues. The closer 
a potential influencer is to the issuing authority, the greater is the chance for meaningful 
contact because secondary channels increase the chance that voice will be diluted or 
distorted in some manner. In addition, the potential for meaningful interaction in higher 
education trade policy appears to be greater if the actors present themselves as credible 
sources of information on the state of higher education and also conduct themselves in a 
collegial, diplomatic manner.  
Finally, potential players should be mindful of possible changes in authority and 
subsequent arena shifts that may necessitate changes in strategy. Such changes are all the 




Semi-Structured Interview Guide—“Authorities” 
 
The following questions are designed for those individuals who have formal positions within 
the WTO, the U.S. Office of the Trade Representative, or any other agency with formal 
involvement in developing U.S. higher education trade policy or with dealing with technical 
issues of GATS itself. 
 
Part I: Background
1. Ask source to establish his/her position at the time period being discussed by asking directly or 
confirming information from referral source. 
 
Part II: Overview of Policy Development
2. Invite source to describe, from his/her own perspective, how the U.S. positions on higher 
education and GATS were developed. Listen for who’s, how’s, where’s, when’s and why’s. 
 
Part III: Actions Taken by Source in the Context of His/Her Formal Position
3. What has been your role with regard to the WTO in general and GATS in particular?  
 
4. What specific actions have you taken with regard to this role that pertain to the inclusion of 
higher education trade policy? 
 
5. Did you initiate any of these actions? If so, which ones? 
(If answer to Question 5 is “no”) If you did not initiate the action, who did?  
 
Probes: Follow up questions to number 5 above 
a. Did these actions meet with any opposition? If so, from whom? 
i. Who did the resistors represent/speak for? 
ii. What positions did they take? 
iii. Was the issue a high priority item for them? 
 
b. How did the initiator/supporters of the actions try to build support for their position? 
i. Who was particularly effective? 
ii. Why? 
 
c. How did the opponents try to resist? What did they do to garner strength for their 
position? 
i. Who was particularly effective?  
ii. Why? 
 
d. How was the issue resolved? 
 
e. What compromises were needed to resolve the issue? 
 
Part IV: Actions Taken by Source Outside the Context of His/Her Formal Position 
6. What is your personal view with regard to the inclusion of higher education in GATS? 
 
7. Is this a high priority item for you? 
 
8. Have you done anything that reflects your personal view? If so, what? 
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Part V: Actions Taken by Other Individuals and Groups
9. Are you aware of actions taken by any other individuals or groups? If so, what? 
 
Probes: Follow up questions only if answer to Question 9 is “yes” 
a. What individuals or groups initiated that action? 
i. Whom did they represent? 
ii. What position(s) do they take on GATS and higher education? 
iii. Is it a high priority item for them? 
 
b. Who resisted or opposed that action? 
i. Whom did they represent? 
ii. What position(s) do they take on GATS and higher education? 
iii. Is it a high priority item for them? 
 
c. How did the supporters try to build support for their position? 
i. Who was particularly effective?  
ii. Why? 
 
d. How did opponents try to resist? How did they try to build support for their position? 
i. Who was particularly effective?  
ii. Why? 
 
e. How was the issue resolved? 
 
f. What compromises were needed to resolve the issue? 
 
Part VI: Additional Information That May Be Helpful
10. Is there anything else you would like me to know about this topic? 
a. Are there any questions that I did not ask you that I should have? 
b. To whom else should I talk to get additional information/perspectives? 
c. What documents and other materials might be helpful to me? 





Semi-Structured Interview Guide—“Partisans” 
 
The following questions are designed for individuals who do not work for the WTO or for any 
agency involved with formulating U.S. trade policy. 
 
Part I: Background
1. Ask source to establish his/her position at the time period being discussed by asking directly or 
confirming information from referral source. 
 
Part II: Overview of Policy Development
2. Invite source to describe, from his/her own perspective, how the U.S. positions on higher 
education and GATS were developed. Listen for who’s, how’s, where’s, when’s and why’s. 
 
Part III: Actions Taken by Agency and by Source in the Context of His/Her Formal 
Position
3. At what point were you or your agency made aware of the issue of higher education’s inclusion 
in GATS? 
 
4. What is your agency’s view with regard to the inclusion of higher education in GATS? 
 
5. Is this a high priority item for the agency? 
 
6. Has your agency taken any action with regard to its view regarding the inclusion of higher 
education in GATS? If so, what? 
 
Probes: Follow up questions to number 6 above 
a. Did you initiate any of these actions? If so, which ones? 
(If answer to “a” is “no”) If you did not initiate the action, who did?  
 
b. Did these actions meet with any opposition? If so, from whom? 
i. Who did the resistors represent/speak for? 
ii. What positions did they take? 
iii. Was the issue a high priority item for them? 
 
c. How did the initiator/supporters of the actions try to build support for their position? 
i. Who was particularly effective?  
ii. Why? 
 
d. How did the opponents try to resist? What did they do to garner strength for their 
position? 
i. Who was particularly effective?  
ii. Why? 
 
e. How was the issue resolved? 
 
f. What compromises were needed to resolve the issue? 
 
Part IV: Actions Taken by Source Outside the Context of His/Her Formal Position
7. What is your personal view with regard to the inclusion of higher education in GATS? 
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8. Is this a high priority item for you? 
 
9. Have you done anything that reflects your personal view? If so, what? 
 
Part V: Actions Taken by Other Individuals and Groups
10. Are you aware of actions taken by any other individuals or groups? If so, what? 
 
Probes: Follow up questions only if answer to Question 10 is “yes” 
a. What individuals or groups initiated that action? 
i. Whom did they represent? 
ii. What position(s) do they take on GATS and higher education? 
iii. Is it a high priority item for them? 
 
b. Who resisted or opposed that action? 
i. Whom did they represent? 
ii. What position(s) do they take on GATS and higher education? 
iii. Is it a high priority item for them? 
 
c. How did the supporters try to build support for their position? 
i. Who was particularly effective?  
ii. Why? 
 
d. How did opponents try to resist? How did they try to build support for their position? 
i. Who was particularly effective?  
ii. Why? 
 
e. How was the issue resolved? 
 
f. What compromises were needed to resolve the issue? 
 
Part VI: Additional Information That May Be Helpful
11. Is there anything else you would like me to know about this topic? 
a. Are there any questions that I did not ask you that I should have? 
b. To whom else should I talk to get additional information/perspectives? 
c. What documents and other materials might be helpful to me? 








World Trade and Higher Education:  The United States’ Experience with 
Development of Trade Policy in Higher Education under the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services 
Statement of Age 
of Subject 
I state that I am over 18 years of age, in good physical health, and wish to 
participate in a program of research being conducted by Laura Messenger, a 
doctoral student in the Department of Education Policy and Leadership at the 
University of Maryland, College Park, USA. 
Purpose The purpose of this research is to examine the United States’ experience in 
development of higher education trade policy as part of the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  
Procedures The procedures involve an interview with the researcher of approximately 45-60 
minutes in length. Interview questions regarding the inclusion of higher education 
in GATS may cover topics such as specific actions (either within or outside the 
context of my formal employment) I have taken; actions that other individuals or 
groups may have taken; and my personal views on the issue. Follow-up interviews 
may be requested by the researcher to clarify information during subsequent data 
collection and analysis. The interviews will be audio taped whenever possible. I 
understand that I have the option of not being audio taped and that, even if I agree 
to an audio taped interview, I may have the recording stopped at any time during 
the interview. I also understand that I will be asked to review my interview 
transcript and to add to or correct the contents as necessary.  
Confidentiality Because the research is being conducted in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for a doctor of philosophy degree, I understand that the information I provide may 
be shared with the researcher’s dissertation committee if requested by a committee 
member. In such cases, my name will not appear on any information forwarded to 
members of the committee. Otherwise, all non-public raw data I provide will be 
kept in a secure location under the custody of the researcher, and all audio tapes 
and other materials that could be used to identify me will be destroyed after 
completion of the study. I understand that the data I provide will be grouped with 
data others provide for reporting and presentation and that my name will not be 
used.  
Risks In the presentation of the findings, the researcher may choose to quote directly 
from a portion of my interview. Although my name will not be used in presentation 
of the results, I understand that there is a slight risk that readers may believe that 
they have discerned my identity despite the lack of information that would enable 
readers to confirm such speculation.  
Benefits, Freedom 
to Withdraw, and 
Ability to Ask 
Questions 
The study is not designed to help me personally, but to help the researcher learn 
about the process and the influence patterns that exist in the United States’ efforts 
to develop its higher education trade policy in the context of GATS. I am free to ask 





Laura C. Messenger 
19, rue de Bâle 




Betty L. Malen, Ph.D. 
(dissertation committee chair) 
Dept. of Educ. Policy/Leadership 
University of Maryland, College 
Park 







If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or wish to report a 
research-related injury, please contact the Institutional Review Board Office, 
University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, 20742 USA; (e-mail) 
irb@deans.umd.edu; (telephone) 1-301-405-4212 





Note: Original form was signed and dated by participant on both pages, which were numbered “Page 1 of 
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